10 replies to this topic

[W. Clark]

Badung Strait-19 February 1942

           

We had our first face to face game in over a year. There were only three of us so, we wanted a small scenario. We are also involved in playing the “Defending the Malay Barrier” campaign so we wanted a scenario related to the campaign. We turned to the Dutch Supplement and selected Badung Strait.

 

Time: 2200 hours       Moon: Full      Wind: Force 2 from the East.             Squalls: None

Max Visibility: 20,000 yards 

 

It was a moon lit night and Rear Admiral Randy Miles (aka Doorman) was on the bridge of his flagship HrMs De Ruyter. HrMs Java trailed him astern and a mixed Dutch and American destroyer division comprised of HrMs Piet Hein, USS John D. Ford and USS Pope followed Java.

A second Allied group consisting of HrMs Tromp and the American destroyers, USS John D. Edwards, USS Stewart, USS Pillsbury and USS Parrott was about 2 to 3 hours behind.

 

The Japanese had landed a battalion of their 48^th Infantry Division on Bali and Allied LBA had bombed the landing force and caused some damage. Doorman’s mission was to finish what the Airedales had started and sink any Japanese shipping in the Strait.

 

The ABDA Force was heading NE and steaming at 25 knots with the cruiser division in line ahead with their destroyer division behind them in a column. They had been heading NE for about 30 minutes in the Strait when lookouts on De Ruyter (could see 6, 000 yards) and Piet Hein (could see 8,000 yards) both acquired what turned out to be two destroyers on their port quarter. Doorman called for full speed and a change of course to port to close when 2 torpedoes struck USS Pope and 3 more struck USS John D. Ford sinking both destroyers within 3 minutes.

 

De Ruyter struck back and hit the lead destroyer (Oshio) setting her afire. Return fire from Oshio bounced ineffectively off DeRuyter. Java could not see anything but Piet Hein opened on the second Japanese destroyer (Arashio). Java now able to see the burning Oshio joined De Ruyter in pummeling her with 5.9”. Oshio’s return fire was smothered under the deluge 5.9” and her speed dropped while she continued to burn. Oshio was also illuminated by many smaller fires from the cruiser fire.

 

Piet Hein traded shots with Arashio and suffered for it. First was a hit in her engineering (which she repaired immediately) and then a bulkhead which took 6 minutes to repair. Arashio was also suffering when Java joined in. Arashio now on fire with her guns being ruthlessly silenced slowly lost speed. Java also suffered a bulkhead hit.

 

Piet Hein finally saw what the Allies were there for; the Sagami Maru chugging along at 10 knots. Piet Hein having lost her forward torpedo mount continued to close the range smothering the Sagami Maru’s lone 3” and damaging a bulkhead. Sagami Maru had gone dead in the water and the two Japanese destroyers were not far from it but refused to give up the fight.

 

Captain Robert Bishopsan had fought gallantly, making moral twice but Asashio and Michishio (while approaching) were too far away to intervene in time to save the valiant captain or his crews.

 

We called it an Allied victory and ended it there.

 

[simanton]

Definitely an improvement over the historical result for the Allies!

[W. Clark]

It was the equivalent hits ratio for the 5.9" of 1.5 to 1 vs DDs. Every 2 hits was 3 hits and they were hot and getting 2 to 3 hits a GT. And that gave a DD an EDR fire every time it happened. The DDs had other damage like real fires, engineering hits and bulkheads to fix. Pretty soon they both had 3 or 4 EDR fires going at any one time. So they stayed illuminated until the sea extinguished the fires. 

The only thing that dragged it out besides the Japanese passing morale time and again was that the Dutch could not seem to get the extra hit when it was 50-50.

 

The Japanese morale would not break. The Dutch could not understand why they would not strike given that they had no guns or TT and as they were all but DIW, ramming was out also. But it was the guy they saw trying to fix a Samurai sword onto the bow of Oshio that scared them.

 

It started out so promising for the Japanese, but they took out the wrong ships. We are all rusty and I think they just set their torps at the wrong angle and ended up with browning shots at the tail of the ABDA column. It would have been so different if they had taken out the cruisers.

