11 replies to this topic

[healey36]

I passed through Gettysburg a few weeks back, coming into town from the east side. I have rarely spent any time at the East Field, scene of the great cavalry clash on July 3, 1863. It was here that Gregg's cavalry division attempted to blunt Stuart's effort to wreak havoc on the Federal rear. In this regard, Gregg was largely successful.

 

It should be noted that, to great extent, the mythology that surrounds one George Armstrong Custer found its origins here, on this field. It was one of the rare instances where two great cavalry forces clashed absent any infantry, a great swirling mass of horsemen, sabers drawn, repeatedly charging and countercharging. Custer, gleefully leading his brigade of Michiganders, is said to have rallied one of his countercharges with the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" as they plunged headlong into the Confederate horsemen. He, unlike many of his men, would emerge unscathed.

 

In 1889, some thirteen years after his death on a hill in the Montana Territory, Michigan erected a monument at the site of Custer's charge here in Pennsylvania. It's one of the few markers on this part of the field, sitting on a slight rise along Gregg Avenue. Worth a visit, should one get there.

 

[W. Clark]

Custer had his strengths and some serious weaknesses. He was very successful as a brigade/division commander during the war. But he had served almost exclusively on the staff and had almost no time with troops at the company/regimental level and that left holes in his experience that would cause gripes later when he commanded the 7th. His substantive rank was that of a captain in the 5th Cavalry when he was appointed LTC of the 7th on 28 July 1866 at the formation of the regiment. IMHO the main problem of the army in 1876 was its lack of marksmanship training. I have real doubts that the bulk of the cavalry had actually zeroed their carbines based on ammunition expenditure and actual field performance. It's not just the 7th. Battalions (5 companies each) of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry caught the Indians asleep in their lodges at the Powder River fight in March 76. They drove them out into the snow with whatever they could collect as they fled for their lives. But the Indians (who the cavalry outnumbered) got themselves together and put so much pressure on the cavalry that Col J.J. Reynolds felt compelled to burn the village before he was in turn driven out in turn even though he needed the food stocks in the village to remain in the field. The Indians then pursued the cavalry and took back their pony herd. The cavalrymen of the 2nd, 3rd and 7th cavalry regiments (some 31 companies present during the campaign) fared poorly throughout the campaign even when they managed to surprise the Indians.

 

The above should not be surprising. The officer corps of the US Army had gained its experience primarily during the ACW. The bulk of the infantry was armed with rifled muskets of one type or another, but the average range of a fire fight was the same for rifle armed or smooth bore musket armed troops (94 yards). Why does infantry armed with rifles that will easily reach out 300 yards against the Napoleonic formations employed shoot the same as if they were still armed with muskets; you might well ask? Black powder weapons have a trajectry like a mortar when compared to smokeless power rifles. The fall of the ball requires that your infantryman be able to accurately estimate range so he can use the graduated sights accurately. But both sides generally failed to do this and thus they might just as well have stuck with percussion smooth bores instead.

It should come as no surprise then that an officer corps that had paid little or no attention to marksmanship training when they were in their youth during the war should continue to do so later until after the campaign of 76-77 showed them the error of their ways and led to extensive marksmanship training in the 1880s. Now the army claimed publicly that its marksmanship was up to an acceptabal standard. But as usual when the army screws up don't pay attention to what it says. Instead pay attention to what it does. In September 1876 the Army mandated weekly marksmanship training in place of the 10 rounds per annum of before. Any of you who have served knows full well that the army does not suddenly do something 52 more times a year if it was doing right to start with.

