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[Adam H. Jones III]

AN AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR A GENERAL QUARTERS 3 NAVAL GAMEBY: Adam H. Jones IIIA World War II naval war game was played at the B and B game shop inEureka in St. Louis, Missouri on Saturday, February 24, 2009. The game master for the gamewas I: Adam Jones. The players that participated in the game wereWilliam Doelling and Mark Johnson, who handled the Italian forces.Will Hodgen handled the US forces. The game rules used was GeneralQuarters 3, a new revision of the classic naval war game rules. Thescenario for the game was a what-if encounter between the ItalianNavy and the US Navy near Sicily at the closing days of the invasionof Sicily. Throughout the invasion, Italian naval vessels attemptedto attack the Allied invasion fleet but had little luck inpenetrating the screening vessels. On August 9, the Italian Navymade another bid to hit the invasion fleet, but this time having alittle help. Below is the description of the game played.NIGHT MARE NOSTRUMITALY VS THE UNITED STATESAUGUST 9, 1943The quarter moon sprayed its reflected light across the water as theUS task force droned on its repetitive patrol route. The number ofship in the task force was small; two Brooklyn Class light cruisers (USS Philadelphia and USS Savannah) and two Benham Class destroyers (USS Rowan and USS Rhind) but they all had benefited from thegrueling experiences learned in the Pacific by their cohorts. Theships carried the latest radars and fire control systems and theircrews were well trained and confident of their ability. The US taskforce had the USS Philadelphia leading the cruiser line with USSSavannah following. The two destroyers were parallel to the cruiserline and off of the starboard some 5000 yards. The task force waspatrolling their sector to prevent any enemy naval forces frompenetrating the invasion force anchorage and threatening the supplysources of the ground forces. Throughout the night, various vesselsapproached the task force and were detected by radar, forcing theships to move to intercept, and then use their Aldis lamps to send acoded signal to the unidentified ship. Friendly ships that flashedthe proper coded response were allowed to pass. Any ships thatfailed to respond or responded incorrectly were to be sunk. So far,the night was relatively uneventful with the last contact being anhour ago when a British destroyer flew through the patrol zone,frantically flashing its response as she charged back to the invasionfleet and the oilier tasked to refuel her. The US task forcecontinued on it patrol awaiting the next encounter……The Italian Navy had been frustrated by their lack of success inattacking the Allied naval forces arrayed around Sicily. Time andtime again, the ships sent against the invasion fleet were eitherintercepted or the commanders of the Italian ships would turn awaywhen they encountered enemy vessels. A number of ship captains havebeen sacked for cowardice in the face of the enemy. Two weeks ago, apresent was given to the Italian Naval Command that may change theirluck. A patrolling torpedo boat engaged a British submarine andmanaged to damage her enough for her crew to abandon ship. Thetorpedo boat captured two officers and ten seamen. Searching theofficers, the crew found a signal book on one of the officers thatoutlined all of the coded light signals for the Allies operatingaround Sicily for the entire month. This would allow our ships toproperly respond to any enemy patrols that are encountered and slippast those patrols to engage the invasion fleet. A force was quicklyorganized to take advantage of the code before the Allies changethem. The ships were to sail to Sicily from Genoa, attempt to slippast any patrols using the codes captured from the British, and thenattack the invasion fleet to deny supplies to the ground forces. TheItalian task force was made up of four light cruisers; (CL GuiseppeGaribaldi (flagship), CL Emanuele Filberto Duca d' Aosta, CL RaymondoMontecuccoli, CL Eugenio di Savoia) and three destroyers; (DDVincenzo Gioberti, DD Carabiniere, DD Mitragliere). None of thecruisers had any radars or fire control systems but one destroyer: V.Gioberti had just received a German FuMO 25 surface search radar andjust finished her shakedown cruise to learn how to use the newradar. As the task force approached Sicily, the ships shook outinto battle formation with the cruisers in line ahead formation withR. Montecuccoli leading followed by E. di Savoia, E.F Duca d' Aosta,then G. Garibaldi. The three destroyers were parallel to thecruisers and off to the port of the battle line by some 5000 yards.At about 0100, the destroyer V. Gioberti flashed a contact signal toG. Garibaldi that a radar contact appeared at the distance of some20,000 yards off of the port bow. G. Garibaldi responded to thefleet to hold fire and continue on course. At 0112 hours, the nightgloom was split by a series of flashing lights that the Italian flagrecognized as the Allied challenge signal