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Action Off Koepang


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#1 W. Clark

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Posted 31 August 2021 - 06:04 AM

Action off Koepang

0400 hours     Rear Admiral Doorman (RNN) was on the bridge of his flagship HrMs Haarlem. She and her sister panzerschiffs, Delft and Maastricht were Holland’s newest and most powerful cruisers. They were looking for a fight, their first. Doorman was tired, he had been on his bridge all night while his striking force searched for a Japanese invasion convoy apparently targeted at Koepang. But he was also happy. He had been trying to put together a striking force for two weeks now, but convoy escort requirements for Singapore had taken most of his and his allies’ ships.

 

Now he led the three Dutch cruisers followed by the USN’s Task Force 5 and its three cruisers as well as seven of his destroyers and one American. There were to have been four, but two had been unable to sortie because of mechanical faults. The third had suffered hull damage from a near miss from an LBA attack yesterday and had to return to Surabaya. Surabaya, where Doorman had transferred his ships to get away from Batavia and the constant requirements for convoy escort.

 

Doorman’s plan was simple. He would lead his cruiser column past the Japanese convoy shooting up what ever he could. Then his destroyers would finish whatever was left with torpedoes. He had not idea what he was facing. The reports had been all over the place, claiming battleships of all things. He would find out when he found the convoy and deal with whatever there was.

 

Rear Admiral Glassford was on the bridge of USS Houston leading Task Force 5; or at least its cruisers (Boise and Marblehead). The Alden was his only destroyer. He had brought four, but Edsall and Whipple had broken down and the John D. Edwards had taken hull damage from a near by a bomb and returned to Surabaya. He could not see much. The moon state was a quarter and it was dark out there. Glassford had his doubts about Admiral Doorman’s plan or at least as much as he had been able to understand from the explanation the Dutch liaison officer had given in halting English. His ability to communicate with the Flag was impaired by their lack of common signals and the fact that everything had to translated from Dutch into a doubtful English. Glassford sighed, may God have pity on a poor sailorman on nights like this one.

 

The Striking Forces’ heading was 315 degrees at 25 knots. They had a date with destiny and were impatient to meet it. The seas were rough with a Force 7 southerly blowing 30 knots and 25 knots was all the destroyers could make. They had just cleared a squall and the sky was now clear above them and Koepang was ahead.

 

Rear Admiral Tanaka surveyed the scene around him. The convoy was at anchor off Koepang and troops were landing. He led the battlecruisers Kongo and Haruna in his flagship Jintsu as well as his DesDiv 15 (4 Kagero class) in a race track pattern some 9,000 yards out to sea to cover the landing at 15 knots. His other DesDiv (16 with 4 Kagero class) was 7,000 yards closer and doing the same at 10 knots. Tanaka knew there were Allied warships at sea and that they were probably searching for his convoy. The Airedales had reported two different groups of cruisers and destroyers, one out of Surabaya and one out of Darwin.

The visibility was 17,000 yards but neither side could see that far. At 0448 hours Haarlem’s masthead reported a ship ahead bearing 4 points to port and heading 90 degrees. Doorman signaled a 4 point turn to starboard in succession. The masthead reported no change in the ship’s heading or speed and there was another very large ship behind the first. Doorman was nonplussed by the report of a very large ship. Could the report of battleships be true? He would like to torpedo an enemy sailing in a straight line and blind, but the sea state made that an unlikely result at this range and he thought he was a bit too far out in any case. The masthead report of a second very large ship behind the first two confirmed in Doorman’s mind that the Japanese had brought battleships with them. He wanted to torpedo them but realistically he needed to get inside 5,500 yards to have any chance of a hit at all in this sea state. Doorman could not make up his mind and all the while the range was closing, they were in 10,000 yards then within 9,000.

 

Doorman could not wait anymore. He ordered his destroyers to fire star shell to illuminate the enemy line that now comprised a cruiser leading 2 battleships and followed by 4 destroyers. At 0512 hours the 7 Dutch destroyers and after a small delay the Alden fired star shell. Wonder of wonders the American star shells (they must be from the last war) went off as five of his destroyer’s star shell; the rest were duds. The star shells illuminated a light cruiser, two Kongo class battleships, the lead destroyer and the trailing destroyer. Doorman ordered his cruisers to fire at their opposite numbers upon their target being illuminated. Correspondingly, Haarlem fired at the cruiser while Delft and Maastricht each targeted a Kongo. Houston fired at the lead destroyer, Boise the second, but Marblehead missed out the non-illuminated destroyers and fired at the trailing destroyer. The Japanese opened at the same time on the Allied destroyers now seeing them because of them firing the star shell. The result was that Allied cruisers were not engaged during their first salvos.

