9 replies to this topic

[Aman]

yep, I read about it all the time in these memoirs of the Solmon Islands night actions. The ships get so up close and personal they are blasting away with everything down to .50cal and even Thompsons and pistols! But I'm more thinking about the 40mm gun sizes, where I could see some real damage being done to an unarmored DD or something.

Anyone know if there are rules somewhere to shoot your AA factors at surface targets up close?

[Cpt M]

yep, I read about it all the time in these memoirs of the Solmon Islands night actions. The ships get so up close and personal they are blasting away with everything down to .50cal and even Thompsons and pistols! But I'm more thinking about the 40mm gun sizes, where I could see some real damage being done to an unarmored DD or something.

Anyone know if there are rules somewhere to shoot your AA factors at surface targets up close?

AA values can only be used against small craft. While the literature is rift with examples of ships firing every thing up to hand guns at the enemy, the fact is that these weapons were never effective against their targets (beyond the morale value). The damage model accounts for hits that can inflict meaningful damage on a target. And even a 40mm falls well below this threshold, even when the target is a DD, DE, or TB. Additionally, the AA value represents an aggregrate of all the AA capable weapons (from MGs up to main guns). As such, it does not represent any one class of weapon (such as 40mms).

[Aman]

Hmmm, I not much of the rivet-counting type of gamer, but I question that a wooden motor torpedo boat would be unaffected by 40mm AA guns, 50-cals, and the like. The rapid fire of the 50cal, 20mm and 40mm types of guns is lethal within range. Also, my understanding is that the metal sides of DE and DDs was 1/4" thick, well within the penetrating ability of such weapons.

Of course i can make a house rule, but I'd like to see if something has already been done by those better informed than I.

Perhaps just take the AA factor at 2000y and roll a shooting dice for each 1/2 factor, only counting unarmored and criticals? No hull boxes?

[Cpt M]

Hmmm, I not much of the rivet-counting type of gamer, but I question that a wooden motor torpedo boat would be unaffected by 40mm AA guns, 50-cals, and the like. The rapid fire of the 50cal, 20mm and 40mm types of guns is lethal within range. Also, my understanding is that the metal sides of DE and DDs was 1/4" thick, well within the penetrating ability of such weapons.

Small craft such as motor launches, MTB and such are covered under section 1.14 SMALL CRAFT and COASTAL FORCES. The AA values are used against such targets as this type of weapon (small caliber automatic guns) was preferred (I have yet to come across a AAR that mentions the use of DD or above main guns in actions against MTBS, except to possibly loft starshells).

Regarding the use of 40mm and below on DD type targets: A close reading of damage reports where such fire was received shows no real damage (beyond very minor and inconsequential damage) incurred (in fact, the impact is so low as to receive little mention). Consequently, there is no convincing evidence that this sort of fire had any real impact on their targets.

Of course i can make a house rule, but I'd like to see if something has already been done by those better informed than I.

Perhaps just take the AA factor at 2000y and roll a shooting dice for each 1/2 factor, only counting unarmored and criticals? No hull boxes?

That type of rule would grossly overstate the impact of such fire and severely skew the damage model. A 40mm HE round (the most common carried) is not going to affect any of the targets listed under the 'C-S-T' line. And since the AA fire control system is not optimized for surface combat, all such fire would be local control only (and very inaccurate over a minimal range). An additionally consideration is the AA value is, as previously stated, an aggregate of all the AA capable weapons. This includes everything from light MGs up to 5" guns; it is not just the light AA. Finally, keep in mind that not all DDs carried heavy automatic cannon. The early Solomons battles occurred prior to the widespread adoption of the 40mm (1.1" and .50" still being the predominant light AA weapons with some 20mm) and none of these have any chance of causing meaningful damage to anything above a small craft.

While firing off everything on deck might have some visceral morale value, such fire had virtually no real affect (and certainly none that would be reflected in the damage model).

Finally, one needs to be careful when reading battle descriptions from memoirs. Such descriptions are often highly exaggerated (not surprising given the extreme nature of the events and the heightened emotions of the writer). CAs become BBs, DDs become CAs and small fires on an enemy ship become massive conflagrations that turn into sinkings when the reality is that the fire has been put out with little damage incurred. This is not to say that such memoirs are not useful; they're very useful for other elements (and they're just good reading). But some of the battle descriptions do need to be read with a critical eye.

[Frank]

Admiral Abe, and the captain of the Hiei were wounded by small arms fire. Abe's chief of staff was killed. The captain of the Yuzuki was killed by strafing F4F's during Fletcher's raid on Tulagi. While 40mm shells might penetrate destroyer armor, they lack the capacity to do a lot of damage. A suggestion would be a (small) chance for small arms to cause a bridge hit? These situation where something rare happens can be a pain in the butt when making rules.

