Savo Island Again
It was 2400 hours the night of 7-8 August 1942. Vice Admiral Mikawa with a scratch force was exiting “the Slot” heading towards Savo Island some 15 nautical miles away to the south east at 27 knots. Furutaka had experienced some engine problems, but her black gang had solved them. The force was now moving at the fastest speed that Mikawa felt could be maintained by all eight of his ships and still maintain station. Mikawa led in Chokai (FF); followed by the 6th Cruiser Squadron (Rear Admiral Goto), Aoba (SF), Kinugasa, Furutaka and Kaku; the 18th Cruiser Sqaudron (Rear Admiral Matsuyama), Tenyru (SF), Yubari and the destroyer Yunagi (the latter two attached from the 6th Destroyer Flotilla). Five heavy cruisers, four of them old and weak, two older light cruisers and an aging destroyer comprised the force.
Aerial reconnaissance had given Mikawa the general layout of Allied shipping in Savo Sound but of course he would have to discover their exact locations for himself. Mikawa placed less trust in the “Airdales” claims of having pasted the anchorage at Laguna Point to the point of extinction. Mikawa intended to see for himself and correct any inaccurate Allied ship status with torpedoes and gunfire. Mikawa kept his two cruiser squadrons behind him in line astern while he swung to the south until he was past the southern entrance to Savo Sound when he would swing in towards Guadalcanal and try to use land shadow to make detecting his force more difficult. Mikawa intended to avoid any screening forces and press on to the reported anchorage at Laguna Point. Mikawa would look, see and decide what to do at that point.
The Allies had landed most of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal and Tulagi islands on 7 August but their supplies and heavy equipment was still on the transports, cargo ships and modified flush deck destroyers in their anchorages off Laguna Point (Guadalcanal Island) and Tulagi Island. There were fifteen such ships at Laguna Point and ten more off Tulagi. They were at anchor awaiting daylight to finish off loading and as such ripe targets for torpedoes. Rear Admiral Turner in the McCawley at anchor off Laguna Point had split his six destroyers between the two anchorages evenly and they were patrolling each anchorage’s perimeter at twelve knots.
Rear Admiral Crutchley (R.N.) in command of the covering forces had split his cruisers into three groups (northern, southern and eastern) to cover all three entrances to Savo Sound.
The Northern Task Group (three heavy cruisers) under Captain Riefkohl in Vincennes, Astoria and Qunicy, screened by the destroyers Wilson and Helm were assigned to a 12,000 yard patrol box guarding the northern entrance to Savo Sound. The destroyer Ralph Talbot picketed the northern entrance outside the sound in a 15,000 yard race track patrol pattern.
The Southern Task Group (3 heavy cruisers) under Crutchley himself in Australia, Canberra and Chicago, screened by destroyers Patterson and Bagley guarded the southern entrance on a 21,000 yard race track patrol pattern. The destroyer Blue picketed the southern entrance outside the sound in a 15,000 race track patrol pattern.
The Eastern Task Group (1 light cruiser & 1 AA cruiser) under Rear Admiral Scott (U.S.N.) in Hobart and San Juan, screened by destroyers Monssen and Buchanan patrolled east of the anchorages in a north/south 30,000 yard race track pattern.
Crutchley was summoned to a command conference aboard the McCawley and took the Australia with him leaving Captain Bode in command of the southern task group. Crutchley intended to return but was delayed to almost 2400 hours and decided not to risk trying to rejoin his task group in the dark. Bode in Chicago did not take the lead over Canberra and that left the two cruisers in line ahead instead of line astern and would complicate Bode’s attempts at command if engaged.
In the event none of the Allied ships (including the damaged destroyer Jarvis at anchor off Savo Island) along Mikawa’s chosen path saw or detected his ships while Mikawa saw all of them and decided to leave them well enough alone while he proceeded towards his objective. At 0200 hours Mikawa acquired the Australia at anchor; Chokai and Aoba fired their port side torpedoes at her at 19,000 yards. At 0212 hours Australia finally detected Mikawa’s column and got under way. Australia was moving at five knots when six long lance torpedoes missed her just astern (one more turn and she takes 2 hits). Chokai’s remaining two torpedoes missed ahead of Australia. Mikawa had closed to 8,000 yards before Australia detected his ships and Australia fired star shell to illuminate the contact.
Australia engaged Kaku (knocking out a turret, her searchlights and hitting her in the hull) as she sailed under Australia’s star shell while all five Japanese heavy cruisers fired on Australia (knocking out both her fore turrets and hitting her in the hull). Mikawa pressed on towards the anchorage while Australia continued on an opposite course. Australia hit Kaku in the hull again and the Japanese return fire knocked out another turret, caused more hull damage, jammed her rudder to port and knocked her bridge out. Australia would repair her rudder immediately and sail out of contact because she could not turn at that point and Mikawa had decided to make the transports his priority.