 

Haarlem scored 4 hits on the light cruiser (later determined to be Jintsu.  Two of the hits were amidships, there was an explosion and two fires started. The third hit was fore and the third also amidship. The cruiser staggered. Delft hit the lead battleship (Kongo) once in the area of her secondary. Maastricht hit the second battleship (Haruna) four times. Three of them were amidship and started 2 fires; the other was in the hull. Houston hit the lead destroyer (later determined to be Natsushio) twice; once forward and the in the hull. Boise firing rapidly with her radar scored 15 hits on the second destroyer. Boise blanketed the destroyer amidships, but did not neglect either end of the ship either. The ship (later determined to be Hayashio) staggered out of line, all fire ceased and she went DIW and appeared to settle a bit. Marblehead hit the trailing destroyer (later determined to Oyashio) once forward. Japanese return fire was ineffective.

The Jintsu hit Evertsen once in her hull. Kongo and Haruna’s secondaries were ineffective at this point as were the Japanese destroyers. The Jintsu was now illuminated by a fire amidship and another smaller fire. Haruna was illuminated by the fires amidships and another smaller fire. Hayashio was illuminated by 5 small fires. Japanese search lights from Jintsu, Kongo and the 4 destoyers now came on and illuminated Haarlem, Delft, Houston, Bosie, Marblehead and Evertsen missing out Maastricht.

Haarlem now firing her secondaries as well completely whiffed at Jintsu. Delft hit Kongo thrice; in the hull and forward as well in her top. Maastricht hit Haruna thrice also; forward and twice in the hull. Houston missed with her MB but hit firing rapidly with her secondaries hit Natsushio thrice; forward, midships and in the hull. Boise still firing rapidly hit Natsushio thrice; sinking her. Marblehead having realized her mistake changed to the third destroyer (Kuroshio) and hit her thrice; twice amidships and in the hull. The Dutch destroyers now all engaged Oyashio as Alden continued to illuminate her. Firing rapidly, they collectively hit her five times; four times in the hull and at her stern. Oayashio staggered out of line.

 

Haarlem again whiffed at Jintsu. But Delft hit Kongo 6 times; Twice forward and four times amidships. Kongo’s fire was cut in half. Maastricht hit Haruna once in the secondary. Houston hit Natsushio four times; two each with her 8” and secondaries. Natsushio was only firing from her aft mount and her hull had taken serious damage. Boise still firing rapidly shifted to Kuroshio and hit her six times; Twice in the stern causing 2 fires, twice amidship causing an explosion and another fire, once forward and in her hull. Kuroshio staggered out of line still firing from her aft mount. Marblehead’s fire was ineffective. The Dutch destroyers continued to gang up on Oyashio hitting her 6 times; three were amidship causing an explosion and a fire, three were in her hull and she also staggered out of line firing only from her aft gun mount. Japanese return fire was ineffective. By now all the surviving Japanese ships had several small fire besides larger ones and were illuminated by them. The Japanese put some of the larger fires out but continued to burn. Natsushio now sank.

 

Doorman starting to feel that he had this in hand when 4 more Japanese destroyers appeared to port. Doorman ordered his destroyers to take them on while he finished what he had started with the first group of Japanese ships.

 

Haarlem hit Jintsu twice in the hull. Delft hit Kongo once and caused another fire. Maastricht hit Haruna once and reduced her to her aft turret. Houston lacking a target now fired on Haruna and hit her once causing minor hull damage. Boise firing rapidly Oyashio hit her 8 times; once amidships causing an explosion and a fire, knocking out her last gun, five in the hull. Oyashio went DIW and began to sink. Marblehead’s fire was ineffective. Evertsen fired at the leading destroyer (Yukikaze) of the new comers and hit her once knocking out her forward gun mount. Van Ghent and Van Nes fired at Tokitsukaze and missed. Banckert and Kortenaer fired at Amatsukaze and missed her. Piet Hein and Witte de With fired at Hatsukaze and missed her. The Japanese return fire was ineffective except for Jintsu who bounced off Haarlem’s armor.

