53 replies to this topic

[Mark Hinds]

Hey Jeff, sounds reasonable.  FWIW, I don't even play my copy of GQIII, and am still using GQ1 / GQ2 with house rules.  If I was to add one for reloading, I'd probably go with the "25-30 minutes" (I like to minimize die rolls), represented in terms of the rule set's time/distance relationships.  I double the movement rate in standard GQ1 / GQ2 to correspond to the time/distance relationships, as Lonnie (sp?) had cut movement in half.  

MH

[Mark Hinds]

(text removed)

Gunnery hit rates are at least double reality.

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I always had a feeling this was the case, and not just with GQ.  Compare medium / long gunnery effectiveness with, say, the Espero action in the Med.  But if we changed this, would the game be any fun?  MH

[W. Clark]

Is anyone aware of any historical occurrences of torpedoes being re-loaded during an engagement other than the Japanese. I am not aware of any such historical occurrence. Let me amplify what I mean by a combat (or engagement reload). My definition would be that the ship intending to reload has fired its torpedoes (in part or in whole) at enemy targets and is attempting to re-ready the fired tubes to reengage during its current engagement. Also, I'm assuming that we are talking a nighttime engagement and early in the war (ABDA time frame) daylight engagements occurred. I bring this up because I don't believe that reloading under fire is possible and the ship reloading should have to break LOS (behind smoke or something) in order to reload as the normal course changes that go with trying to avoid being hit are enough IMHO to preclude reloading. Now, I've never reloaded a torpedo, let alone reloaded one under fire and I'm strictly going by what I've read from authors who as far as I know never reloaded under fire either. I know that the Japanese reloaded during engagements but as I recall (it has been some time, years in fact since I read the author(s)) the ships that did reload actually broke off contact and reloaded in peace before returning to re-engage. If anyone knows of an exception to this, I would like to hear it.

 

WMC

[jwsleser]

Jim

 

Do allow me to make one comment, this is NOT a simulation. Lonnie and I have talked about this at some length, and it is a game that reflects some of the decisions a naval commander was presented with. 

 

Of course GQ3 is a simulation. In this case the simulation is focused on presenting decisions in a realistic manner to the players commanding divisions/squadrons of ships. Because the game is targeted at a higher level than individual ships, it combines many lower level decisions/results into an abstract system so players are not bogged down with the minutia of controlling individual ships. Players aren't lucky enough to have a player for each ship. Even if GQ3 only focused at commanding a single ship, lower level decisions/results would still need to be abstracted to a certain degree because we don't have hundreds of men under us making all those individual decisions that happen on a ship during combat. Even with these abstractions/simplifications, players are still required to make a series of decisions for each individual ship. It is the nature of wargaming without a cast of thousands. 

 

​If GQ3 wasn't a simulation, we wouldn't be having this discussion. Lonnie could just step in and say 'Its my game and that is the way it is' or 'I like space lasers, deal with it'. Instead he has crafted a wargame designed to force players to deal with the real world of issues that historically occurred in WW2. The game/simulation is designed to create historical decision points, hence the use of historical data to generate those points to create decision. What range should I fight at? What maneuver can I use to isolate part of the enemy force? Darn those Type 93s are nasty.

 

​I did a comparison of GQ3 and Snorkers (Good Oh) when I was exploring rules to see what I liked. I ran the same scenario with both rules (a French v British DD action). Snorkers uses a IG/YG turn where a player moves his ships and fires before the other player gets to move/fire. Unlike ground warfare, ships are constantly moving and firing. The idea that one side gets to do its worst before the other can act/react was a big problem for me. Additionally Snorkers uses drawing cards to see who moves. That in itself isn't bad (as long as the other side gets to move before fires are resolved which Snorkers doesn't), but an ace allows a ship/squadron that has previously moved to move again. If you are one of those who shakes their head when SciFi gets the science wrong, that should make your head hurt. There are other problems with the rules IMHO. At that point Snorkers is not simulation but a game. I have played DBA and when you can't use an historical formation/tactic, the rules aren't simulating anything.

