Breaking French in the War Down Under
DTMB GT4 1-4 February 1942
Many Frenchmen, particularly in the Marine Francaise had wanted to emulate the UK after the fall of Metropolitan France and fight on from their colonies. While they were making up their minds about exactly what to do Churchill ordered what morphed into Mers El Kebir. But what if Churchill had followed all the advice given him and restrained his desire to kill Frenchmen in the wake of what he saw as the Vichy Government’s (read French) almost personal betrayal. What follows is such a what-if.
VAdm Godroy’s Force X was steaming NW out of Darwin at 25 knots. Intel had it that there were three Japanese invasion convoys from the EAF aimed at Makassar on Celebes and Dili and Koepang on Timor. Makassar was bad enough, allowing entrance to the Java Sea as it did. But a landing anywhere on Timor would cut the direct life line from Darwin to Surabaya. If that happened the end for the DEI and the ABDA was just a matter of time.
The wind was Force 4 (how many fives for wind speed can I roll in a roll?) at 15 knots from the South (finally, a good direction die roll for the ABDA). Smoke would last just a few minutes (3 to be exact) in these conditions. It was 2400 hours (that is a lot of nine through 12 on the watch roll). The Moon State was full, but the overcast sky made it like new. There were neither squalls nor sea haze but down here if you don’t like the weather just wait awhile as it’s sure to change. That observation would later turn out to wrong as the weather held steady throughout.
Force X had been in Darwin since early January. The French really didn’t want to fight their countrymen. They wanted to convert them and they saw killing them as counter productive to that endeavor. Nevertheless, they needed to be useful to the Allies if they wanted their logistical support. Augmenting the defense of the Malay Barrier seemed to check all the boxes. Besides, the Japanese had occupied French Indo-China and that made them enemies in of itself. Godroy had been working closely with Commodore Collins (RAN) and a rapport had built up between them since their arrival. After all these were almost Australian waters and Godroy didn’t want to step on Aussie toes so Collins’s cruiser division and the Aussie destroyer division were leading. Besides, they had SW radar and Force X did not. Godroy could have added Phoenix to the mix (probably with Collins) but that would have added another set of signals and accent to what was already a complicated command and control structure. In their exercises there had always been some delay in communication and Godroy certainly did not want to add to that. So, Phoenix swung at anchor in Darwin as did a division of old USN destroyers whose state of maintenance had led Godroy to believe they were better left behind.
Force X was arrayed with the Aussie DesDiv (Napier, Nestor, Nizam & Vampire) in line abreast as a screen. The division would need to turn together 90 degrees to port to get back into line ahead. 3,000 yards behind the Aussie destroyers, Collins’ cruiser division (Perth DF & Hobart) followed. Godroy and Cruiser Division 2 (Suffren FF, Duquesne, Tourville & Duguay-Trouin) followed 3,000 yards behind and the French DesDiv (Basque, Forbin & Fortune) followed them at 3,000 yards. Everything but the screen was line ahead.
Japanese LBA had found them during the day but the level bombing at high altitude has missed as had a small force of carrier TBs. Nevertheless the Japanese knew they were coming.
Godroy was not opposed to a gun fight if it became necessary. But a well delivered torpedo attack on Japanese patrol/cover force might leave his force intact to take on the convoys and their escorts. Or so he hoped. Godroy intended if the Aussie radar worked to get within star shell range and use that to acquire the IJN and then deliver such a torpedo attack. Besides, his ammo was coming from stocks in the Med and its resupply was neither timely or abundant.
2403 hours Napier and Nestor reported a radar contact due north at 16,000 yards on an estimated heading of 180 degrees at 25 knots. Godroy remarked to Henri, his flag lieutenant “That’s no convoy” before ordering everyone to flank and to turn to port on a new heading of 270 degrees. That would open up his broadsides and give Perth’s SW radar a chance to get into the contact business.
But that would take awhile as Perth’s radar operator was not any sharper than Nizam’s (I rolled just as poorly for both and blamed it on them). Godroy ordered all FPs launched.
2406 hours Now all the SW radars were showing four contacts at 12,000 yards that were in line abreast and followed at 3,000 yards by a column of larger contacts with all on the same heading and at the same speed. Godroy remarked, if we don’t have a convoy, we certainly have a formation. 2,000 more yards to extreme star shell range.
2409 hours The Japanese screen was within 8,000 yards of the Aussie DDs. And radar had picked up three trailing columns arrayed from port to starboard, a column of 4 smaller contacts, a central column of at least 4 larger contacts and another column of 4 smaller contacts. Still no change in the contacts course or speed. Collins turned his cruisers together 45 degrees to starboard and closed 1,500 yards before turning together to port back to a heading of 270 degrees. Godroy ordered the Aussies to fire star shell at the larger contacts. The star shell performed better than expected (only 1 dud instead of a third) and illuminated three Myoko class and 1 Takao class cruisers.
2412 hours Aussie DDs fired off their torps at the illuminated cruisers on normal range settings and turned away together to port under smoke. Godroy realized that his cruisers were too far out yet and ordered them to turn 2 points together to starboard. He closed to inside 8,000 yards. The French DDs followed the French cruisers. The Japanese increased their speed but held to the same course.
