6 replies to this topic

[W. Clark]

After having played 3 GT of TSC as if Savo had not occurred we decided to start over and fight Savo after all. We looked at it and decided that it would take multiple sessions to complete and so we labeled each combat with an Allied Force as Mikawa took them on as a phase. This then is Phase I, Part 1.

Randysan playing the part of Vice Admiral Mikawa with his trusty subordinates Jeffsan and Terrysan upon learning of the upstart Yankee landing on the "Canal" steamed south from Rabual through the Slot timing his approach to reach Savo Sound about midnight. He knew he would be outnumbered but he was counting on my repeated crying about the greater Japanese night fighting skills and the Long Lance torpedo give him victory.

Mikawa had use line ahead for his formation and gone after the weaker Southern Force first. Randysan knew that Rearmost Admiral Clarkski (playing the part of Rear Admiral Crutchley) knew all that, so Randysan tried the old switcherroo and changed things up. Randysan would form three columns and take on the Northern Force first.

Randysan's Columns from East to West (person commanding)
East-DD Yunagi (Randysan)
Center-Chokai (Randysan), Kinugasa, Furutaka and Yubsri (Terrysan)
West-Aoba, Kako and Tenryu (Jeffsan)

Rear Admiral Crutchley (err Clarkski) although a veteran of Jutland, had failed to get an appointment aboard a battle cruiser and thus missed having a ship sunk beneath him. Yearning for the experience, (his staff tried taking him on elevators to simulate the sinking sensation to his satisfaction, but no luck), he went with the historical deployment.

In the event, command of the Northern Force went to my most trusted subordinate, Preston as Captain Riefkohl while myself and my nephew (commanders of the Southern and Eastern Forces respectively) commanded a cruiser each under Preston.

Mr. Bishop (aka The Ref) and I had talked over what had happened at Savo Island. I was and remain firm in my belief that primary cause of the scope of the defeat was as Admiral King said; "That the commanders were not sufficently battle minded". I was a cop for 20 years and I've seen it happen on the street with cops. Some of them if you give them a scenario in a classroom will correctly determine if there is a threat and what they should do about (I call this head knowledge). But, on the street they see the same scenario and are obilvious to the threat until it hurts or kills them. I call that heart knowledge. They just do not believe in their heart of hearts that someone will try to hurt them. It puts them so far behind the curve that they can not catch up. This to me explains why every bit of evidence that the Japs were coming, coming at night and coming to fight were taken as anything else that the commanders could come with up. Anything, no matter how unlikely the explanation was had to be more likely than that the Japanese were hunting a night fight that night.

To reflect this we had Allied commanders make their green morale DR to do anything prior to actually being able to identify a Japanese ship by type and class. You want to fire starshell at a radar contact make your morale; report a contact, make your morale and so on. For a commander to believe a report he received he had to make his morale. Because Pearl Harbor, Congress declaring war, the battles of Java Sea, Coral Sea and Midway really were not evidence of war. To some of these captains having their ships sunk under them may have not been enough. It is possible that some of them died believing it was friendly fire. Heart knowledge rules over head knowledge even if it kills you. It cost us some 1,700 US and Australian sailors whose commanders never gave them a chance.

It was dark but not so stormy that night. Randysan and company could see 18,000 yards while the Allies could see 6,000 yards. But, the Allies had a secret weapon. No, not radar; rather Preston making our radar acquistion DR which allowed Ralph Talbot to pick up on Randysan's approach in a timely fashion.
GT 1
Ralph Talbot having made its morale fired starshell at two radar contacts. Randysan had launched Float Planes but steamed on without any other action at 20 knots.
GT 2
Ralph Talbot's starshell illuminated empty water as it turned out to be two dummy returns; reinforcing the Talbot's commander's belief that there wasn't anything out there. But with two more contacts and having made his morale he fired starshell at them. At this point the Japanese Float Planes returned the illumination favor. Randysan steamed on while cunningly holding his fire so as not to interfere with Yankee self deception.
GT 3
Lo and behold, the starshell illuminated the Chokai bearing directly at him at about 12,000 yards and Yunagi off to Chokai's starboard about 5,000 yards. Chokai opened on the Talbot with her forward turrets hitting Ralph Talbot twice knocking out a depth charge, setting a fire and damaging her hull.
GT 4
Ralph Talbot put her fire out in a case of first things first. The Talbot's commander was so shocked by this thunderous evidence of Japanese hositility that having failed his morale he failed to report being in contact and engaged. He did turn away while making smoke after making another morale check.

