13 replies to this topic

[jwsleser]

All the naval rules that I have played attempt to address the issue of larger caliber shells hitting smaller ships and its reverse, smaller caliber shells hitting larger ships. These rule sets have mixed results. In this post I will discuss two questions:

 

1. Does the historical record support the need for such rules?  

2. Does the Equivalent Damage roll actually address the question at hand?

 

Wargamers certainly think that such rules are needed. After all, a bigger shell should cause more damage and a smaller shell less. Logical right? In this particular case, the historical record is limited but in the main doesn’t support this assumption. There are four actions to examine: Battle of the River Plate, 2nd Battle of Narvik, 1st Guadalcanal, and the Battle off Samar. I will briefly discuss frequency of hits and actual damage. 

 

Battle of the River Plate was the only one of the three fought at ‘normal’ battle ranges. The 11” guns of the Spee were handier against small ships than the 14” and 15” guns used in the other three battles. In an action lasting a little over an hour (11 game turns) Spee scored nine 11” hits, seven on Exeter and two on Ajax. In almost all cases, the 11”rounds did localized damage as if hit by any size round (putting the object hit out of action), but nothing more. The hit on Exeter’s B Turret didn’t put A Turret out of action, cause engine damage, etc. Using the Equivalent Damage rolls, those seven hits would be 14 hits with those extra hits causing more damage over the length of the ship.

 

2nd Battle of Narvik. Warspite is credited with hitting three German destroyers during the battle with 15” rounds. In all three cases the ships were either barely moving or stationary. Two of the destroyers were already badly damaged from the 1st battle. Again damage was limited to what was hit and the ships were sunk due to the combined hits of Warspite and her accompanying destroyers. The 15” hits alone did not pulverize the destroyers. 

 

1st Guadalcanal. San Francisco was hit by two/three 14” rounds from Hiei. It is stated that these hits were using the bombardment rounds and not AP, hence limited damage. The comment made in the official damage report was that it was the 6" rounds that did the most damage. These two/three 14" hits would be six/nine using the Equivalent Damage Rolls. 

 

Battle off Samar. The destroyer Johnston was hit simultaneously by three 18” rounds, followed by three 6” rounds from Yamato. Equivalent damage would make these a total of 20 hits. Yet the destroyer survived, executed damage control, was able to remain in action for another 2+ hours, remaining combat effective while returning to the attack twice, and finally taking more 6” hits before she was sunk.

 

The ships hit by larger rounds in these four cases survived because these hits only damaged what was hit, it didn’t cause other damage all over the ship. That’s another issue I have with the Equivalent Damage Rolls; the extra hits cause damage anywhere on the ship regardless of the location of the first damage roll hit. Another point that is mentioned in all these cases that should limit damage by larger rounds is that AP rounds tend to pass through (over penetrate) lightly armored/unarmored targets without exploding. HE rounds carried by battleships were still a SAP type of round and suffered the same problem. In all, the historical record doesn’t truly support the idea that a larger shell against a smaller ship should create more damage. 

 

Now one can rationalize these results in many ways and still feel comfortable that the Equivalent Damage roll is justified. It is the reverse of the situations above that finally forced me to recognize that Equivalent Damage Rolls don’t work. What about smaller shells hitting larger targets?

 

In our last battle, my 8” cruisers were firing at PoW (BA armor). The 8” can’t penetrate BA. The Equivalent Damage states 1/2 C-S-T. So only half my hits count and can only caused critical (if the round penetrates), and damage secondaries and tertiaries. Okay so I can at least take out those weapons that threaten my destroyers. Instead of getting a damage roll for each 8” hit, I only get 1/2 a roll for each 8” hit. So four hits is only two rolls. Why? I hit the ship four times, the rounds can’t penetrate, so why the extra penalty when hoping for hits on the unarmored areas? Why doesn’t a smaller round get a chance of damaging those systems which are vulnerable to those smaller rounds? It was this part of the Equivalent Damage Rolls that pushed me into the ‘it doesn’t work’ camp.

