Historicon 2006
#1
Posted 22 March 2006 - 01:40 PM
#2
Posted 22 March 2006 - 02:40 PM
#3
Posted 22 March 2006 - 03:41 PM
#4
Posted 02 June 2006 - 12:13 PM
Col Glantz's seminar alone is reason enough to attend the con!Cheers,GregoryConclusions: The Reconciliation of Myths and Realities The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance. The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few of these judgments are as follows: - Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German operational aims. - Soviet forces throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed significant or overwhelming numerical superiority. - Soviet manpower resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored human losses. - Soviet strategic and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly dismal. - Soviet planning was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible and unimaginative. - Wherever possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever possible. - The Soviets operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked along straight axes. - Lend lease was critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have ensured. - Hitler was the cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the back legend). - The stereotypical Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face of uncertainty. A majority of Americans probably accept these judgments as realities. In doing so they display a warped impression of the war which belittles the role played by the Red Army. As a consequence, they have a lower than justified appreciation for the Red Army as a fighting force, a tendency which extends, as well, to the postwar Soviet Army. Until the American public (and historians) perception of Soviet source material changes, this overall perception of the war in the East and the Soviet (Red) Army is likely to persist. Close examination of Soviet sources as well as German archival materials cast many of these judgments into the realm of myth. Recent work done on Eastern Front operations has begun to surface the required evidence to challenge those judgments.45 Continued work on the part of American historians, additional work by Soviet historians, joint work by both parties, and more extensive efforts to make public Soviet archival materials is necessary for that challenging process to bear fruit. It is clear that no really objective or more complete picture of operations on the Eastern Front is possible without extensive use of Soviet source material. Thus definitive accounts of operations in the East have yet to be written. How definitive they will ultimately be depends in large part on the future candor and scope of Soviet historical efforts. In the interim it is the task of American historians, drawing upon all sources, Soviet and German alike, to challenge those judgments and misperceptions which are a produce of past historical work. It is clear that the American (Western) perspective regarding war on the Eastern Front needs broadening, in the more superficial public context and in the realm of more serious historical study. Scholarly cooperation among Soviet and American historians, research exchange programs involving both parties, and expanded conferences to share the fruits of historical research would further this end and foster more widespread understanding on both sides.
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