[W. Clark]

The other issue for the Japanese was that when they got a hit on the cruisers they needed a second hit to guarantee it. They of course rolled with a 50-50 chance to get that hit confirmed but only succeeded once with Java (her damaged bulkhead). They never finished landing a hit on De Ruyter as she pummeled Oshio repeatedly. My reading of the historical fight leads me to believe that the cruisers failed to hit at all in their run by the anchorage. The cruisers' failure to soften up the opposition meant that Piet Hein, John D. Ford and Pope got more than they had bargained when they engaged the Japanese destroyers.

 

In this case that was completely reversed. The Japanese had opened the engagement with multiple torpedo hits but their gunnery was ineffective compared to the Dutch and it cost them the fight.

[healey36]

Nice, thorough accounting of the action.

 

The "multi-cultural" nature of these early fights in the southwest Pacific have always fascinated me, Language, protocol, and doctrinal differences, not to mention competing national priorities, must have made things difficult, although based on most accounts one reads, there doesn't seem to have been many that manifested. Dutch, British, American, and Australian forces, all operating in, or attempting to operate in, a closely coordinated operation seems a tall order, yet it apparently was done in a relatively effective manner (or do I have this all wrong). One is left to wonder how many prewar exercises were conducted, if any, to lay the "groundwork" for such operations in those early months.

 

One mate has been over to the house of late, but otherwise it's still a solo effort. After playing around with Möwe for a few weeks, we've been kicking around a WWI commerce-raider-versus-convoy scenario, something that rarely, if ever, occurred. At least we get more than two ships on the table.

 

Today's project...go find some gas for the mower. Apparently it's starting to run short in supply around here.

 

Healey

[W. Clark]

Admiral Hart wanted to concentrate the ABDA Flot and go hunting Japanese. The Brits wanted to reinforce Singapore and needed naval escorts from the ABDA to get the troop convoys to Singapore (where of course they added to the POW bag when it fell). The Dutch wanted to defend every where (And of course he who defends everything, defends nothing.). So between the convoy escorts and dashing hither and thither and yon to forestall invasions that had already occurred and getting bombed by LBA the whole time the ABDA was whittled down from 2 CAs, 10 CLs, 11 modern and 18 old DDs to the 2 CAs (Houston had her rear turret bombed out), 3 CLs, 5 modern DDs and 4 old DDs that fought at Java Sea. Even then the ABDA was not totally concentrated as there was 3 CLs and 2 old DDs deployed to defend Batavia. There was also some other DDs about but I don't have a good handle on them.

 

The air coordination was bungled. There was no common signal book. But most of all there was no pre-war conversation between the ABDA powers about the Japanese problem and what to do about it. Each of them approached the problem in their own way. So, they tried to pull it together on the fly, failed and got slaughtered for it.

 

The Dutch Navy had been concerned about Japan's intentions towards the DEI since at least 1908. They asked for 8 dreadnoughts armed with 14" in 1912 but that got talked to death in the legislature until WWI started and made it impossible. After the war the Navy started up with their concerns about the Japanese again. But by this time the Politicos realized that there were Japanese who saw Russian territories in the far east as being an alternative to the DEI. The Dutch were buddies with everyone (after a fashion), but no one liked the Bolsheviks. Japan could take from them and not disturb the Brits and the Americans. Why would the Japanese risk war with Great Britain and the US (the two largest navies) to take the DEI when they could get the resources they needed from the Russians and maybe even get applauded for it.

 

There was no need to build an expensive fleet to defend the DEI or even maintain the cruisers they had. And the Japanese with their belligerence towards the Russians gave them the evidence that they needed to convince themselves that what they wanted was what was happening. And the Japanese kept giving the Dutch that evidence right up Khalkin-Gol. The Russians had handed the Japanese their heads and the Northern Resource Area was off the table.

 

All the sudden the Dutch start doing what the their Navy has been asking for 30 years. They refit Java and lay down the replacement cruisers for the Java class. They lay down a new quartet of larger, better armed destroyers and lo and behold they start looking for capital ships. Why, did they suddenly have a naval moment and an urge to build ships. No, they realized the DEI were next on the plate and there was no longer an alternative.