for unidentified shipsapproaching an Allied task force. The Italians still have not madevisual contact with the enemy force detected by radar since it was16,000 yards away, but the Italian flag admiral ordered theG. Garibaldi to flash the appropriate response based on the capturedsignals book. The signal was flashed and all of the bridge officersheld their breath as they waited to see if the ruse worked. Afterwhat seemed like minutes but really just a few seconds, the enemyforce flashed a signal received and confirmed response. The bridgereleased a collective sigh and continued to close on the contact. At0118, lookouts reported visual contact with enemy force at 12,000yards off of the port bow. The enemy force appeared to be three USheavy cruisers and two US destroyers sailing at about 18 knots. Theenemy force was heading 90 degrees true and would cross in front ofthe Italian formation in twelve minutes………The Philadelphia's radar made the first contact with the unidentifiedforce at about 0112 hours at 16,000 yards. General Quarters wassounded for the fleet and the men took to their respective battlestations. Plot reported seven ships approaching from the northwestat about 21 knots in two lines. One line appeared to be cruisers andthe other destroyers. A quick check of the patrol logs for the dayconfirms that a British task force was operating in that generaldirection. The patrol logs along with the earlier British destroyercontact convinced the Philadelphia's admiral that this was probably aBritish force. A challenge contact signal was flashed and theunidentified force responded properly. A received and confirmedsignal was flashed back and the US task force prepared to stand downfrom General Quarters. As the British force closed to 12,000 yards,the British force was sighted visually by the US task force and thecaptain of the Rhind and his first officer began to notice somethingnot quite right with the "British" force closing. Staring throughthe night binoculars, the two officers quickly realized thatthe "British" force was in fact an Italian task force. At 0118 hours,the Rhind signaled the fleet that the approaching force wasItalian…….The R. Montecuccoli took the initial blow as the US task force openedfire. The ship disappeared as shell splashes surrounded her. The R.Montecuccoli took three hits that knocked out both of her torpedomounts and a 3.9" secondary gun mounts. The Italian flag admiralwas stunned by the massive amount of fire coming from the US cruisersand quickly had to change his tactics. He ordered G. Garibaldi andE.F. Duca d' Aosta along with the three destroyers to turn to portand attempt to sail to the rear of the US cruisers. He ordered R.Montecuccoli and E. di Savoia to turn starboard to try to cross thebow of the US cruisers and hopefully draw them from our rear forceturning to port. The Italian cruisers did return fire against the UScruisers but no hits were observed. The Italian admiral did noticethat the third US cruiser at the end of the US line was not firingand thought it was very strange that the US cruiser would not fire.The admiral quickly dismissed the thought as the engagementunfolded…..The US task force commander saw the Italian maneuver and realizedthat the US force would not be able to engage both groups of enemyships. The US task force commander signaled the fleet to staytogether and decided to engage the two cruisers that turned towardthe front of the US cruiser line. The US force would deal with thesetwo cruisers first and then turn back to engage the others. Thatdecision would have consequences later on in the battle. The next 24minutes saw the entire US force continue to close with the R.Montecuccoli and E. di Savoia, concentrating fire on the R.Montecuccoli. Shell hits destroyed the R. Montecuccoli's floatplanesand started a fire on the fantail that was quickly extinguished.Hits also penetrated her hull and damaged the engine room slowing theR. Montecuccoli to 18 knots. A turret was destroyed and additionalsecondary mounts were knocked out. The Italian cruisers continued tofire back defiantly but could not find the mark as numerous salvosmissed the US cruisers and destroyers. The US destroyers closed totorpedo range and loosed torpedo salvos toward the Italian cruisers.Two torpedoes flashed just to the stern of the R. Montecuccoli andtwo others ran under her with no hits reported. The torpedoes mayhave failed to hit but the attacks forced E. di Savoia to turn out ofthe battle line to port and sail toward the rear of the US cruisers.R. Montecuccoli was left alone as the US cruisers continued to poundher mercilessly. The US destroyers sailed across her bow andcontinued to engage from the opposite side. The captain of the R.Montecuccoli had had enough and turned to disengage the damagedcruiser from the battle. As she completed her 180 degree turn andsteamed away from the US cruisers, a final salvo smashed into her.The R. Montecuccoli was mortally wounded with the last salvo as herbulkheads were smashed and two fires breaking out inside the