Crutchley just prior to the bridge hit had summoned all the various groups to Laguna Point to repel Mikawa’s assault. Scott and the Eastern Task Group happened to be approaching the southern end of their patrol pattern when they saw Kaku illuminated by Australia’s fire and at the same time they sighted Chokai at 8,000 yards. Buchanan’s torpedoes proved to be duds. Mikawa turned his guns on Scott’s column while his five heavy cruisers fired their starboard torpedoes at the ships (mostly at the five destroyer minesweepers) anchored off Laguna Point. The Japanese torpedoes hit and sank Hopkins, damaged Fuller, Hovey and Barnett. Japanese gun fire missed Hobart and Hobart’s rapid return fire knocked out Chokai’s fore turret. Fire from destroyers Monssen and Buchanan bounced off Chokai.
Monssen, Hobart and San Juan all fired torpedoes at the Japanese cruiser line while the Japanese continued to fire torpedoes at the anchored transports. Monssen got a hit on Kinugasa while the rest missed. The Japanese torpedoes sank Alhena, Hunter Leggit, Zane and damaged President Adams. Hobart had to change her fire to Aoba and hit her knockng out a turret. Other Allied fire was ineffective while Japanese fire was not much better.
At this point the three Laguna Point picket destroyers, Selfridge, Mugford and Henley acquired the Japanese cruiser line and turned for a gap in it as did Scott’s column. San Juan was hit by a torpedo from Furutaka which reduced her to 10 knots. Hobart crossed Aoba’s stern at 500 yards and her rapid fire hit Aoba 10 times which coupled with a hit from Buchanan sank her outright. Rapid fire from Selfridge and Mugford at 1,500 yards knocked out Furutaka’s rear turret and caused other damage. Chokai damaged Henley’s hull and fire from Tenryu and Yubari caused some damage to the transports. Kaku and Aoba hit Hobart hard damaging 2 bulkheads and other hull damage that would sink her when she failed to repair them.
Selfridge, Mugford, Henley and San Juan (set at long range) fired 28 torpedoes expecting a Japanese turn towards Tulagi. All the torpedoes missed when the Japanese continued straight ahead. Tenryu, Yubari and Yunagi fired torpedoes at the transports sinking Fuller, Hovey, damaging McCawley, Southard and Bellatrix.
By 0248 hours Bode had reversed course in response to Crutchley’s command and was approaching engagement range. Meanwhile Monssen, Buchanan followed by Selfridge, Mugford and Henley continued to closely engage Chokai, Kinugasa and Furutaka giving and receiving damage. The rapid fire of the destroyers coupled with luck over the next eighteen minutes blew the Chokai up and sank the Kinugasa and Furutaka while Monssen was disabled; Selfridge, Mugford and Henley were damaged.
Chicago and Canberra in twelve minutes knocked out all Kaku’s armament and reduced her to 5 knots without any damage in return. San Juan knocked out all of Yubari’s armament and wiped out her bridge.
Rear Admiral Matsuyama having expended his torpedoes turned Tenryu and Yunagi for Rabaul and escaped while the Allies finished off Kaku and Yubari. All fighting had died out by 0330 hours.
The Japanese had sunk the light cruiser Hobart; APA Fuller, Hunter Leggit; AK Alhena, DMS Hovey and Hopkins. The Japanese also crippled the heavy cruiser Australia; AA cruiser San Juan; APA McCawley, Barnett, President Adams; AK Bellatrix and DMS Southard. Also damaged were destroyers Selfridge, Mugford, Henley, Monssen and Buchanan. In return the Japanese lost the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka and Kaku as well as the light cruiser Yubari. Mikawa seriously damaged the Allied effort to supply the Marines on Guadalcanal inflicting a 31 VP loss on the Allies, but suffered a loss of 30 VP in return.
I had the Japanese pre-plot their course, formation and speed to their self-determined objective (Laguna Point Anchorage). I then determined the exact start location of each Allied ship(s) but did not inform the Japanese player or place the ships on the table. Instead the Japanese player followed his plotted course with me keeping track of his location and having the Japanese and Allied players roll for acquisition or detection as appropriate. The game moved very quickly and no ships were placed on the table until turn 21 when the Japanese tried to torpedo Australia.
I also restricted the Allies to their pre-plots until they either detected, acquired, successfully responded to a contact report or received an order from admirals Crutchley or Scott. The Allies to respond to a contact report had to roll 1-5 on a d12. Crutchley or Scott could not give an order to their forces not in contact until they themselves had detected, acquired or successfully responded to a contact report. Even then Allied forces not in contact had to pre-plot a course and speed to where ever they had been ordered to or decided to go to and could not change that until they complied with the restrictions that had allowed them to leave their original pre-plot. In addition ships without TBS (Australia, Canberra, Hobart & Chicago) could only communicate by wireless and I imposed a GT delay to such messages.
I made the Allies fire with half their dice when firing at a target the first time. All Allied detection and acquisition DR were made with 2 d12. I was trying to keep the Allies as confused and blind as I could make them, DRs allowing until they were directly in contact.
The Japanese chose not employ submarines as they realized they would need to spend more time south of Savo to achieve their objectives. The Japanese plan was working right up to the point when their gunnery and torpedo dice went stone cold. This allowed 3 Allied cruisers and 5 destroyers who were never all engaged at one time to completely out shoot the 7 Japanese cruisers and 1 destroyer. We all had fun and we all agreed that we have explored Savo enough for now. We are moving on to GT1 in TSC now with AARs to come.