 

But 30 years of putting off defense spending, of kicking the can down the road came to an end. They were never honest with themselves about the world they lived in. They went to Germany for capital ships. A Germany run by Mr. Hitler who was on public record both in writing and verbally. Hitler had said and had published the fact that he despised the Dutch for sitting out WWI and that if it was up to him they would not be allowed to do it again. Hitler meant every word and proved it on 10 May 1940 when he invaded Holland. The Scharnhorst knock-offs were a ruse. Hitler intended to conquer the Dutch, not arm them.

[healey36]

Okay, so my impression that "it apparently was done in a relatively effective manner" is greatly misplaced. That would make sense to me, as there seemed to be too many competing priorities amongst the Allied "operators", and we all know how this ended after a few months. Any ABDA operational/tactical successes would then seem to only prolong the inevitable (which may have very well been the point). 

[W. Clark]

Because the Allies had not bothered to talk with one another prior to Japan's attack about what they all feared was coming; it took too long to form the ABDA. There are a lot of reasons why that occurred. Some of it is because the Dutch were playing diplomatic footsie with the Germans. That gave the Japanese a head start that the Allies were not able to catch up to.

 

In DTMB game terms the Allies each have 1 CD selection per GT that they can not share out, nor can they combine ships in a CD mission until the ABDA forms on 16 January (or GT3 of a 6 GT campaign). The Dutch and ANZACs (and the bulk of the Americans) don't show up until GT2. That gives the Allies 2 CDs on GT1 to the Japanese 8 (4 each for the WAF & EAF) but without the strength (the Brit and American cruisers combined only have 16 non-rapid firing D12 to the Japanese 50 D12 8" dice and I'm not going to bother with the disparity between their destroyers) to contest the Japanese moves with a realistic expectation of success. Of course that excludes any detachment for Singapore convoy escorts (a 1-5 on a D12 on GT 1 & 2) that could take as many as 3 cruisers and up to 6 destroyers per Allied base (Singapore, Batavia, Surabaya and Darwin).

 

Now the Allied player(s) in DTMB are no where near as bad off as their historical counter parts were. For play balance they have been given the entire ANZAC Squadron. That adds the CAs Australia and Canberra as well as the New Zealand CLs Leander and Achilles to the Australian CLs Perth and Hobart. That gives them 8 D12 (8") and 16 rapid firing D12 (6") concentrated in one base as of GT2. But they have no destroyers and can not sortie on their own. So the Allies (specifically the Brits and Americans) need to transfer DDs to them. 

 

In addition to the ANZACs the Allies can take reinforcements (that cost them a CD and VP) that they essentially shanghai from convoy escorts. These consist of HMS Mauritius (GT2) and USS Phoenix (GT4). In addition to that there are theater events (very low odds of occurring) that give the Allies the use of a ship for one GT only. These are USS Pensacola (GT2) and HMS Emerald (GT3). Of course if they get the TE reinforcement then they were not plagued with Singapore convoy escorts.

 

The campaign generally follows history in that the Allies will find it very difficult to contest the Japanese advance for the first four GT. The Allies can seldom concentrate before GT5 (Singapore along with Batavia tends to fall on GT4). So its comes down to who wins when the Japanese try to take Surabaya. Or who wins Java Sea if you will.

 

But that is the game. Historically IMHO the Allies were beat before they got started and then the internal politics of the alliance just exacerbated their situation. I believe Admiral Hart was right. The Allies needed to concentrate their strength and take it to the Japanese. But I also do not believe that saves the DEI even if wildly successful. The Japanese just regroup send in the carriers and put paid to the ABDA because it has neither the AA or air cover needed to survive that kind and magnitude of air attack.

[healey36]

In DTMB game terms, what is a "CD"? 

[Dave Franklin]

Healey36,

 

A CD is a "Command Decision", or in other words a naval mission.  In DTMB these are Carrier Groups (CG), Patrols (P), Sweeps (S) and Convoys ©.

 

Dave

[healey36]

Thanks for the clarification, Dave. I'll have to round up a copy of DTMB, as I have great interest in the mechanics employed in transitioning between situations at the operational and tactical scales, and how search is handled conceptually (if included).

 

Paul