ship.The R. Montecuccoli slowed to a stop and at 0154 hours, rolled overand sank….The E. di Savoia attempted to assist R. Montecuccoli with her gunfirebut again, the Italian cruisers seemed to be unable to hit any of theUS ships. The US cruisers ignored the E. di Savoia as she made herrun toward the rear of USS Savannah. When R. Montecuccoli sank, theUS cruisers quickly turned and started to engage E. di Savoia.Apparently practice make perfect as both US cruiser inflicted overten hits on the E di Savoia in 12 minutes. Most of the damage washull damage as shells ravaged the engine room and generally destroyedthe hull. Two main turrets were knocked out as well as the firecontrol director. The E. di Savoia did manage to do something thatno other Italian cruiser did during this battle. The E. Savoiamanaged to hit the USS Savannah on the stern. The shell destroyedthe floatplanes and started a major fire in the stern. Damagecontrol crews struggled to put it out and eventually extinguished thefire but not before it damaged more of the inside of the ship. Thesuccessful hit by E di Savoia must have angered the US ships. Overthe next six minutes, the E. di Savoia was pounded into the waterwith some ten additional hits. Completely engulfed in flames, the E.di Savoia sank at 0212 hours….The Italian flag admiral on G. Garibaldi stared toward the southeastas flashes and fire flickered on and off as the two cruisers he hassent toward the front of the US task force engaged the Americans. Itappeared that his quick reaction seemed to work as he watched the USforce fade into the darkness until only the gun flashes and fire werevisible. Repeated attempts to contact the two Italian cruisers havefailed and he feared that one or both of them had been sunk. Theirsacrifice did allow his force to slip to the rear of the US force andsteam to the invasion fleet. The three Italian destroyers got astrange surprise as they began to make their move to the rear of theUS force. The destroyers began to make a torpedo run on the rear UScruiser that was not firing. The destroyer's lookouts sent distanceand speed reports to the torpedo men. The destroyer V. Gioberti'sradar however, was not picking up a contact at the distance beingreported by the lookouts. The captain of the V. Gioberti challengedthe lookouts to verify that they have a US cruiser in sight. Finallythe torpedo officer reported that he could not see any US cruisersanywhere. Shortly, the other destroyers begin to report losing sightof the US cruiser and could not see anything now. The Italian flagadmiral was concerned as to where the third US cruiser was. Theadmiral decided to send a disengage signal to the two Italiancruisers engaged with the US forces, not knowing the fate of thecruisers. He ordered E. F. Duca d' Aosta along with the threedestroyers to accelerate to flank speed and make the run into theAllied invasion fleet before the third US cruiser reappears. Theflagship, G. Garibaldi would remain in the area to run interferenceand to keep the US ships occupied by distracting them but keeping outof a gun battle after seeing the horrific effect of the fast firingUS cruisers.Just as the destroyers were streaking out of the battle area, the USSSavannah popped into view at 12,000 yards and fired on the V.Gioberti, destroying the front turret with the salvo…The US task force commander was well satisfied with the performanceof his ships. The force had engaged two Italian cruisers and sunkthem handily with only one hit in return. Granted, the resultantfire from that hit caused damage to USS Savannah that probably wouldforce her to return to England or the United States for repair, buther loss would not seriously affect operations and USS Savannah isstill operational and dangerous as demonstrated by the quick salvoshe fired on an Italian destroyer as the destroyer sailed into thenight. The salvo hit the destroyer but the USS Savannah could notdetermine what damage was inflicted. As the US task force gatheredtogether and moved toward the second Italian force, the radar plotsrevealed a serious problem. Plot was reporting that the Italianforce was moving at an incredible speed of 36 knots except for oneship which was traveling at 30 knots. The US task force commanderknew that there were two cruisers in the second force and as his owncruisers could not go faster than 33 knots, he could not grasp thatthe Italian cruisers were traveling as fast as his destroyers.Noting the position of his force in relation to the Italian force, itwas apparent that his cruiser force could not catch the escapingItalians. There was also a second contact traveling some 30 knotsthat was withdrawing north but zigging back toward his force atintervals. Realizing that some Italian ships got past him, the UStask force commander quickly radioed HQ and let them know of theapproach of the Italian ships. He then decide to keep an eye on thesingle 30 knot contact to make sure it does not attempt to move tothe invasion fleet…The game was called at this point and the post game discussionoccurred. The