 

The army had performed better earlier. So, what changed? The cavalry was armed with the Spencer carbine during the period prior to the summer of 1874. That is when they adopted the 73 Springfield Trapdoor. This weapon (whether rifle or carbine) out ranged the Spencer but there was a caveat. You are back to needing to use the sights and adjust them for the range or you cannot hit the side of a barn even when you are in it. They didn't do that and sacrificed their newly acquired standoff ability by doing so. The other problem was the ammunition. The bullets were copper cased. They had been so with the Spencer as well. But they were then carried in brass tubes and those in leather ammo pouches giving some protection against the weather. The troops made their own ammo belts for the trapdoor ammo out of leather and canvas using their troop's saddler tools. This left the ammo exposed in cartridge belts around their waists to the weather. That led to corrosion and a green substance that any of you that have seen a corroded copper penny have seen. It becomes like glue when you heat it and that is what happens when you fire it repeatedly. This led to jams (the extractor ripped the base of the cartridge off). Not a problem with the rifle because it came with a ramrod. The carbine did not. How bad was it? We don't know because the army did its best to suppress any investigation into the jamming. Fox and company during their dig at Little Big Horn in 84 found very few ruptured casings and concluded that it existed but was probably not that big a problem (of course that presumes that the soldiers were able to get the ruptured casing out of the carbines otherwise). The ruptured casings they did find all had marks and cuts on them that made it appear that the soldiers were using their belt knifes to resolve the stoppage. I cannot think of a tool less useful for that situation when you need your carbine to work to save your life. It probably explains the many Indian observations of many of the soldiers discarding their carbines and going to their revolvers. Army (cash strapped) in later 1876 switched from the cheaper copper to brass casings and has never gone back. I wonder why? Another point on the soldiers abandoning their carbines for their revolvers. I shot pistols for decades in the army and as a cop. I'm not a bad shot. But if I thought with any certainty that I was going to be in a gunfight the shotgun was coming out of the cruiser in preference to my pistol. I've found very few people who will willing give up a long gun to depend on pistol for their life. All deference to Scott, that's not archeolgy, it's just common sense.

 

I know, I know, but you wrote Custer and that is like saying Niagra Falls, slowly I turned.

 

WMC

[healey36]

Wow, like drinking from a firehose, that  . Some good history there, much of it tamping down some of the mythology surrounding ACW weapons/tactics.

 

Some forty years ago, I used to do a lot of stupid things with mates involving firearms and beer on a hot summer afternoon. Primarily skeet-shooting, but at the end of the day we frequently broke out the artillery. I had, on numerous occasions, the chance to use both smoothbore and rifled muzzle-loaders of the era (genuine stuff, not reproductions). Once one got the hang of firing the gun without the recoil separating one's shoulder, you could see how accurate you could be. I recall being able to pretty reliably put a round from a rifled musket onto a 40-inch square target out to a range of 120 yards. The smoothbore...I could reliably hit the bank behind the target. Then and now, I'm a novice at this sort of thing, so no sophistication in ranging the shot (unless the guy I was with who owned the guns was doing that for me). Of course memory gets better with time.

 

What you are saying might explain why infantry continued to fight in relatively tight line formations up to the closing days of the war. I always figured those tactics optimized the effectiveness of massed smoothbore fire, but would have thought the introduction of rifled weapons with the intuitive increase in accuracy would have lead to devastating casualty rates in lined up infantry. If, however, the rifled musket was not ranged properly, than like you said, not much of an increase in accuracy with the corresponding increase in casualties.

 

Pistols? I tried a Colt 1860 a few times. That gun supposedly had an effective range out to 50+ yards. I couldn't hit anything. I don't think I could throw it 50 yards, but I might have had better luck hitting something.

 

Only carbine I ever used was an M1. Now I could hit something with that.