[Cpt M]

Admiral Abe, and the captain of the Hiei were wounded by small arms fire. Abe's chief of staff was killed. The captain of the Yuzuki was killed by strafing F4F's during Fletcher's raid on Tulagi. While 40mm shells might penetrate destroyer armor, they lack the capacity to do a lot of damage. A suggestion would be a (small) chance for small arms to cause a bridge hit? These situation where something rare happens can be a pain in the butt when making rules.

There are many examples of individual senior officers being incapacitated during battle. And in every case the chain of commander would kick in and he is immediately replaced. This, however, is not what a bridge critical represents in game terms. The critical hit represents a wholesale disruption of the command element (as when the entire bridge crew is disabled by a direct hit to the bridge). The loss of one officer, however senior, does not rise to this level and does not merit inclusion.

[Aman]

"Finally, one needs to be careful when reading battle descriptions from memoirs. Such descriptions are often highly exaggerated (not surprising given the extreme nature of the events and the heightened emotions of the writer). CAs become BBs, DDs become CAs and small fires on an enemy ship become massive conflagrations that turn into sinkings when the reality is that the fire has been put out with little damage incurred. This is not to say that such memoirs are not useful; they're very useful for other elements (and they're just good reading). But some of the battle descriptions do need to be read with a critical eye"

Sure, I do have a history degree. However, too often the scientific mindset ignores eyewitness evidence too its detriment. As has already been stated here in the forum several times on other posts, tests conducted on ranges or ideal conditions do not accurately replicate actual combat events.

And who is anyone to say that the damage on the Heie caused by smaller weapons fire from the Sterrett (their testimony) wasn't of critical import? The only people would be the Hiei personnel, and of course they can be wrong also.

My point is there's a balance of science / testing and first-hand accounts, and the military itself values both. Certainly we should also.

[Cpt M]

"Finally, one needs to be careful when reading battle descriptions from memoirs. Such descriptions are often highly exaggerated (not surprising given the extreme nature of the events and the heightened emotions of the writer). CAs become BBs, DDs become CAs and small fires on an enemy ship become massive conflagrations that turn into sinkings when the reality is that the fire has been put out with little damage incurred. This is not to say that such memoirs are not useful; they're very useful for other elements (and they're just good reading). But some of the battle descriptions do need to be read with a critical eye"

Sure, I do have a history degree. However, too often the scientific mindset ignores eyewitness evidence too its detriment. As has already been stated here in the forum several times on other posts, tests conducted on ranges or ideal conditions do not accurately replicate actual combat events.

In this case, eyewitness accounts, can be very deceiving (especially in night actions). Often perceived ranges are wildly inaccurate, damage assessments on enemy ships and the effects of gunfire grossly overstated. I have long ago lost count of the number of occasions when the on the scene states x number of cruisers sunk and y number damaged when the reality is that there were no cruisers in the area and the whole of the damage was to a single destroyer (and that light). This is why analyzing any combat action mentioned in a memoir is so difficult. Where memoirs excel is in coming to grips with the mindset and preconceptions (especially of those in command) and how these affected the outcome.

And who is anyone to say that the damage on the Heie caused by smaller weapons fire from the Sterrett (their testimony) wasn't of critical import? The only people would be the Hiei personnel, and of course they can be wrong also.

This a bit of a straw man argument since Hiei did not survive. That said, from an abundance of AARs and damage assessments of other actions by other combatants (USN, RN, IJN, etc.), it is clear that the effect of small caliber AA weapons on anything DD sized and over was minor and inconsequential. Now while these effects might justifiably be included in a more highly detailed damage model (as used in the classic rivet counter type of game), they would not be included in the damage model used by GQ3.

My point is there's a balance of science / testing and first-hand accounts, and the military itself values both. Certainly we should also.

But if the first hand account is wide variance to the actual outcome (as reflected by post battle damage assessments), then the actual outcome must take precedence. When constructing a damage model (or any system for a ruleset) the actual, physical outcomes must take precedence if the ruleset is to have any validity.

[MatthewB]

I just finished reading Neptune's Inferno, and this was a question I had when reading about Destroyers, and other ships pumping 20mm and 40mm fire into the portholes and superstructure of the Hiei.

From what I gather, the superstructure itself was not especially armored, and the 20mm/40mm would have been able to damage all manner of systems.

The question would be:

Do those systems create a real effect upon the fighting capability of the ship?

 

Of that.... I do not know. 

MB

[Cpt M]

"Do those systems create a real effect upon the fighting capability of the ship?"

 

Based on what we know from post action reports, generally speaking, no.  The bigger issue, however, is that this sort of damage is below the level of the game's combat model.