 

Tanaka wanted to make smoke and withdraw, but with the wind that was impossible. Nor could he torpedo his way out of the spot he was in due to the sea state. The onslaught continued.

 

Haarlem again whiffed at Jintsu. Delft hit Kongo six times; knocking out her armament and hitting her in the hull three times. Maastricht hit Haruna four times; knocking out her armament and another hit in her top. Houston hit Haruna twice causing minor hull damage. Boise firing rapidly changed her fire to Yukikaze and hit her 8 times; Twice amidship, knocked out her armament, hit her thrice in the hull causing her to swing out out line slowed considerably and once in her stern. Marblehead’s fire was ineffective. Evertsen hit Yukikaze in the stern causing a fire. Van Ghent, Van Nes, Piet Hein and Witte de With’s fire was ineffective. But Banckert and Kortenaer hit Amatsukaze once in the hull slowing her by half.

 

The Japanese put some fires out but continued to burn nonetheless. Tanaka and his sailors continued to remain true to their mission (they keep making their morale).

 

Haarlem finally got on target and hit Jintsu six times; knocking out her armament and hitting her in the hull twice. Jintsu was now only making 4 knots. Delf finally missed Kongo. But Maastricht hit Haruna six times; Two of the in the hull and a bridge hit that killed her captain. Houston also hit Haruna twice in the hull and proved that enough minor damage will sink even a battleship. Haruna went down. Bosie firing rapidly hit Yukikaze 7 times; once in the stern causing a fire, knocking her DIW and then sinking her. Marblehead’s fire was ineffective. The Dutch destroyers then hit Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze 11 times causing explosions, fires, loss of gun mounts, and 5 hull hits. Additional hits jammed steering and force them to flood magazines.  Tanaka kept making his morale until the sea closed over him. Doorman then sank the convoy, except for the Chitose who managed to escape.

 

Doorman would now press on to try and clobber a invasion convoy at Dili.

 



#2 healey36

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Posted 01 September 2021 - 06:38 AM

I'm unfamiliar with Haarlem, Delft, and Maastricht...are these the proposed 1047-design battlecruisers?



#3 W. Clark

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Posted 01 September 2021 - 12:07 PM

No, they are a new Dutch capital ship variant proposed by Jim O'Neil. They are upgraded copies of the Deutschland class 11" cruisers or "Panzerschiffs". They are basically the Panzerschiff D design that the Germans never built. I keep arguing that Germany under Hitler is never going to give the Dutch assistance in rearming and the Project 1047 battle cruisers were a red herring from the start. 

 

Hitler was on public record several times in print and in speeches saying that he despised the Dutch for staying neutral in WWI and if it were up to him (or words to that effect) that he would not allow it again. He obviously meant what he said as he had them invaded in May 1940. Apparently as much as Hitler lied; Holland did not fit into that category as he backed up everything he ever said about her.

 

Hitler was not going to rearm the Dutch; he was going to conquer them. So any Dutch capital ship variants from Germany have to occur (at least the plans delivered) before Hitler comes to power or they are pipe dreams. When the Project 1047 negotiations opened in late 39 Hitler was already planning the invasion of Holland in the spring of 1940. I don't know if the German negotiators knew that, but Hitler certainly did. Now I can be the suspicious type, but the timing seems obvious to me. The whole negotiation was a lie, at least for the German part.


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#4 healey36

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Posted 01 September 2021 - 02:54 PM

These cruisers are interesting, but seem equally unlikely, even with an earlier start-date. Still, a good exercise contemplating what might have been. One wonders why the Dutch didn't contract with the Americans to build them a class of up-gunned heavy cruisers (unless they judged American shipbuilding design/tech inferior). Were the Dutch bound by the Washington Treaty Limits?



#5 W. Clark

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Posted 01 September 2021 - 05:55 PM

I do not believe the Dutch were signatories to the treaty. I don't think they were even offered the chance. But in fact I do not know for sure. They (or at least the navy) had been talking about capital ships since at least 1908. But the guys with control  of the purse strings said no. They considered the concept wasteful and unnecessary or so they said.

 

The argument seems to have been; "Why should we spend that kind of money? Let the Americans and the British do it". Or in other words, why should we carry our water when we can get those other suckers to do it for us. Of course no one asked the question, why would they do for us what we won't do for ourselves? That would have required them to look at the consequences of not being able to carry their own water.