[W. Clark]

You can examine several fire fights throughout the ACW that we have fairly detailed info on and when you consider the range they were fighting at, the weapons capabilities, the time the fight lasted and the casualties that actually occurred, it becomes quite clear that something does not add up. Take the 26th North Carolina (800 men plus) versus the 24th Michigan (400 men plus) in Herbst Woods on 1 July 63. They were about 30 yards apart (we know because their dead lay with their feet online (whether they fell forwards or backwards) with each other and marked both unit's positions quite clearly. The woods shorten the range they could fight at considerably. Both sides lost over 50% of their strength during a fight that lasted 20 to 30 minutes (estimates vary). At that range if every man was a competent marksman with a rifle musket the fight should have ended with the first volley in the 24th Michigan's total destruction. It did not. Neither of these regiments were green although the 24th Michigan was far more experienced. So, there was a lot of missing on both sides that I'm sure the smoke helped to happen. But there was no smoke for the first volley. These are both considered well trained regiments with the 24th considered elite. Four things IMHO come into play here. First the woods are going to inhibit hits, second the smoke is going rapidly to become another inhibiting factor and then the level of marksmanship training. Lastly and perhaps the most important is getting men to kill one another. We don't like it. If you estimate that only about 3% of each regiment was actually shooting to kill, then (and only then) does the time and the casualties caused add up.

 

Another note on black range estimation. The sights on most rifled muskets were graduation in 100 yards increments. At 200 yards if you have set your sight at 100 yards you are hitting the ground in front of your target. If your sights are set for 300 yards then you are shooting over your target. 

 

WMC

[W. Clark]

One last point on the jamming of the carbines and I'll shut up. Captain French (commanding Company M, Reno's Battalion) and his 1st Sgt were reputed to be 2 of the best shots in the entire 7th. They were both carrying the infantry rifle rather than the carbine and thus had ramrods. On Reno Hill there several statements of those involved that said that French spent his time during the attacks clearing ruptured casings from trooper's carbine rather than commanding his company and none of these observations was made in a disapproving manner. Think of it, your company is engaged by hostiles who want to kill every one of you and you find your time better spent in keeping your trooper's carbines in firing order rather than commanding your company. This does not get mentioned very often in discussions about whether the trap doors jammed a lot. IMHO it is telling.

 

WMC

[Peter M. Skaar]

This is an interesting discussion.  Thanks!

[healey36]

Custer's commander at Gettysburg was a guy of questionable capabilities and sensibilities, especially with regards to his own men. One Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, he was deemed equal parts reckless, aggressive, and arrogant, and was prone to making costly decisions in the field. He and Custer may have been a matched set, but Kilpatrick wasn't present at Custer's moment of Gettysburg glory. Kilpatrick had been sent with his division, less Custer's Michigan brigade (detached to Gregg), to harass the southern end of Lee's line.

 

Kilpatrick's actions that day would see Elon Farnsworth's brigade largely destroyed and Farnsworth himself killed, this following the failure of Pickett's attack on the Union center. Edwin Coddington described it as "a brilliant display of courage and horsemanship, but the attack ended in a fiasco, including the death of Farnsworth." Kilpatrick's notion that the Confederates were demoralized by Pickett's (Lee's) failure proved sadly misplaced. It's notable that Kilpatrick's nickname was "Kilcavalry", something which he was apparently quite proficient.

 

[W. Clark]

Your observations on Kilpatrick are spot on IMHO. In the Army of the Potomac's (generally) successful attempts to improve their cavalry (62-63) and its leaders, Kilpatrick's promotion was probably the most questionable after Stoneman and Pleasonton.

 

WMC

[healey36]

Custer's Gettysburg "experience" was capped with the Michigan Cavalry Brigade's attack on one of Lee's two retreating Confederate supply trains at Monterey Pass on the night of July 4, 1863 and continuing into the early hours of the next day. A difficult action was fought in a driving rain/thunderstorm between Custer's Michigan regiments and the Confederate rear-guard.

 

Under orders from Kilpatrick, Custer led three of his regiments up South Mountain to the pass where he encountered Maryland and Virginia cavalry. Fighting continued for a few hours, Custer finding himself blocked by the relatively small Confederate force. He eventually broke through when reinforced by the 1st West Virginia Cavalry. The West Virginians were able to clear Confederate units and artillery, and soon after Custer's Michiganders set upon Lee's 20 miles-long wagon train. It was reported that a ribbon of fire could be observed down the mountain, well into the Cumberland Valley, marking the destruction of much of Lee's wagons, supplies, and equipment.