At this point "The Ref" made some DR about determining the relationship in space between the Talbot, Randysan and the Northern Force and pointed at two spots on the table within 10,000 yards of Chokai for Preston to place the Wilson and the Helm (not good). Preston was compelled to sail straight ahead at 12 knots bringing us even closer but at least Helm and Wilson having made morale could fire starshell at Randysan's center column. Chokai hit Wilson twice knocking out her port TT and damaging her hull. Other Japanese fire was ineffective
GT 5
The Japanese Center and West columns now launched torpedoes at the Northern Force.
The illumination of the Chokai and the Kinugasa behind her shattered Riefkohl's belief in Japanese reluctance to engage at night. He checked for the sun, it was down; he checked the Japaness guns; they were firing. Sounds like a night fight to me quiped his XO. Riefkohl making his morale ordered his entire force to turn 150 degrees to port together to avoid closing Randysan's ships. He made his morale again and ordered a full increase in speed (10 knots for the DDs and 5 for the cruisers). Wilson and Helm made their morale and started laying smoke (not an doctrinal night action). Kinugasa hit Helm twice damaging 2 bulkheads while Chokai hit Wilson twice knocking out another gun and damaging her hull again. Other Japanese and American fire was in effective.
GT 6
Helm failed to repair either bulkhead and lost two more to in rushing sea water. Wilson fired 4 fish (NR) at Chokai while Ralph Talbot fired 8 at her (LR). Riefkohl having made his morale tried to report the engagement to Admirals Turner and Crutchley who having failed theirs failed to belief him and told him not to bother them with the improbable. Chokai hit Vincennes and damaged her hull. Kinugasa hit Quincy and damaged her hull. Other Japanese and American fire was ineffective. The Americans continued to starshell Randysan's center column.
GT 7
Helm failed to repair either bulkhead again and lost two more. The American starshells had illuminated the entire center column revealing the Furutaka and Yubari trailing the Kinugasa. Chokai's secondary hit Wilson twice knocking out her laqst two guns. Wilson made her morale and remained to make smoke. Chokai also hit Vincennes in her engineering. Kinugasa hit Quincy and damaged a bulkhead. Other Japanese and American fire was ineffective. The Americans continued to starshell Randysan's center column.
GT 8
Helm having failed to repair her bulkheads was now sinking rapidly (DR 1 on a D6). Vincennes repaired her engineering and Quincy repaired her bulkhead. Ralph Talbot's torpedoes scraped down the starboad side of Chokai without hitting. Wilson's four fish had a perfect 90 degree angle of approach at Furutaka' but for an American torpedo in 1942 that was the worse target aspect and of course the result was nada. Aoba's and Kako's torpedoes ran out of air just they would have hit Astoria for another nada result. Yunagi hit Ralph Talbot and knocked out a gun; Talbot's return fire returned the favor. Vincennes hit Chokai at least twice, knocking out a fore turret and causing other damage. Other Japanese and American fire was ineffective. The Americans continued to starshell Randysan's center column.
GT 9
Vincennes now hit Chokai 4 times knocking out another fore turret, damaging her hull and causing other damage. Quincy hit either the Kinugasa or the Furutaka but only damaged a now empty TT. Other Japanese and american fire was ineffective.

We now recorded by measurement and photograph the location and orientation of the ships for set up for Phase I, Part 2 next month.
Analysis
The Astoria class cruisers were too close to the Japanese from the start to fight their kind of fight. We tried to get outside 15,000 yards but could not get outside 10,000 from the center column. we were about 18,000 yards from the west column. I figured that 4 out of 5 Japanese CAs are CL/CS armor which we penetrate at all ranges so staying outside 15,000 yards we are almost immune from their fire and it makes it much harder to hit us with torps also. Even the Chokai turrets are only CS thus every one of their cruisers is vunerable at over 15,000 yards to our fire while we are in our immune zone. We just couldn't get there.