 

​Note in the background of this discussion is that it is easier for a larger caliber armed ship to hit a smaller target in GQ3 than historical. The nature of the CRT always allows a roll of '1' to hit and the adjustment for firing at a smaller ship is only up 1 row on the CRT. Once at 15k range, a battleship with 15" (UK CRT) has a 1⁺ - 2 to hit a destroyer with 3-4 dice. Each hit is x4. This skews the impact of larger caliber guns against small targets due simply to more hits and the Equivalent Damage Rolls modifier. 

 

I feel that the Equivalent Damage Rolls isn’t needed as it doesn’t reflect the historical record. Even if others believe that it is still justified, it doesn’t work as it needs to work. It penalizes smaller guns against larger ships in a unhistoric manner and spreads damage across the target ship instead of concentrating it at the area of impact (assuming that the first damage roll defines where the actual hit was located). If one truly believes that a larger round should create more damage, the game needs a mechanism to reflect structural damage that impacts survivability absent a specific ship system.  GQ3 currently lacks such a damage mechanism. 

 

Comments?

 

v/r  Jeff

[Jim O'Neil]

Very interesting and hard to argue against. Food for thought for sure. 

[Jim O'Neil]

    I’ve been contemplating JWSlesser’s comments and the more i consider what we know, the more sense his comments make.  I believe it was USS Gambier Bay that was taken under direct fire by Yamato, with 18” shells passing through the ship and exploding some 100 yards or so on the far side after going completely through the ship. 

    It’s basically a simple physics problem. All navies used fuzes that fit most all of their guns. So 6” though 16 or 18” guns all used the same delay action fuze. The fuze functioned when it was slowed quickly by piercing a steel plate. The issue is that a 2,000 pound BB shell is not slowed very much by this armor, while a 100 pound 6” shell is slowed significantly more. Simple Physics, the heavier projectile has more mass and requires more to slow its considerable inertia. So while a Battleship projectile will do much more damage if it detonates in a destroyer of lightly armored cruiser, it is unlikely to be abruptly slowed enough to activate the fuze. Thus major caliber shells do best against ships armored against such shells. Now IF a major caliber shell hits something significantly resistant in a smaller ship, it is going to be quite damaging.

   Historically the Graf Spee’s 11” functioned against the relatively light armor of HMS EXETER. Most 8” guns also seem to have functioned when hitting destroyers and lightly armored ships. Note that SCHARNHORST’s 11” were different and are less likely to function in the same situations as the pocket battleships guns and that is a fuse issue; the pocket battleships were to fight cruisers and merchants and thus had a fuze designed to function against lighter plates. Perhaps the best way to differentiate is to say that shells piercing BB armor won’t function against lightly or unarmored ships. Now before anyone screams…yes an 8” will penetrate BB armor at exceedingly close range, so it simply doesn’t explode in lightly armored ships at those ranges! If the shell functions on CA armor, we will assume there is enough resistance to it’s passage to cause it to detonate. If a shell fails to detonate it does 1 hit damage to the target.

 

   Next we have the valid point that a 6” hit in the forward gun of a DD by a shell doing more than 1x damage is unlikely to set off the depth charges. Simple solution is to roll damage until something close to the original hit/damage is affected.

[JAHinson]

I wonder about from a game perspective about three things.  First, whether or not the "hit" represents a single shell or whether it represents some sort of aggregate damage?  Second, how do the results overall compare to the historical record so that we get a fun to play simulation that is 'close enough' so that the decision making which is the real fun part for me is preserved?  Third, how stochastic outcomes intersect with determinative outcomes (how much randomness do we want to include in the model and so how much might be attributable to luck?).

 

From RaW:  "Each attack simulates the effect of one battery’s fire at its normal, sustained rate of fire over a three-minute period." and "A damage roll may represent a

single hit, splinters from a near miss or several smaller caliber hits. Similarly, a major caliber hit may result in several equivalent damage rolls." So that could go either way in understanding what a 'hit' is and how damage is apportioned.  Other games I've played have been more clear on whether one is rolling for unique hits by shells (Avalon Hill's Bismarck, for example) or whether it is aggregate damage which might then generate hits on specific areas (Larry Bond's Command at Sea, for example).  

