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Company-Battalion size & how long to unload an AP


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#1 William Betts

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Posted 07 March 2010 - 12:26 PM

Two questions,1. On chart 10B for Amphibious Assault there is a listing for Company and Battalion. How many troops are in each? When I googled it I get anywhere from 60-250 for a company and 300-1000 for a battalion.2. In the extended campaign it says it takes a full 8hr turn to unload a ship anchored off shore. The AP's come in 3 sizes 2,3 or 5K worth of troops. Does it take 8hr for any of these? (I'm thinking Guadalcanal after operation Watchtower)Thanks, Bill

#2 William Betts

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Posted 09 March 2010 - 11:59 AM

Answered my own question. In GQ2 there is a GQ1 supplement including Amphibious Operations.1. Company = 200 men. So a Battalion would be 800.2. Unloading 6 companies took 4hrs so I could work out some kind of ratio for 2,3 or 5K.After reading through GQ 1 & 2 again, I am amazed how well the 35year old rule set stands up.

#3 Lonnie Gill

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Posted 11 March 2010 - 09:21 AM

Thanks for the complement Bill,It is pleasing to see that the old GQ 1 and 2 rules hold up pretty well, considering they were written over thirty years ago - when much less data was available.To further answer your question, the typical assault company was in the 150 - 200 man range. Hence, the listing of four LCVPs (one platoon or about 36 men each) needed for a company in GQ III rule Section 4.10.4. The LCI(L) was designed to carry and unload one company . Battalions were generally in the 800 - 1,000 man range, with 800 being more typical for the assault elements. The tail portion was often landed later. One can go into a great more detail, but these ranges are representative of US practice, which accounted for the majority of amphibious assaults in WW II. I fear I may have led you astray in rule Section 4.10.4 as it indicates a landing requires an eight hour Extended Campaign Turn. That is for the overall landing, not the time needed to unload an individual ship. You correctly went beyond that to consider the time for individual ships if one wants to break the assault down into one hour Campaign Turns. Amphibious assault ships, of course, were designed to be able to unload much more quickly than merchant cargo ships and passenger liners and did not need port facilities or supplemental equipment. If you'd like to explore this in more detail, the Osprey book US World War II Amphibious Tactics by Gordon L. Rottman provides an easy, but quite useful summary of the equipment, procedures and tactics.LONNIE

#4 William Betts

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Posted 12 March 2010 - 04:45 PM

Thanks Lonnie,I'm trying to cobble together a 3 month campaign for Guadalcanal after Watchtower using GQ3 campaign rules. I'm just getting the operational rules down including supplying the forces already landed. (19,000 troops?). I don't plan on tactically landing supplies with LCI(l)'s but the AP, APD, AK will certainly be there for surface or air to attack. Using GQ2 an AK can supply 18 companies (approx 3600 men) for two weeks and takes 12 hours to unload.Right now converting a "division slice" to a company or batallion level in GQ 3 is getting the best of me. If I understand a "division slice" the 19,000 on Guad. would equal a division more or less so I would need 10,000t mixed and 1250t POL per WEEK as per chart 10 B Military Cargo. (per month figure divided by 4 to get a week). This total allows "Hold Position" so should be considered adequate supply.

#5 Lonnie Gill

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Posted 18 March 2010 - 06:13 PM

Bill,Down with a stomach bug, but wanted to get you an initial reply.Guadalcanal presents a complex case that differs in many ways from the general “division slice” MILITARY CARGO table provided on Chart 10B. First of all, less than a division was originally landed (IIRC, a little less than 17,000 men, but later increased) in combat requirements quite different from those in other areas of the world. While the ground fighting was incredibly intense, it was primarily infantry combat at close range and on foot, involving less artillery and vehicle usage than in Europe or the Med. That all translates to differences in tonnage. Further, the Marines got past severe initial shortfalls by using Japanese supplies and food stores and tightening their belts in ways American troops were not expected to endure. To get a better feel of how all this compares with the general “division slice” presented on the table would be worth some time spent reading parts of Richard Frank’s Guadalcanal and/or Morison’s Vol. V, The Struggle for Guadalcanal.Second, the logistics requirements at the “Canal” involved supplying both ground troops and an active airfield. These are treated separately on the MILITARY CARGO table on chart 10B and you would want to consider them separately in your campaign. Ground defense of the airfield and keeping it supplied with the gas and bombs needed to make it effective are two different aspects of the tactical challenge. A Japanese opponent may choose to attack either or both of these. You would want to reflect that in your campaign.Finally, the MILITARY CARGO table reflects the cargo needed for a “typical” division (the average at Guadalcanal more or less) for one month. Therefore it would require one fourth, or 5,000 tons mixed cargo and 1,250 tons of POL per week, to “hold positions.” Similarly, it would take 1,250 tons of mixed cargo plus 2˝ tons of POL per aircraft flight to keep the “Cactus” airfield operating for a week. As mentioned above, you will probably want to research the special conditions at Guadalcanal to see if these should be adjusted.The CARGO table on chart 10B provides average cargo capacities for different types of ships. Note also the cargo capacity of APDs, which the Americans made considerable use of to keep the airfield supplied. This can include both mixed and POL cargo. [The table does not list POL separately as that was not a normal APD cargo.]Hopefully, these generalized logistics aspects and a little research will enable you to add this key determinant to your campaign without creating an involved logistics bookkeeping process.LONNIE

#6 William Betts

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Posted 21 March 2010 - 02:21 PM

Lonnie,I've read Lundstrom's 1st Team Guadalcanal Campaign so I have a few ideas on the air side and a basic understanding of the ground side as far as supply goes. Certainly the operational side of the campaign for the U.S. will focus on supplying Guad. The Japanese will focus on landing troops, supply and bombardment. The tactical situations should happen as a result.I do want to keep bookkeeping to a minimum but supply levels will have to be the central theme. Thanks for the book recommendations they are appreciated!One of the things in the "Guad. Campaign" that caught my attention was the fact, once the radars (3?) were installed there was no longer a need for a standing CAP. So in game terms this adds a special cargo (radar) to be delivered with a benefit of less fuel needed per flight at Guad and a die roll modifier for CAP interception once the radar is delivered and installed.Thanks again for the suggestions,Bill

#7 Lonnie Gill

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Posted 18 April 2010 - 01:18 PM

Bill,Sounds like some interesting ideas. I hope you will give us a status report to let us know how the campaign works out. It sounds like you can tie your ideas in with The Solomons Campaign, which has inovative systems for streamlined mission planning and force allocation. Combining your ideas with TSC should be a winner. So, let us know how it works out!LONNIE




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