At this point it seems to me that the center column has fired their torpedoes and cannot reload if we keep the pressure on them. So I prepose (Preston will depose) that we turn to starboard together to get back into line ahead. Presumming that Jeffsan wants to reload his torps he will not be able to turn after us for another 2 GT. We will open the range to Jeffsan's West Column making his alrady ineffective fire the more so while we can then open on Chokai, Kinugasa and Furutaka with all 3 of our cruiser's broadsides. Our current heading only allows Vincennes to fire her broadside at Chokai while Quincy and Astoria have been firing only their rear turrets at Kinugasa and Furutaka as we tried to out run the torps we just knew they had fired. Now that Chokai has lost two turrets that gives 4 D12 and 1 D24 per cruiser versus their 3 D12 per cruiser. Also we are hitting on 1,2 & 10 while they are hitting on 1 & 10. We'll have to use our cruiser secondaries for starshell as our destroyers guns are just about gone but its worth it.

With a bit of luck Mikawa just might not make it into Savo Sound after all. This was written from the American point of view. But, its war and no true patriot should be taking a son of Nippon's views seriously in any case.

[Frank]

I like this scenario very much. Thank you for sharing. You captured the feel of a night battle very well. I like your system of dealing with the ineptitude of American commanders. Seemed to pervade all levels. You can't make up a scenario where a radar operator spots the enemy, sounds general quarters and both the duty officer and the CO try to countermand it, even when being fired upon. I'd be interested in how others approach this.

During one of the Fleet Problems during the interwar period, later-to-be CNO Richardson had an encounter that lead him to assert that the USN needed to work on night combat. Unfortunately, when he was in position to do something about it, he had apparently forgotten about it. If you read the literature, it appears the junior commanders and crew did their jobs very well. The failures appeared to be due largely to faulty doctrine, leadership, and equipment. Again, I thank you for posting this. Tomorrow, if time allows, I'll try out a what-if scenario I've been working on. I'll post the results it it can.

[W. Clark]

Thanks for the feed back. My concept of command was pounded into me as a young E-6 in 1976 when I took over my first platoon. My troop commander, a Captain Howze told me that no mater what went right or wrong; no matter who did right or wrong it was my fault. I was strictly accountable for my platoon doing its job and if my subordinates screwed up, then it was my screwup. I had failed in that case to insure that they did what they were supposed to do. Check, double check and recheck until its right. Anything else and I had failed, my platoon, my troop, heck my country.

Command is not about being fair to the commander. Its not about savinb his career or rep. It is about holding the commander accountable for his command's performance. Anything else and we start playing the "Emperors new clothes" with our people's lives; in that we are avoiding the tuff realality for a comfortable fantasy even if it kills us.

[simanton]

Or, as we used to say ", You can only expect what you inspect."

[W. Clark]

One check or however many you make is not enough if it fails to insure that nothing once made right is not cocked up between last check and the test of command. Only when success is secure can you rest and of course the next mission often intervenes immediately precluding that. There are no valid excuses for failure, let alone reasons. All you can do is to redouble your efforts to see that further failure does not attend your efforts at command.

[simanton]

You have to beat Murphy before you can beat the enemy.

[W. Clark]

Murphy is the enemy. I rename every compentent enemy I find Murphy. That what can go wrong will go wrong has risen its menace in my path many times. But, that is why you plan an exfil with options for every op. So that when the going gets too deadly you can get gone and live to contend with Murphy on another day; hopefully with court not in session.

Personally, I do not expect to beat Murphy. Rather I try to avoid him while preventing "Knock, Knock, Knocking on Heaven's Door" from becoming the theme song of my cruisers. That "it's getting dark, too dark to see." and "that long black shroud is coming down" sound too much like the waters off the Canal for me.