 

​A simulation will never get everything right. The moment you try to refight a battle that had 10K men on side with only two people, abstraction is the only way to go. But abstraction strips away much of the realism of the system. A good simulation will strip everything away except the key issues the designer wants the player to deal with. Then the abstractions must present the data in a realistic manner such that the player has an opportunity to decide and the decision looks like something they read about in history.  

 

​Note that my comments about the torpedo reload rule weren't focused on the basic rule (which is simple for a reason) but the optional rule. 

 

Gunnery hit rates are at least double reality.

 

I always had a feeling this was the case, and not just with GQ.  Compare medium / long gunnery effectiveness with, say, the Espero action in the Med.  But if we changed this, would the game be any fun?  MH

 

​The underlying issue here is time; the time players have to complete a game. Most players want to finish a game in ~2 hours, hence why games like Snorkers are popular. So rule writers can either make damage happen quicker and/or use a compressed turn time scale ('minutes feel like days' to paraphrase ST). The 6/3 minute thing in GQ3 is addressing this issue. Jere and I have both identified that hits happen too often and in the main are too destructive. We have modified several aspects of the rules to get a more realistic (IOHOs) damage over time. You might have seen some hints of those mods on our AARs. We have time, we like the way the battles historically unfold, and we have a lot of fun. Time plays a big part in whether a wargame is successful or not (says one who played Campaign for North Africa once, or tried to).

 

v/r  Jeff

[jwsleser]

W. Clark

 

Is anyone aware of any historical occurrences of torpedoes being re-loaded during an engagement other than the Japanese. 

 

The simple answer is no. That is mainly due to the fact that ships carrying reloads other than the Japanese were never in a situation where reloading during combat was needed. Only the German cruisers/DD carried torpedoes already assembled. The rules state the Alberto di Giussano class also carried reloads. So the lack of evidence is a correlation but not proof of causation.

 

I uncovered one discussion that the Hipper reloaded torpedoes at sea (not during combat) and that sea state caused problems. As I easily found the mention yesterday, I didn't copy it. After spending time today unsuccessfully trying to find it again to seek the source, I am kicking myself for not copying it. It was mentioned in a book about the Hipper during one of her Atlantic raids. If anyone has books on the Hipper, please see if you can find this mention. 

 

I did find some pictures of the Prinz Eugen's torpedo system, including the workshop with fully assembled torpedoes. The ship had an overhead rail system to move the torpedoes from/to the workshop to the launchers. Clearly not as sophisticated as the Japanese system, but much more than found on other ships. https://www.shiparch...?type=torpedo#2

 

We can debate the reloading under fire until we are blue in the face. We lacked the data. 

 

We can meet halfway on this. If a ship is fired upon (no hits necessary), the turn doesn't count even if all the other requirements are met. No need to be out of range, behind smoke, or hiding behind other ships. This is similar to a ship shooting when it is not being shot at. Same logic. 

 

Or not. It is a house rule. 

 

v/r  Jeff

[Mark Hinds]

I'd say GQ is a simulation, as are all historical wargames.  What varies is how abstract and/or accurate they are.  Even DBA (Phil Barker's simple Ancients system) is a simulation; just more abstract (intentionally) than its predecessors.  

MH

[Jim O'Neil]

One point that was missed, night turns are three minutes and day turns are six minutes long.  If anything, I'd think it would be easier to do in daylight, but we need  to clarify the times for all.

[jwsleser]

Jim

 

The 6/3 minute turn is an issue greater than just the torpedo reload. It is an artificial device designed to make the night battles appear more historical time scale-wise as stated by p.xii (or actually the opposite as the six minute turn is really the artificial construct). I simply ignore it. A turn is a turn. I used the six minute turn in my night AAR battle. Note that if one uses the three minute turn for both night and day, battles are far more destructive than historical. I feel that the closer ranges at night, combined with the greater chance of hits (those 3s on the dice and rapid fire can be devastating) will make night battles as deadly as they were without the three minute turn. Remember that torpedoes are the ship killers, most ships only damaged by gunfire normally survive. Night battles gets everyone into torpedo range. Some gunfire-damaged ships are lost because their damage is significant and their side believe they can't get out of harms way in time so they are scuttled. A point to remember when comparing historical results to game results. 

 

v/r  Jeff

[jwsleser]

Mark

 

We should discuss DBA at some point but this isn't the place to do that.