 

Note the above is only for shellfire.  Torpedoes look to be carefully intended to be individual torpedoes striking a ship.

[Jim O'Neil]

I spoke with Lonnie about this, he apologizes, but has a trip he has to go on, but sent me these comments:

 

a) I don't argue with the basic physics.  There's no doubt that a heavy battleship caliber shell can go right through a lightly built or unarmored target without even setting off the fuse.  That's especially the case with CVEs that have large above water hanager structures with thin near and far bulkheads and little or nothing in between.  Certainly several cases were evident at Samar and further north off Cape Englo where a US cruiser group required a lot of hits to sink several of the IJN carrier cripples that evening.  And an 18" shell going through an intervening TBM in the hanger probably wouldn't have made much difference.  This point probably also contributed to longer survival of the US DD and DE escorts in the Samar running battle.

 

b ) That said, there are a number of intervening structures, boiler uptakes, storage areas and other things in most small warships that could provide the added resistance needed to set off a shell.  So, it becomes a case of when the shell hits a given area is it basically empty interior space or are there some intervening structures or things in the area that the shell might or might not encounter.  That's often the case with DDs and other small warships that are lightly built, but do have a lot of stuff crammed in their small hulls.  Does it make sense to add another die roll or modifier to cover this possibility which varies widely from ship to ship?  I don't think so as the arguments about the difference for hits in this area vs hits in that area become almost endless.  BTW, one of the reasons there is a +1 die adjustment for attacks on DD and smaller targets by 8" + guns is to partially account for this as well as just being smaller targets.

 

c) OK, but carriers and empty merchant ships are a bit of a special case with significant, lightly built above water areas that are largely empty - very different from other types of warships and loaded merchant ships. 

 

I can see the value in an optional rule to cover hits in these special cases.  Happy to entertain proposals for an optional rule: be it die roll modifier or  an additional "don't hit anything inside" roll or...,  along with parameters for when to employ the optional rule that are simple and easy to apply.  If we can define a good optional rule for carrier and empty merchant ship hits, it can be a good addition to the simple Amendment 3 we are working on.

[jwsleser]

I was planning on responding days ago, but other priorities needed to be dealt with. Thanks to Jim who reach out to Lonnie and provided Lonnie’s input.  I will return to where I started, the two questions I posed about the Equivalent Damage Rolls chart. 

1. Does the historical record support the need for such rules? My answer remains no. 

To us, it is counter intuitive that a larger shell doesn’t really cause increased damage to smaller targets. Yet all of the historical examples available indicate that this true. Try this thought experiment. 

 

Image a 18” shell hitting a destroyer. What damage do you expect that shell to do? Is the destroyers shattered? Is the bow or stern blown off? Does the ship break into two pieces? Does the destroyer limp off out of the fight, the crew desperately trying to save a sinking ship? Now image three 18” shells hitting a destroyer nearly simultaneously? Think about Narvik and a 15” shell hitting a destroyer. Did any of this happen? No according to the historical records. 

 

From Destroyer Report Gunfire, Bomb and Kamikaze Damage Including Losses in Action 17 October, 1941 to 15 August, 1945 25 January 1945. A very interesting read.

 

2-62 One of the outstanding examples of successful casualty control through split plant operation was JOHNSTON (DD557). Her after turbines, gears and boilers were completely disabled early in the action by heavy caliber gunfire, nevertheless the ship continued to effectively engage the enemy at speeds around 20 knots for two hours afterward although additional hits finally sank her. 

 

This was one of three simultaneous heavy caliber hits, along with three simultaneous 6” hits. Does this match anyone’s mental picture of what three 18” shell hits would do to a destroyer? 

 

The report cites 14”, but Lundgren (The World Wonder'd: What Really Happened Off Samar),  Anthony Tully (co-author Shattered Sword ) and others (see Tully’s Port https://propnturret....opic.php?t=5185) effectively argue that it was in fact Yamato’s 18” that hit the destroyer. 

