The Battle of Karimarta Strait
28 January 1942
Vice Admiral Ozawa’s Western Force was conducting operations against the island of Sumatra with the intended culmination to be an invasion of that island on 28/29 January 1942. To further this intent, Vice Admiral Ozawa organized his forces into three different groups. First, he operated the 4th Carrier Division (CVLs Ryujo & Shoho) under Rear Admiral Kakuta and screened by elements of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla (Rear Admiral Tanaka) and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Rear Admiral Nishimura) in the Java Sea to try and intercept any ABDA attempt to intercept the invasion force. Second, he sent an invasion convoy comprised of destroyer divisions 16 and 18 (2nd Destroyer Flotilla) and ten troop transports to conduct landings on Sumatra scheduled to occur late on 28 January and conclude on 29 January. Third, he sent Vice Admiral Kondo with 4th Cruiser Squadron (CAs Atago, Takao, Maya & Chokai), 5th Cruiser Squadron (CAs Nachi, Myoko & Haguro-Rear Admiral Takagi) as well as destroyer divisions 8 and 15 (2nd Destroyer Flotilla) to act as a covering force for the invasion convoy.
The ABDA had sent a task force under Commodore Collins RAN comprised of the Australian Squadron and forces detached from the former West Group to patrol Karimarta Strait. Collins had formed his heavy cruisers (CAs HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra & HMS Exeter) into a squadron and his light cruisers (CLs HMAS Leander, HMNZS Achilles, HMAS Hobart & HMAS Perth) into another. Collins’ destroyers consisted of the Australian destroyer division (DDs HMAS Vendetta & Vampire), Destroyer Division 1 (DDs HMS Jupiter, Express & Electra) and Destroyer Division 2 (DDs HMS Thanet, Scout, Stronghold & Tenedos) also from the former West Group.
The weather was overcast and the Japanese carriers failed to find Collins’ Task Force as did Japanese land based air. This allowed Collins to transit the Java Sea unmolested and set the stage for the first surface action under taken by ABDA ships since its formation some three weeks earlier. Although it was overcast visibility was some 22,000 yards. This was somewhat reduced by numerous squalls that spotted the area the action was to take place in. The wind was Force 5 from the west and that caused the various squalls to march across the paths of the oncoming opponents. The ABDA was heading north and the Japanese south and directly at one another when their leading ships sighted each other at 1300 hours.
Collins’ force had the relatively modern Destroyer Division 1 in front in line abreast in an anti-sub formation, followed by his heavy and light cruiser squadrons respectively in line astern. Destroyer Division 2 was line astern to the starboard of the cruiser column and the Australian destroyers were the same to port. The entire force was steaming at 20 knots.
Kondo’s cruisers were in line astern, 4th and then 5th Cruiser Squadrons. Destroyer Division 8 was following the cruisers and Destroyer Division 15 was also in line astern to port of the cruiser column. The entire force was steaming at 15 knots.
Each side continued straight ahead as their commanders decided what to do, which did not take long as Atago and Australia both open on each other with their bearing fore turrets. Collins ordered all float planes launched and speed increased to maximum as did Kondo. Collins quickly determined that a long range gun duel between his cruisers (22 8” & 32 6”) and the Japanese heavies (70 8”) was to fight the fight the Japanese should want.
Collins decided that he wanted and needed a knife fight where his light cruiser’s rapid fire might just prevail. Collins’ problem was that his heavies were leading and he was at a range that would allow the Japanese to pummel his cruisers before he could get into range if he just went straight at them. Collins’ solution to getting to where he wanted in the sailing order he wanted while avoiding being shot to pieces was a liberal use of smoke and the squalls to his port.
Collins had his light cruiser squadron turn from 0 degrees to 330 degrees while his heavies turned sharply to port to take station astern of the lights. Destroyer Division 1 turned together 90 degrees to starboard to get back into line astern while making smoke and using evasive action. The smoke and a nearby squall covered the heavy and light cruisers’ maneuver while the evasive action made any gunnery by the Japanese at Jupiter almost not worth the effort. The Australian destroyers also turned to port to 330 degrees while making smoke to provide cover behind which the cruisers could advance. The old destroyers of Destroyer Division 2 also turned to port to get behind the Australian destroyers and extend the cover for the cruiser column. Collins’ intent was close inside 9,000 yards where his 6” would penetrate and then engage.
Kondo at first split his cruiser column intending to angle each squadron out to port and starboard (4th and 5th respectively) at 45 degrees from their original heading of 180 degrees to create a cross fire. He intended to support each cruiser squadron with a destroyer division. Kondo quickly realized that plan would not work when he saw what Collins was doing and recalled the 5th Cruiser Squadron to take station astern again of the 4th Cruiser Squadron. Kondo turned his 4th Cruiser Squadron further to port to a heading of 270 degrees to stay ahead of Collins’ leading ships and also to stay between Collins and the invasion convoy.
Collins could see that Kondo had adjusted to his tactics, but he simply did not see any other option that would allow him to fight his way past and he continued on. Atago opened on HMAS Vendetta at over 12,000 yards and hit her twice, knocking out a gun and slowing her to 29 knots. Vendetta’s hull damage coupled with evasive action would compromise Collins’ plan. Other Japanese cruiser fire hit HMS Thanet in her engines, slowing her greatly. Thanet would stagger out of line and HMS Scout would take her place.
It was now 1330 hours and the decisive moment had come. Collins had failed to take into account Vendetta’s reduced speed and HMNZS Achilles (second in line) was now visible to Atago while HMAS Leander was visible to Atago, Takeo and Maya. Atago and Achilles would target each other while Leander would target Takeo. Takeo and Maya would target Leander. In addition, the destroyers HMAS Vendetta, HMS Scout and HMS Jupiter were now visible to Chokai, Nachi and Myoko. Sixty Japanese 8” now decided the issue by hitting both light cruisers thrice each and all three visible destroyers four times each (despite the destroyers using evasive action). Leander knocked out a fore turret on Takeo and Achilles hit Atago causing a fire that damaged her badly before she could finally put it out.
Collins launched torpedoes from Leander and Vendetta and turned away under smoke. Kondo also launched torpedoes from Atago and then also turned away. Collins reassessed and realized that the damage to his cruisers was repairable and he needed to preserve his ships for another day. Collins decided to withdraw. Kondo decided that he had prevented Collins from hitting the invasion convoy (his mission) and that he had suffered enough damage already and allowed Collins to disengage.
The end result was that Atago had enough hull damage to require her to be withdrawn for repair (out of the campaign) and Takeo had a turret knocked out that cannot be repaired outside Japan. Collins cruisers could be repaired locally as could the damage to destroyer Thanet. The destroyers Jupiter, Scout and Vendetta on the other hand had to be withdrawn for repair and Scout counts as crippled having lost all her guns. Collins failure resulted in Sumatra being invaded the following day and the island would fall within days.