 

v/r  Jeff

[Jim O'Neil]

Interesting reading, I am not going to start a discussion over simulation vs game. Lonnie's point was: that it being fun to play was much more important than getting every little difference between various Navies and ships just right.  I can be a detail freak and have to watch my ideas for that reason.

 

Funny you should mention the dismissal of the varying turn times as I have found I just forget them. I also have often forget the night ranges vs day ranges charts and just use day ranges. I am getting better at that.

 

I too have my copies of GQ 1 & 2, which I played for years ... Right  WMC?   (we played together in Germany in the late 1970's).  I prefer the additional realism of GQ 3.

 

I think the concept of IJN reloads variable time should be one roll which says it takes X long. I am not a fan of lots of die rolls either.  Best time is 12 minutes and worst is 36 minutes or a 12 is a complete foul up requiring out of combat time to fix ... things like tube has been bent or wasn't correctly aligned and the reload is jammed.  An 8% chance of a total foul up is sort of high, but it is is combat and that which can go wrong likely will in the most awkward way possible.  HMS Hoods little armor/design lapse is such an example. 

[jwsleser]

I think the concept of IJN reloads variable time should be one roll which says it takes X long. I am not a fan of lots of die rolls either. 

 

Clever idea Mark. I like it. Anything to reduce die rolls. Thanks!

[jwsleser]

Here is another website showing Prinz Eugen's reloading system. The overhead rail system is a more secure method to reload at sea with the rail carrying the weight and limiting the movement of the torpedo. Not as good as the Japanese system, but the German crew isn't pushing 3000lb on shopping carts. With this system, each tube must be individually loaded. 

 

https://wwiiafterwwi...ss-prinz-eugen/

 

v/r  Jeff

[jwsleser]

Finally tracked down the Hipper comment. Found at https://www.kbismarc...?p=16786#p16786

 

12th February 1941

Hipper closed in to within 2.0 -5.5km of the helpless merchantmen of unescorted convoy SL64s under a false flag, and proceeded to kill more than 150 men of their virtually unarmed crews by gunfire and torpedo after, very correctly, hoisting the Swastika. The merciless execution is described in detail in Heavy Cruisers of the Hipper Class Koop and Schmolke, who have plenty of detail about the difficulty of handling the torpedo reloads when the ship was rolling. The badly damaged SS Lornaston with her own dead and injured was spared so as avoid the bother of Hipper picking up survivors. 

 

If any one has this book, it would be great to read what the authors' provide on reloading the torpedoes. I am not sure whether all three ships of the class had the same torpedoes arrangement as they all differed in some ways. If indeed weather was the culprit, the reload rules already address that. 

 

The author's also have a book on the German destroyers. Again if any one has the book, do the authors discuss torpedo reloads? 

 

v/r  Jeff

[healey36]

FWIW:

 

“All German destroyers were designed to carry reload torpedoes, the number of which is usually given as eight. In fact, only four reloads were provided for, except in the Type 42 (none of which was completed). The reload torpedoes were stored in covered compartments alongside the tubes themselves, in the raised half-deck on which the tubes were mounted, where there was room for the stowage of only one torpedo to port and starboard of each bank. It is noticeable that the width of this half-deck was considerably greater in the Type 42C in order to allow the stowage of the extra four torpedoes. The weapons could be withdrawn for servicing using loading beams fitted to the break of the forecastle and the midships deck; they could also be placed on trollies which were provided for the purpose and ran on the mine rails (this is probably the reason why the port rails were carried up to the break of the forecastle whilst the starboard set terminated at the funnel). In action, reloading proved difficult under battle conditions and in any sort of sea, since the reload system was not purpose-designed as was that employed by the Japanese. There were a few occasions when destroyers did attempt reloading, such as the actions in the Bay of Biscay in 1943 and 1944, when both Z23 and Z32 managed partially to reload, but both ships were seriously hampered by the weather conditions. Z27, in her final action, attempted to reload her torpedoes but was unable to do so. Quite apart from the physical problems, the weight of four extra torpedoes, some twelve tonnes, cannot have improved the destroyers’ already suspect seakeeping properties.”