game was called a draw.The Italian objective was to slip ships past the patrols and get theminto the invasion fleet. Three Italian destroyers and one Italianlight cruiser succeeded in doing that with only one destroyer withany damage. However, the loss of two light cruisers was a severeblow and the fact that the flagship did not move to the invasionfleet reduced the Italians cruiser force by three quarters therebyseverely weakening the force that got through.The US force objective was to prevent any enemy ships from getting tothe invasion fleet. They failed to prevent this with four intactenemy vessels getting past them. However, the aggressive tactics andefficient use of the rapid firing US cruisers totally obliterated twoItalian light cruisers with only one ship hit and damaged in returnwas impressive. The loss of the two Italian cruisers along with theItalian flagship staying out of harms way reduced the Italian cruiserforce by three quarters and made it easier for follow on forces toengage and stop the ships that got through.The rapid firing 6" and 5" guns of the Brooklyn Class light cruiserswas the decisive factor in the game for the Americans. The twocruisers consistently smacked the Italian cruisers with multiplehits. Damage accumulated quickly and soon two of the Italiancruisers were sunk. The effectiveness of the US guns was a factorin Bill Doelling's decision not to send the flagship that sailed only30 knots to the invasion fleet. Historically, the Italians spottedthe US ships and turned back to avoid combat. They were roundlycriticized and eventually removed from command. This game seems tosay that if the Italians pushed the battle, the Italian captainswould have been heralded as heroes…dead heroes.Bill Doelling and Mark Johnson did a smart thing to split their forceand force Will to respond to one force or the other. This decisionwas helped by the fact that Will did not know of the speed of theItalian cruisers. When Will was ready to confront the second Italianforce, the speed of the Italians allowed them to escape unharmed.Bill and Mark also had tremendously bad luck. The entire Italianforce only successfully hit the US ships ONCE. If the Italians hadmanaged to hit the US ships with normal hit percentages, the outcomemay have been different. The US force did not get distracted byhaving to repair damage, losing turrets and torpedo tubes to shellfire, or slowing down the formation due to damage accumulation. Billstill stated that the rapid fire US ships would still win the day andthat may be true, but the fact that the Italians could not hitanything certainly made the battle appear more lopsided that itshould have been.Will, also, did very well. Faced with the Italians splitting hisforce, he did not overreact and attempt to do too much with toolittle. He realized that he could not effectively stop both forcessimultaneously. Will smartly kept his force together and forced anengagement with the closest Italian force. Will closed the rangequickly to get into effective torpedo and gun range and even with themultiple battery penalty when two or more gun batteries engage thesame target, swarmed the Italian cruisers with hits and quickly sanktwo cruisers in three turns. If Will had realized how fast theItalian cruisers were, he may have used a different tactic to slowthe Italians down, but I do not think he would have managed to sinktwo cruisers if he tried to maneuver more cautiously and attempt tokeep all of the Italian force on the board. Luck also helped Willwhen a sharp eyed destroyer captain rolled a "1" on an acquisitionroll and recognized the "British" ships as Italian on the very firstvisibility check. Without that roll, British ship models would havebeen placed on the board and the "British" force would have continuedto move and eventually got into a good firing position to "ambush"the US force. Finally, the mysterious third US cruiser that the Italian spotted formost of the battle and did not fire….A SHADOW. In the historicalbattle, the reason the Italian force withdrew rather than engage isthat all of the Italian captains insisted that there were three tofour US cruisers spotted…not two. I had the US player place oneadditional cruiser model as a shadow of either Philadelphia orSavannah. The shadow must follow the "real" vessel it was assignedto and could not fire or spot. The Italians would discover it wasnot a real vessel once it got to within 8000 yards visual range andmake a successful acquisition roll. The Italian destroyer with radarwas not good enough to differentiate individual ships so the radarwould not have allowed the Italians to discover that the ship was ashadow until very close. The Italian destroyers attempted to make atorpedo run on the shadow and discovered that the ship was really notthere…it provided a really good reaction when I removed the ship fromthe game board.In general, all had a good time and I also learned a lot from thegame. I hope all that attended had a good time and also hope thatthis AAR will spur more of you to come out and play.