 

     2. Does the Equivalent Damage Rolls actually address the question at hand?

 

As I feel I have demonstrated, the chart doesn’t work even if one accepts its need. The damage caused by the additional damage rolls often bear no relation to the location of the single hit (assuming that the first roll represents the actual hit location of the single hit). This can be rationalized in any way one wishes, but rationalization needs to be supported by the historical record. Here it is not. 

 

As I previously stated, I was still debating whether the chart was needed (but already leaning towards not) when the treatment of smaller shells hitting a larger target finally caused me to address this issue here on the forum. A 5” shell detonating in a battleship’s magazine, boiler room, engine room, secondary mount, bridge, etc. will cause the same type of damage as a larger shell. The main difference is whether that shell can reach those depths through the armor. GQ3 already has a mechanism to determine whether that happens. So why cut  the number of damage rolls which reduces the smaller shells’ possible of damaging those unprotected/weakly protected systems? 

 

This issue is compounded by the Gunnery CRT. It penalizes smaller guns as the possible number of hits doesn’t reflect the higher rate of fire. It doesn’t adjust for speed or size (the up one row is partial acknowledgment but is inadequate, but no down one row for a larger target or down one for <15kts). Why does a UK 15” gun firing 6 rounds/gun in three /six minutes get the same number of possible hits as a German 5” with a rate of fire of 30-45 rounds/guns in three/six minutes? A four gun destroyer firing 360 rounds only has two tries for hits (two dice), an eight gun battleship firing 48 rounds has four tries. Then remember that the number of 15” hits is x3 while the number of 5” is halved. How does this reflect the US destroyers splattering Hiei with numerous 5” hits that caused havoc on the unprotected parts of the ship? 

 

I realize that the Rapid Fire modifier is meant to correct this, but its application is arbitrary in which guns are allowed to use the modification. Using the data from from navweap.com, many of the excluded guns have a similar rate of fire as those allowed to use Rapid Fire. More importantly, the historical record doesn’t support the haves and have nots. The German destroyers (45-54 rounds/gun in three/six minutes) at 1st Narvik certainly hammered their British counterparts just as fast as the British (30-36 rounds/gun in three/six minutes) return fire, yet no joy in Mudville for the German 5” guns to use Rapid Fire. The highly touted 5”/38 only had a rate of fire of 15 - 22 rounds per minute, so marginally faster than the German gun. While experts often assess ship capability (e.g. the ammo hosts are poor configured) in prewar comments, actual combat rarely supports their conclusions. The Dutch 5.9” has the same rate of fire as the UK 6”, but no Rapid Fire. Japanese 5”, no Rapid Fire. This doesn't make any sense. Now the French themselves stated that the Le Fantasque and Mogador classes had ammo reload issues, so I can see the logic in their case. To better understand the Rapid Fire issue, what does Lonnie see as the ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ rate of fire as compared to the rate of fire required to use Rapid Fire? 

 

In conclusion, I don’t see the value of the Equivalent Damage Rolls. It doesn’t deliver what it claims to adjust and penalizes the small caliber guns even more than the CRT already does.

 

Okay an overly long post for something that is unlikely to move the needle in any meaningful official way. This is house rule territory. I like the basic GQ3 system but recognize that it does have issues. These issues can be reduced in scope but never eliminated as no rule set can ever be perfect. Adjustments can be made without changing the basic system. Equivalent Damage is unnecessary chrome so don’t use it. Rapid Fire is merely a band-aid for a basic problem with the Gunnery CRT, but the CRT would need to be redesigned to fully solve its issues. Allowing Rapid Fire for all 6” and under except for well documented cases would better reflect the realities without a redesign.  

[Jim O'Neil]

I guess you and Lonnie will need to arm wrestle over this... he won't be back until the end of the month sometime.

 

I will point out that near misses can be exceedingly damaging due to the spray of fragments, and a shell hitting water almost always goes off [at short ranges it can skip like a rock, which may not arm the fuse ].  

 

The rest isoprene for discussion in my view, and you have made some strong arguments.

[jwsleser]

Jim

 

I guess you and Lonnie will need to arm wrestle over this... he won't be back until the end of the month sometime.

 

Not really. He has made it very clear that a GQ4 isn't going to happen. Play the rules as is or use your own house rules, he is good with both. I recognize that. My posts are PSAs. 