 

M. J. Whitley

Destroyer!: German Destroyers in World War II

Naval Institute Press - 1983  

[jwsleser]

Excellent. Thank you healey. Weather is already identified as a limitation in the rules. This appears to valid the Force 4 weather restriction. More importantly it states that German destroyers still carried reloads and actually did reload during the war. I already knew they only carried half the number of reloads as tubes. This also indicates that if they sortied without reloads, it was a local, tactical decision and not a navy-wide policy. 

 

v/r Jeff

[healey36]

FWIW II

 

I went rummaging around, recalling the Life in the Royal Navy cigarette card series. While not a torpedo reload under duress, I thought it interesting:

 

 

 

I think it should be captioned "Loading Torpedo Into Tube". 

 

A family friend sent me the bulk of his 1000+ cigarette card collection some two to three decades back. All from the Interwar years, there' some pretty fascinating stuff in there.

 

Sure beats the hell out of baseball cards.

[Jim O'Neil]

I discovered that I had failed to order the Koop & Schmolke books on the German Heavy Cruisers as well as on the Light Cruisers and Destroyers. So I corrected that, the Light cruiser book showed first and they were not gentle in describing how poor the ships were as cruisers. I was, of course looking for anything on torpedo reloading and found nothing.  The other two books are in route.  I have never been much impressed with the Kriegsmarine and I am sure that is part of the reason I didn't buy these books years ago.  But comparing the various ships designs by the Navies of WW2 has been most illuminating.  Italian DDs had their issues, but were generally commanded by competent and aggressive officers. British DDs were a bit better designed and also had competent and generally aggressive officers. German and Russian officers, while competent, seem to have had a watch your back concern given the dictatorships they represented, which diluted any aggressiveness in many cases. I am always stunned by the German approach to radar; I can understand the concern of being tracked by its use, given the much closer environment in which they served, but to make it so secret that the captains did not know it's capabilities was stupid beyond words.  In the early years the Japanese DDs were likely the best, but by mid 1943 the USN had improved, as had their equipment, and beat them in DD skills.  My 2¢.  

  I am not forgetting the very determined and dangerous German TBs and E-boats in the channel and Bay of Biscay, but those were not DDs generally although a few did serve there.

[jwsleser]

Thank you for taking the time (and spending a few quatloos) on more research.

 

I have been having a discussion on the German torpedo reloads on another forum. A poster there provided this quote from the Koop & Schmolke book.

 

IV Experiences: The modifications carried out to the torpedo installations as a result of the experience of previous operations have proved themselves. There were no breakdowns. The personnel worked safely and well. Once the starboard tubes were vacant the crews of the two sets began the reloading of the reserve torpedoes immediately. After the port forward tubes had been fired, the four ready torpedoes stored in the workshop were used to reload. After about twenty minutes we had two torpedoes ready to launch in the tubes. The other two were intended for the starboard tubes. Reloading of these was at first not possible on the course being steered. Although ship movement was slight, the torpedoes were rolling so heavily on the transporter that if they had been sluiced [?] through from port to starboard, personnel and torpedoes would have been endangered. When the ship later turned head to sea with reduced speed, the two torpedoes were reloaded.

Six reserve torpedoes were stored on the bell[?] deck ignition pistols in their lockers. It was not possible to make ready these torpedoes during the operation because even relatively slight movements of the ship would have endangered personnel and torpedoes during transport.

 

The forum is https://www.kbismarc...opic.php?t=9777  We have been uncovering more about the heavy cruisers and their torpedoes. I am not surprised by the info on the light cruisers. I feel they are rated too highly in GQ3. Equal to Perth and other UK cruisers, but that is another discussion. 

 

​I am very interested to read what they say about the destroyers (if anything). 

 

v/r  Jeff

[Jim O'Neil]

Very Interesting, so about 10 minutes to load a torpedo and the quad mount becomes a twin mount. The sluicing comment to me means the water coming aboard would to have washed away men and endangered the ship by having the torpedo knocked awry.

[healey36]

Very Interesting, so about 10 minutes to load a torpedo and the quad mount becomes a twin mount. The sluicing comment to me means the water coming aboard would to have washed away men and endangered the ship by having the torpedo knocked awry.

I would imagine moving a torpedo on one of those trollies could be a harrowing task regardless of sea conditions.