10 replies to this topic

[mhl67]

In Rule 2.17.3, FPs on a ship are disabled after 3 turns of engagement by a 5.25 or larger gun. The question I have is, does engagement mean merely being fired upon or actually hit? I'm guessing that the former is what's intended, albeit that seems somewhat excessive, since for example in a River Plate scenario the Graf Spee could disable all three British floatplanes from the start of the Battle (in reality the British launched one from the Ajax).

[Phil Callcott]

HI,

 

"Floatplanes on a ship are disabled after 3 turns of engagement by a 5.25 or larger gun".

 

IMHO

The full rule says that this would be as a result of splinter damage, splinters did result from near misses as well as direct hits.

The target ship has to be fired at (but not necessarily hit) for three game turns in order for its floatplane to suffer sufficient damage to render it unsafe to fly.

 

"Graf Spee could disable all three British floatplanes from the start of the Battle".

 

Quote from Wiki -

"From her opening salvo, Graf Spee's gunfire proved fairly accurate, her third salvo straddling Exeter. At 06:23, a 283 mm (11.1 in) shell burst just short of Exeter, abreast the ship.

Splinters from this shell killed the torpedo tubes' crews, damaged the ship's communications, riddled the ship's funnels and searchlights and wrecked the ship's Walrus aircraft."

 

I think the moral of the story is for the British to launch their spotting aircraft ASAP before the mother ship takes incoming fire.

[W. Clark]

Yes, but it takes 3 turns to prep the FP. So. if you want to get it off, turn away and make smoke until you have launched it or risk never getting it off.

[mhl67]

I might suggest a rules change if this is indeed how the rule is supposed to be interpreted. Instead of disabling the FP after 3 shots, roll a d12 and on a 1-4 disable the floatplane. This will disable the floatplane after 3 turns in around 70% of cases, and eliminates the need to track shots; as well as allowing the chance for a FP to be launched in the circumstances of the River Plate.

[Dave Franklin]

In my River Plate scenario, I handled it as a scenario rule:  Ajax was already preparing her seaplane for launch, so it would be ready for launch on the second turn.

 

My info was that Achilles was not carrying aircraft at this time, so for her it doesn't matter.

 

Exeter may launch her floatplane after 3 turns, unless it is damaged due to enemy fire (an FP hit or 3 turns of fire) as per the rules.

 

Dave

[W. Clark]

I didn't know that Achilles didn't have a FP. I'll tuck that away, thanks. But I concur in your ruling and reiterate that Exeter can preserve her FP by covering herself in smoke until it is ready to launch. It's not convenient, but it is in keeping with the RAW.

 

WMC

[healey36]

According to Bennett, Achilles' "Fairey Seafox aircraft was accidentally lost before she left New Zealand to join Force G."

 

He also states that Ajax actually had two Fairey Seafox aircraft on board, but "on Dec. 13, 1939 one of these was no longer operational."

[W. Clark]

Obviously, Harwood's foresight was sufficient unto the moment. But some gunnery spotting is always a nice modifier.

 

WMC

[W. Clark]

If it takes roughly 18 minutes to get a FP off and if you don't want to have it left in a state of readiness (for whatever reason) then it stands to reason when you are coming into a period where you could launch but might get caught with the FP not ready (dawn or anything else like that) then your SOP should be to "stand to" in readiness until the danger is proven to not exist, Any other course of action is incompetent IMHO.

 

WMC

[Lonnie Gill]

Interesting alternatives guys.  Here are a coupe of related tidbits on the River Plate episode. 

1. Ajax's FP had significant communication problems for much of the battle, reducing it to limited use. 

2. The British CLs tried concentration fire using GMC, but the spotting corrections by Ajax seldom got them on target until late in the clash, rendering both ships largely ineffective for most of the battle.  One of the reasons that the British CLs tend to have a bigger effect in replay scenarios than their real counterparts did in the historical battle.  It also brought home to the British that concentration fire, especially GMC, could be more of a hindrance than a help without frequent, intensive practice between ships that operated together.  

 

LONNIE

[W. Clark]

It's funny how we concentrate on the potential and not the reality of what happened in many cases. If the RAW allows it, then players will do it; it's that simple and I'm just as guilty as anyone. I play the rules, so protect me from me and write to restrain.

 

WMC