 

I will point out that near misses can be exceedingly damaging due to the spray of fragments, and a shell hitting water almost always goes off [at short ranges it can skip like a rock, which may not arm the fuse ].  

 

True. So how is this handled in the rules? Bombing can get a near miss that can cause hull damage, but nothing for gunfire. So a mechanism exists but is not used. I can rationalize that the higher than historical to hit probability in the CRT includes near-misses. That hull hit was actually a near-miss. That sounds logical and keeps things simple, but does it work across the board for all size shells? It doesn't address the rate of fire problem which should generate more near-misses. Does armor negate the effect of near misses? Did the spray of fragments actually have a significant effect? I can see the porcupine look of British cruisers/destroyers after several actions but they were still combat effective. 

 

​Note that a significant behavior makes this issue of equivalent damage greater than it should be: players will shoot any gun at anything because they can. The cases of battleship size weapons firing at much smaller ships are rare for a reason. Partly because large warships are often usually firing at similar sized ships, but the reality of target tracking, firing control, rate of fire, and limited ammunition meant that captains just didn't waste effort on trying to hit such small, mobile targets. It wasn't cost effective by any measure. A destroyer at 10k isn't a threat (I know about the Type 93), and if it was, that is what light cruisers, destroyers, and secondary guns are for. How many times have we heard a gamer say 'well I have nothing better to shoot at so....' and all you need to do is roll a one for a hit (which becomes three or so). ​My RJW variation of GQ3 doesn't allow the big guns to shoot at small targets. 

 

Too often rules incorporate those rare events because they happened once (Hood anyone) and players expect it (these rules aren't realistic if I can't blow up Hood). Sometimes it is just better to say no, it doesn't happen in these rules. However you can write your own house rule to allow it to happen (or an optional rule that can be crafted to realistically reflect the right odds of it happening without distorting the CRTs, etc.). This way, the rules can be designed to focus on what actually happened 98% of the time in a more realistic manner.  

 

Just some more thoughts.

 

v/r  Jeff

[Jim O'Neil]

Well bombs have significantly more explosive than shells. An GP bomb has roughly 50% HE vice a large shell having 3-7% ; so a 2,000 pound shell might have 100 Lbs of HE depending on type. And often a less brisant explosive as well.

 

You make a lot of realistic and valid points, but we need to be careful about limiting peoples options. We could limit BBs to 10-12 turns of shooting, but then you have to count salvoes for each ship and track times when only some turrets fired while others didn’t (couldn’t bear or whatever). The goal was simplification, which always seems to allow people to do unhistoric or irrational things.

 

I have not seen a “Hood” rule in any set of rules …of course I haven’t bothered with a lot of rules either. HMS Hood was a case of the “Oh the odds of that happening are minute” running pell mell into the Variation of Murphy’s Law that says “if something bad can happen, it likely will and usually at the worst possible moment”.

 

Keep thinking…it can’t hurt to make folks defend their reasoning.

[JAHinson]

I remembered this discussion from a few years ago from another gaming group I was following: https://admiraltytri...age_Effects.pdf

 

I like hybrid systems because I'm lucky 

[Jim O'Neil]

One of the things we haven't addressed is point detonating (PD) fuses. Many naval shells don't have the ability to have these, but some do... I *think* the Pocket battleship 11" guns  had some shells that had these for Merchants and lightly amored ships, but can't vouch for any other large caliber guns having such. The US 16 light bombardment projectiles may have had them. 

 Most Naval shells were common with solid noses as Jeff has said though. The base fuses were less sensitive and given to blow through.

[jwsleser]

Good discussion Jim

 

I just read your last post, so this reply doesn't touch on that point.

 

You make a lot of realistic and valid points, but we need to be careful about limiting peoples options…The goal was simplification, which always seems to allow people to do unhistoric or irrational things.

 

Yes, simplicity is very important. But the balance between simplification and historical accuracy is as important.