Perth and Hobart and opened on the leading Myokos. Perth firing rapidly hit the leading Myoko (Ashigara) thrice, knocking out a secondary, damaging a bulkhead and hitting her bridge. Hobart firing rapidly hit the second Myoko twice, knocking out a TT and setting a major fire as well as knocking out her fore turret.
2415 hours The Ashigara failed to fix her bulkhead and suffered more damage. The Haguro put her fire out. Perth and Hobart now launched their starboard TT at Ashigara and Haguro and turned together to port under smoke. The Japanese destroyers turned together to port into line ahead and then turned 45 degrees to starboard. The Japanese cruisers continued on course (probably the bridge hit) and slowed to 26 knots. Napier and Nestor had each targeted Ashigara with a quintuplet mount. Napier hit once and Nestor missed. There was no attempt at evasion, the bridge hit probably being the reason. Ashigara suffered 5 hull and had her engine damaged. Nizam and Vampire targeted Haguro with a quintuplet and a triple mount respectively. Nizam missed, but Vampire hit twice. Haguro suffered 7 hull, lost her fore turret and had her engines damaged. Ashigara slowed to 5 knots and Haguro sank taking RAdm Takagi with her.
2418 hours Ashigara fixed her bulkhead. By now Godroy’s cruisers had acquired the remaining Myoko and two Takao class cruisers and fired off all their torpedoes at them from inside 7,500 yards. The trailing Japanese cruisers accelerated around their stricken brothers to starboard and then turned in succession to port 45 degrees in what appeared to be an effort to open up their broadsides.
Godroy’s heavies engaged the cruisers while Duguay-Trouin fired at the leading destroyer. Suffren missed. But Duquesne hit Chokai 5 times and Tourville hit Maya 4 times. Chokai lost a TT and had a major fire set, she lost 2 secondaries, her fore turret and had her engines damaged. Maya took 2 hull, her engines damaged and lost her fore turret. Duguay-Trouin missed.
2421 hours Chokai put her fire out but was still slowed to 21 knots. Maya failed to fix her engine hit and was slowed to 21 knots. The French DDs now fired all their TT at the remaining Japanese heavies. Godroy’s cruisers turned away together to port under smoke. Collin’s Aussies (cruisers & DDs) were back together in line ahead, DDs leading and had turned due north but were outside 6,000 yards and only had radar contact with the Japanese.
Suffren had targeted Nachi with 2 triple mounts. Duquesne and Tourville had targeted Chokai with a triple mount each and Duguay-Trouin had targeted Maya with 2 triple mounts. Suffren missed as did Tourville. But Duquesne hit Chokai thrice. Duguay-Trouin hit Maya once. Chokai tried to evade but took 10 hull and sank immediately taking VAdm Ozawa with her. Maya failed to evade and took 2 hull and was set afire. Maya slowed to 18 knots.
Basque, Forbin and Fortune engaged Natsushio, Hayashio and Kuroshio respectively and the Japanese fired back. The French missed as did the Japanese.
2424 hours Maya put her fire out. Godroy ordered Collins to reengage with his port torpedoes as Godroy intended to with his. The idea was for the Aussie DDs to star shell again and illuminate the Japanese cruisers to allow the Allied cruisers to fire torpedoes unmolested and then finish the job with gun fire. To further this Collins turned ESE and Godroy fell in behind him. Japanese appeared to be thrashing about as if no one was in charge anymore. One DesDiv was pursuing the French DDs and the other 2 had interposed themselves between the Allies and the stricken cruisers. Although there was no way to tell if this was based on any idea where the Allied cruisers were. It would later be discovered that all three Japanese Admirals (Takahashi, Ozawa & Takagi) present had been killed but the Japanese had somehow made their morale and had not therefore broken off. Takahashi had been killed by the bridge hit on Ashigara and Ozawa and Takagi had gone down with their cruisers.
2427 hours Ashigara and Maya both fixed their engine hits and the surviving cruisers began heading back north at 18 knots and escorted by Nachi. The exception was Ashigara who could not exceed 5 knots but headed north in a forlorn hope of saving her anyway. Because of the 8 Japanese destroyers covering the cruiser withdrawal the Allied cruisers could not get at the Japanese cruisers without dealing with the destroyers first.
2430 hours The Perth, Hobart and Vampire fired star shell at the trailing Japanese DDs (a DesDiv of 4 DDs). They fired 6 star shell and two were duds but still managed to illuminate the four DDs at 8,000 yards.
2433 hours Perth, Hobart, Napier and Nestor engaged the Wakaba, Hatsuharu, Hatsushimo & Nenohi. The Japanese fired back. Perth targeted Wakaba and hit her twice. Hobart and Napier missed while Nestor hit Nenohi once. The Japanese were firing through their stern arcs. Only Nenohi hit, once on Nestor.
Wakaba lost a TT, suffered a major fire and took a hull hit. Nenohi lost a TT and suffered a major fire. Nestor suffered a hull hit. The Japanese were slowed to 26 knots and the Aussies topped out at 32.
2436 hours The Japanese withdrew under smoke and Godroy let them go. The Japanese would put their fires out. Godroy would abort the landings on Timor but was unable to save Makassar.
WMC