 

Today, there's not much to see of the field at Monterey Pass. The county reconstructed the toll-house which now serves as a small museum, and there are a few markers. There's a driving tour that details the fight at the pass and the following assault on the train as far as Ringgold. If nothing else, one gets a sense of the mountain terrain involved.

 

Michigan marker at Monterey Pass  

 

https://montereypassbattlefield.org/

[W. Clark]

Custer was very flamboyant. IMHO there were two reasons for this in addition to any other quirks in Custer's nature. First, he greatly admired Marechal Murat and wanted to emulate his command style. IMHO he succeeded and one could argue that was one of his problems. Second, his absolute lack of experience at the company/regimental level prior to joining the 7th in July 1866 probably gave him some pause and the way he acted was a form of compensation to hide his inexperience. Absent a contemporary Psych evaluation, it is impossible to say now without serious qualifiers. But it seems likely to me. Does this mean that he was a bad commander? Possibly, but it is hard to argue with his record in combat during the war. Phillip Sheridan certainly was of the opinion that Custer was a top combat commander. We can deduce that opinion from Sheridan's extraordinary efforts during Custer's career to keep him in active command of the 7th and Sheridan's actions and statements on the matter throughout the period after Custer came under his command. Sheridan purchased (out of his own pocket) the table on which Lee signed the surrender, and had it transported from Virgina to Ohio (not easy in 1865) and presented it to Libby Custer saying, "That scarcely any other officer in the army had done more to bring about the surrender than Custer had". I may not always agree with Sheridan's opinions but I'm not arrogant enough to claim superior knowledge about his opinions on officers he commanded in combat. I find it very difficult to dismiss that opinion on Custer regardless of my perceptions of his deficiencies.

 

WMC

[healey36]

The Army of the Potomac was awash with commanders whose primary interest seems to have been self-preservation in place of initiative. Custer, for all of his faults, was a seize-the-moment kind of guy IMHO. He seems to have had the ability to recognize those precise moments when a narrow window of opportunity briefly opened, thereby shifting the momentum in a battle if one chose to take advantage in the moment.

 

Commanders that would actually "do something" on the field were incredibly valuable to the brass when so many others would choose to simply hold the line. The ACW was fought at a time when a lot of the tactical "thinking" had failed to keep up with the advancing tech of weaponry, and I think this led to a lot of second-guessing and trepidation. There were a few that seemed to have mastered it, Hancock and Barlow come to mind, but many in the infantry seemed to have paid dearly for daring to seize the initiative. The cavalry, perhaps not so much. Maybe the speed and shock value of mounted units, together with the operational failure to use them properly, shielded them somewhat from wholesale slaughter. Then again, the experiences of guys like Farnsworth demonstrates the vulnerability of all to poor senior command.

 

This sense of relentlessness was a much-appreciated trait in the second half of the war, and it seemed that Custer had that in spades. It's what made guys like Sheridan, Grant, Sherman, and a few others so successful and valued in those last two years. Attrition was accepted, knowing they could afford it while the other side could not. The casualties were indeed horrific, but the execution ultimately ground the Confederate armies to paste.

 

I recall reading an account of the Army of the Potomac's movement following the defeat at The Wilderness nearly a year after Gettysburg. As so often had been the case, the army expected a long retreat back to Maryland to regroup. As 1st Corps approached a crossroad where straight ahead led back to Maryland and right led east further into Virginia. Grant, Meade, and their staff stood on horseback in the crossroad. They directed Hancock to take his men to the right, with Grant declaring that there'd be "no turning back". Perhaps the pivotal moment in the war in the east, a great cheer went up from the ranks. Lee's fate was sealed. 

[W. Clark]

I've been there several times, but it has been about 15 years since my last visit.