 

And the consequences were this; they had the third largest colonial empire in the world at the time. But they were an occupying force and controlled 80 million people with 8.7 million people. They had not shared out the pie and the vast bulk of those 80 millions did not consider themselves Dutchmen. The Dutch army in the DEI was more of a police force meant to control the populace then a defense force. So a ground defense was out of the question. Too many places for an aggressor to attack at any one time to defend. A defense to have any chance of success had to preclude landings to begin with. That meant an air force and a navy sufficient to the task. The Dutch had neither and no real interest in acquiring them.

 

The DEI gave Holland the following percentages of the world's supply and placing among suppliers:

Rubber 40% First place

Tin 30% Second place

Sugar 7% Third place

Oil 3% Fifth place

Quinine 90% global monopoly

Pepper 80% global monopoly

Kapok 75% global monopoly

Copra 33% unknown placing

Sisal 23% unknown placing

Palm Oil 20% unknown placing

Tea 17% unknown placing

Rice 15% unknown placing

Asia Bauxite supply 75%

 

Holland was not poor. She was just tight with the guilder and thought she could by without fire insurance right up to the point when the fire took everything. The Dutch never asked themselves the question; What if the Americans and British have so many problems of their own that ours just don't rate. They never asked the question because they knew they would not like the answer. The Brits were in no place to throw stones; but the Americans looked at the Dutch empire with distaste and wanted it to end. The Americans just did not want it controlled by the Japanese as an alternative.

 

The Dutch response to this was that the Americans and British were not living up their obligations by not producing what ever the successful defense of the DEI required. In other words they expected us to carry their water and we were selfish treacherous bastards for not doing it to their satisfaction. The reaction of Governor General Starkenborgh and Vice Admiral Helfrich to Admiral Hart's arrival was where is the American Fleet, Army and Marines. With their attitude they could have added why are there still beat cops in NYC when we have need of them here and not caused any further surprise.

 

My response would have been; "You chose not to pay for the bucket. So now you can cup your hands and carry your own water". After all, we did not need to defend the DEI to deny its resources to the Japanese.

 

The Japanese started the war about a million tons short of the merchantmen they needed to transport the resources they needed from the DEI to Japan. This is not me saying this. It is what the Japanese planners said. They constructed about 750,000 tons of merchantmen during the war. So without us sinking a single ship, they don't have enough and remember, planners never actually plan for the worst case scenario.

 

No, we just needed to do what Raeder did and fire or court martial (or both) Rear Admiral Blandy (Chief of Naval Ordnance) and fix our torpedoes. Raeder had the same problems and took a year less to fix them because he either fired or court martialed those in charge and that got their replacements off their duffs.

 

We then proceeded to sink 60% of Japan's merchantmen in a year. It turns out that we didn't need the Dutch at all. And that was something they never admitted to themselves.



#6 healey36

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Posted 02 September 2021 - 07:02 AM

Two or three decades ago, back when I was still working for The Man, I briefly had a Dutch woman working for me as a consultant. She was married to a Moluccan guy, and I got to know both of them a bit over that summer. I'd worked with any number of Germans, French, and Brits over the years, but was generally unfamiliar with the Dutch. It was eye-opening, getting a bit of an understanding of the priorities and sensitivities of not only a "continental" Dutch citizen, but also a person born and raised in the former Dutch East Indies.

 

I won't go into all of my impressions, but I would agree that they seemed not to be averse to the idea of having others do their heavy-lifting, an image diametrically opposed to the fact that Holland, amongst other things, once maintained the largest fleet in the world (albeit four centuries ago). Today, the Dutch seem to hold some fairly progressive societal notions, yet they remain fiscally tighter than a drumhead. For whatever reason, I find the balancing of those traits rather enigmatic (friends tell me I'm a cultural dinosaur, so it might be more on me than the Dutch, lol).

 

Of course, the great dichotomy, or at least one of them, of the Second World War was the destruction of the last of the European "empires". In the years of and immediately following the war, Britain, Holland, and France saw their colonial holdings largely expunged (Germany had suffered this as a result of their defeat in the First World War). The European victors, it seems to me, paid a heavy price for their victory, not the least of which being that the center of the Occident moved across the Atlantic and has remained there for the last 75 years. It must have been tough for guys like Churchill to accept, especially having had a substantial hand in much of it and then unable to contain it or undo it in the end.