 

Sometimes simplification requires limiting options because the simplification itself encourages unhistoric behavior as you have stated. I have tried to visualize refighting 2nd Sirte with unlimited battleship ammo and fighting at the historical ranges (7k-20k). The Italians can sit back and bang away as their ability to hit is much greater than historical. One has a 25% of hit when rolling four dice. It jumps to 52% if a 1⁺, which happens at 18k for an Italian 15” gun. Yikes!  That 15” shell is x3 against a cruiser, x4 for a destroyer. Any hull hit reduces a ship’s speed (which is another discussion). The British might wish to close the range to avoid being shot to pieces at long range and their cruisers and destroyers get Rapid Fire but the Italians don’t. 

 

We could limit BBs to 10-12 turns of shooting, but then you have to count salvoes for each ship and track times when only some turrets fired while others didn’t (couldn’t bear or whatever).

 

How are the six turns for Rapid Fire tracked? How are torpedoes tracked? Given GQ3 already uses Ship Logs that one constantly refers back to, is it too much to add a line of boxes that quantify ammunition supply? A destroyer with 300 rds per gun firing 30 rds in 6 minutes (GQ standard) would have 10 boxes. No need to track ammo types, but making players aware there is a limit would certainly change player behavior. Firing half or less of the armament is half a box. Rapid Fire is 1 & 1/2 Boxes. Using half the available dice (reduced firing) is one half box. Half a box if the optional Initial Salvos rule is used. GQ3 already has a system because of the Ship Log, it just needs to be implemented. 

 

RE: Hood Rule. That is my tongue in cheek name for naval rules that allow a magazine explosion. Name another ship that had a magazine explosion from gunfire alone which hadn’t already been battered to death. I don’t know of any except Bretagne and it is unclear whether the shell actually hit the magazine or the serious fires from the second and fourth 15” hit set off the magazine minutes later. So two ships out of hundreds. GQ3 has a .5% chance of a magazine explosion (die rolls in order of 12, 5-7, 10-12 this varies by navies (.17% for US/Ger). French ships are a .69% which appears pretty arbitrary given the lack of data. 

 

GQ3 gives the opportunity for magazine explosions to manifest at a significantly greater rate than the historical record. It just didn’t happened. Steering and engineering hits were far more common than magazine hits (explosion or not). The real threat to magazines were turret/barbette hits. Even then, those rarely (if ever) transformed into magazine explosions. On the Critical Hit chart, you could make 5-6 a magazine hit with automatic flooding (disabling the gun). A 7, followed by 12 for an explosion would make the odds .058%. Better historical odds. 

 

Limiting choices is often a better than allowing players to do unhistorical things because the adjudication system (here a 12-side die) makes those unhistorical things much easier. Which makes a better game; Hood blowing up in the first game turn or the British and Germans maneuvering and battling it out over 10-20 turns? 

[jwsleser]

Jere corrected my math in my last post RE: The Italians can sit back and bang away as their ability to hit is much greater than historical. One has a 25% of hit when rolling four dice. ​The actual odds are 29%. The 52% if a 1⁺ is still correct. 

 

From Jim's last post:

 

One of the things we haven't addressed is point detonating (PD) fuses. Many naval shells don't have the ability to have these, but some do... 

 

Clearly trying to use each individual case to prove the historical results (bottom-up reasoning) is a sisyphean endeavor as each case had a unique situation. In my original post, I presented the historical record and then offered possible reasons why this was (top-down reasoning). Like most wargame rules, GQ3 is an aggregate simulation (top-down) which uses a few entity models (bottom-up) to focus on what the designer feels are important for the players' decision making. When an aggregate simulation uses a limited adjudication system (like a 12-sided die) but includes the entire range of possible outcomes, the results will always skew to the extremes and the mean will be under-represented. 

 

This and the other discussions I have posted are possible ways to keep the basic structure of GQ3 (which is pretty solid) but to buff out the sharp edges. The options so far have mainly been chart changes or to realign the problematic rule with an existing rule. 

[Jim O'Neil]

Well as a House Rule, you could roll a D6 for each major caliber hit on a unarmored vessel  with 1, 5 and 6 being 1 damage, 2 being 2, 3 being 3 etc.

 

It gives some chance a high order detonation, but significantly reduces it.