 

With regards to the Japanese, your examination of their merchant navy just further cements the notion of how unprepared they were for "total war", and reinforces why the all-or-nothing knockout blow was a key facet of their "plan" for dealing with the Americans. The blunder at Pearl was compounded six months later at Midway, and that, together with the foothold gained at Guadalcanal, pretty much wrote the the preface for the end of the Japanese Empire. The IJN went into the war strategically, operationally, and ultimately tactically flawed. Historians often argue that their defeat was the result of a compounding of errors and misjudgments over the course of the war, but I would argue they were doomed from the start. Other than the Type 93 torpedo, much of the notion of their "superior equipment" is a myth, and they had staggering problems with their basing and training doctrines. The fact that it took the Americans 3-1/2 years to roll them up seems, to me, more an effort by MacArthur to build a legacy for himself with his "island-hopping" strategy, than the fact that the USN was likely able to substantially take them out as early as late-1943 or early-1944. We lost a lot of people, perhaps unnecessarily, in allowing "Dugout" Doug to drive the grand strategy in the Pacific.



#7 W. Clark

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Posted 02 September 2021 - 11:08 AM

We lost a lot of people because our torpedoes didn't work for 2 years. We lost a lot of people because we fielded a weapons system without proper testing because of its cost. And we lost a lot of people because the B. of Ordnance was more interested in protecting itself then in performing its responsibilities. Our torpedoes didn't work and that allowed the Japanese the bottoms needed to occupy a lot of islands. They had those bottoms because we did not even come close to sinking in the first 2 years of the war what we sank in the third once our torpedoes worked. If we had sank in 43 any where near what we sank in 44 it is a different war. Think about places like  Iwo Jima. You can not grow anything thing there in that soil. And the only fresh water you can find there is what you collect in cisterns from the rain or bring in by ship. How do you feed 20,000 men by fishing from the surf. And how do you provide water for them if you haven't seen a supply ship in 2 years. And that is what that garrison was facing if we sank in 43 like we sank in 44. 

 

In my opinion the greatest admiral for the Japanese war effort was not Mikawa (who handed us our worst defeat) or Tanaka or any other admiral who was Japanese. Nope, the greatest admiral for the Japanese was Rear Admiral Blandy (USN), because he caused more harm and death to the US than any number of Japanese admirals combined. I believe you can put a lot of the American death toll from the amphibious war right at his feet. Because the Japanese were able to garrison and maintain those garrisons with bottoms that would have been on the bottom a year earlier at least if our torpedoes worked. And they only worked after October 43 because of admirals like Lockwood who went around Blandy to get problems identified and fixed with Blandy doing his best to end their careers in order to stop them. And what happened to Blandy? He was promoted and retired in 1954 or there about a full Admiral.

 

There is no question in my mind that managers were running the show in the navy and the rat catchers had to get past them to win the war. The Germans in 39 had roughly the same problems with their torpedoes. The difference was Raeder. When the German sub skippers complained about the torpedoes, their Naval Ordnance equivalent said almost exactly the same things Blandy and his boys said. The difference was that Raeder believed the warriors and told German Naval Ordnance to fix the problem. After six months and no progress he fired the chief and his department heads and told their successors fix the the problem. When that didn't work he court martialed the new chief and his department heads and told their successors fix the problem or else. Suddenly the problems were identified and fixed. It took the Germans at least a year less than it did us to find and fix their problems. I believe Raeder's actions toward his Ordnance chiefs and Blandy's retirement as a full Admiral is the difference.



#8 healey36

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Posted 03 September 2021 - 07:45 AM

Even if one puts aside the USN's horrendous record of faulty torpedoes, the fact is that the Mark 15, as designed, was far and away inferior to the IJN's Type 93. Even after the production and employment issues were resolved, the Mark 15 still packed a warhead less than half the size of the Type 93 and had an effective range only one third of that of the IJN's fish. The Japanese advantage was compounded by their development of a superior torpedo fire-control system, the Type 97, which allowed them to use their torpedoes at extended range (although with limited success).

 

The failure of the USN's BoO to recognize both the mechanical faults of the Mk. 15 together with the technical superiority of the Type 93 was one of, if not the most, glaring mistakes of the war. I'm certainly not one to give Blandy an out, but there were a number of issues early in the war that may have clouded the assessment of torpedo effectiveness. Failures were attributed to documented instances of torpedoes having been fired at too short of a range to arm the detonator, or too long of a range, or set to run at an inappropriate depth. However, even after these issues were mitigated with tightly revised firing procedures, torpedoes still failed to explode. Following Santa Cruz, there was an episode where 18 torpedoes were fired at an abandoned carrier and destroyer to scuttle them - only nine hit the target and exploded, yet BoO refused to accept this as evidence of a problem. Perhaps even more perplexing is the fact that the USN did not issue an intelligence bulletin with an accurate assessment of the IJN's Type 93 until March 1944.

 

Even with their torpedo-arm tied behind their back, one can, it seems to me, argue that the USN surface units had effectively gotten the upper hand (or at least comparability) in the actions during the latter stages of the Solomons campaign. Both sides made a number of tactical adjustments, perhaps the biggest of which being the Americans' improved employment and faith in their radar sets. But even saying that, perhaps, is far too simplistic.

 

The submarines' largely useless Mark 14 torpedo was a similar matter which, I would wholly agree, led to the great difficulties in interdicting the Japanese supply routes in 1942/43. Thank God they eventually got Blandy out of BoO and sent him to Iwo where he commanded the pre-invasion bombardment group (Group 1, Amphibious Force). After the war he oversaw the nuclear tests at Bikini, then promoted to command of the 8th Fleet.

 

Here's one of my favorite shots of Admiral Blandy, celebrating the success of Operation Crossroads with a cake and his wife (wearing a vaguely similar hat):

 

Blandy Crossroads
 
Yeah, he was a peach.


#9 W. Clark

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Posted 03 September 2021 - 10:49 AM

Oh, it goes beyond even that as bad as all that was. The US Embassy had a walk in in 1940 that gave us a good view of what the Type 93 could and its specs. But when Naval Intel ran it past, yep, you guessed it; the BoO they got told it was not possible that the Japanese had developed that good of a torpedo because the BoO couldn't do it and that of course meant no one else could. The hubris is astounding. And of course having staked out their position at the "Best makers of Torpedoes", bar none, would defend that POV until the last soldier, sailor or marine was dead rather then admit they might have got that a bit wrong.

 

Justice to my mind would have been to take them from the East Coast in 45, give them a rifle, put them out front in Okinawa and tell them to deal with the Japanese their torpedoes did not deal with. I doubt if Blandy makes retirement and given the number of soldiers, sailors and marines who also failed to make retirement; that sounds like justice to me.



#10 healey36

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Posted 04 September 2021 - 11:36 AM

A final comment, then I'll leave it alone.

 

Further reading revealed that Blandy's post-BoO record included command of an amphibious group at Kwajalein, the reserve groups at Saipan and Peleliu, then the advance bombardment group at Iwo and Okinawa. He apparently suffered some criticism at Iwo for not adding a day of preliminary bombardment, as was afforded by the original invasion plan. He was considered a gunnery expert, which may partially explain his failure in managing the review and resolution of the Mk 14 and 15 torpedo problems. He is said to have been instrumental in the USN's adoption of the 20mm Oerlikon and the 40mm Bofors antiaircraft guns.

 

And he graduated top of his Naval Academy class (1913).

 

While documenting the issues with the Mk 14 torpedo, it's interesting that Morison, who I have great regard for, never took a swipe at Blandy for his BoO failures. This probably says far more about Morison than Blandy.



#11 W. Clark

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Posted 04 September 2021 - 02:24 PM

I'd say that Morrison respected the Admiral's club. Like any organization the Navy tends to protect its brass unless their screw up is so public that protecting them from the consequences does the Navy real harm. Take Savo Island. The Navy decided to limit its investigation of the debacle to a board of inquiry. A court martial would have allowed testimony in the ship captains defense if they cared to give it. That would have made public the very real mistakes made by the Admirals involved, who the Board of Inquiry did not criticize or censor in any way. The Board reserved that for the ship captains as if the Admirals had no say and were not responsible even though they were in command.

 

I expect the last thing the Navy would want to make public is the consequences of our torpedo problems in terms of American lives lost directly or indirectly. And they did a good job of suppressing it. Yes, they admitted that there were problems with our torpedoes and, yes that it took some time to identify and correct them. But they name no names nor hold anyone accountable other then to say that the BoO resisted the concept of the problems being a design fault and therefore no investigation into the torpedoes function was needed. I like the way they describe Blandy's attempts at punishing those who tried to test the torpedoes as "Resisting a concept". The Managers had been caught out by the Rat Catchers and there was no way the Managers were going to allow there to be any consequences and they swept it under the rug as best they could.






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