10 replies to this topic

[jwsleser]

This is an AAR of first of several prep games to prepare to play DTMB. Ship are 1:2400 GHQ.

 

v/r Jeff

 

https://themanchuria...ttle-of-25-may/

[Mark Hinds]

Interesting.  MH

[W. Clark]

Warms my heart to see someone playing DTMB. If you like naval campaigns and WWII Naval Campaigns in the Pacific, then IMHO it is very hard to top DTMB.  And whoever was commanding the Allied cruisers is who I want on my tactical team in a game. That is the best daylight gunnery by an Anglo/American cruiser force that I've seen in some time. I very much look forward to seeing more AAR from you in the future. I've posted several articles on DTMB play in the DTMB Forum that apply to both sides and may give you some ideas about how to get the most out of the forces you command in the campaign. 

 

Good Luck & Good Hunting

 

WMC

[jwsleser]

Thank you for the encouragement Mr. Clark (I decided not to try and guess what the W stands for). Our next game is this upcoming Saturday (27 June). I should have the AAR written up by Monday or Tuesday following. 

 

I reread my AAR posts severals times after they are posted. I always catch typos, unclear subjects, and wrong tenses that I missed in my initial work. Wow, there was quite a few doozies in that AAR. Fixed. 

 

Both my wargaming partner in crime and I have had a life-long interest in the DEI campaign. It is a campaign that I have studied for decades. So much potential lost through politics, wrong priorities, ignorance of the enemy, and just plain bad luck. It will be interesting to see if one of us can do better (I will be playing the Japanese as my fellow gang-member is an avid Anglophile). 

 

v/r  Jeff

[W. Clark]

IMHO there was nothing that that the UK, her dominions or the US was going to or even able to do in late 41, early 42 to change the scenario from what it was given their other problems at the time. And of course, the Dutch were extremely limited in their immediate choices because of the many choices they had made going back to 1908. The real problem IMHO is that while the Dutch navy saw the DEI as Japan's target starting right after the Russo-Japnese war, (after all they were going to be expected to defend the DEI) the legislature did not. They were confident that the Japanese would go after Siberia (after all, who would attack the Dutch when the Russians were available instead) instead and remained so right up to Kalkin Gohl. That is when you see additional expenditure for the navy accepted. Keep in mind that they had let maintenance go on their cruisers and destroyers (the state of the Java class is the proof of that) and had let the numbers of sailors dwindle until they did not have enough crews to man what they had (Sumatra was minimally crewed with reservists and naval cadets as an example). Siberia did not require the Dutch to spend money on defense and not spending money on defense was near and dear to their hearts (IMHO) so they went with Siberia until it was absolutely crystal clear that Siberia was off the plate. Then realizing that the navay was correct, they started making preparations for a defensive war with Japan in 1943 or there abouts. Of course, Japan was early to the party and all their what ifs went out the window and they were stuck with their actual preparations (or lack thereof).

 

A ground defense was out of the question. The Dutch army was more of an occupying force than anything else. That is because the Dutch made no effort to turn non-Christian Indonesians into citizens and considered them subjects instead. The Ambonese and a few select others had more standing and they fought but they were only about 20% of the population at most. I don't know what the Dutch would have had to do or when they had to start doing it to change the indigenous people of the DEI into Dutchmen but as they never made any real effort to do so the point is moot. That means it was all on the navy and the navy was inadequate. They also walked a tightrope diplomatically between the UK, the US and Japan. Every time either of the Allies tried to talk about what a common defense might look like, the Dutch shut them down to not offend the Japanese. Nevertheless, the Dutch fully expected the UK and the US to show up in with everything they had if the DEI was attacked. When you look at the interview between Admiral Hart, Helfrich (RNN) and Starkenborg (DEI Governor) the sense of delusion and entitlement becomes clear. Given what controlled preparations and what commanded the result is no surprise. 

 

There are many possible choices that the Dutch could have made differently but chose not to (primarily IMHO due to cost). The Dutch wanted the economic advantages their empire provided, they also wanted to spend that wealth on anything but the ability to defend what provided it and so they lost it all.

 

WMC 

[W. Clark]

Dave Franklin (the author of DTMB) and I had very similar ideas and opinions on this campaign. His ability to express them in a clear and concise way far exceeded my ability to do so and I recognized that from the start as soon as I had seen his rough draft of the rules. That is not to say that we had no disagreements, but they were minor at most. I wanted a strictly naval campaign, no land combat, no excessive attention to mine warfare and subs and other such items kept to a minimum. DTMB historically, checked every box. The only extended land combat was the Japanese drive south down the Malay peninsula and Dave's Singapore Index handles that perfectly IMHO. We also were in agreement that the ANZAC Squadron was as an Allied naval reinforcement necessary for play balance and thus it was included from the start. We did not let the historical fact that the US was completely against such a reinforcement (and the Australians were not going to counter the US on this) restrain us from including it. We gave the Allies every chance to "Shanghai" additional naval units from the various convoy escorts that arrived with what equipment the Allies were willing to expend in defense of Singapore and the DEI. It costs you CDs (out of the 4 you get per GT) and VP to take these reinforcements, but they really help you to counter the IJN's overwhelming strength in eight-inch cruisers. So, Mauritius and Emerald for the RN; Pensacola and Phoenix for the USN are very real additions to your cruiser strength (although Emerald and Pensacola are 1 turn additions). You also need to roll the right Theater Event to get them, and the odds are not in your favor.

 

Dave's method for dealing with the Japanese land-based air covers both its constant presence and limits its effectiveness while giving it the ability to wreck you if the die rolls go its way. Groundings, being mined and sub attacks are all theater events and resolved with a die roll(s). You don't need to dwell on them, but they can really screw you if the die roll goes against you. Allied LBA is a theater event and replicates its historical minor irritant quality quite nicely. Japanese light cruisers and everybody's destroyers play their parts, but it really gets down to surface engagements between IJN heavy cruisers and Allied cruisers. In fact, it almost always gets resolved by who wins in the Java Sea on game turns 5 and 6. The exception is if the RN manages a successful torpedo ambush of the WAF before Singapore falls. The odds of that happening are long but I've seen it twice now, so in my experience it can happen. This all applies to the standard start. As soon as you add capital ships you begin to weigh the campaign in the Allied favor IMHO. The primary reason for that is that they are all great cruiser killers and when the Allied capital ships go away, so do the Japanese capital ships (per the RAW). If the Japanese have suffered any significant losses to their heavy cruisers from Allied capital ships, then their ability to win against the Allied cruisers has been significantly depleted IMHO. For play balance I would greatly recommend exchanging Force X (the Free French) for the ANZAC Squadron if any Dutch capital ships options are taken. The French shoot about on par with the IJN (so a down grade compared to the RN CRT), their torpedoes are good but not as good as the RN (they have more of them), their night acquisition is not as good as the RN and they have no radar. They have the same 2 GT delay as the Dutch when combining with other Allies. But they come with three destroyers of their own (they also have 3 poorly protected heavy cruisers and their light cruisers do not rapid fire). 

 

It is a great (if not the best) campaign as I have ever seen. But its best attribute IMHO is the fact that weather and set up die rolls can vary things so much that both sides could make the exact same campaign moves ten campaigns in a roll and you would not realize that from reading the AARs if it was specified. I could play the standard start option until the cows came home and still not be bored with the campaign in the least. I'm fully expect you to really enjoy the campaign and look forward to having the opinion vindicated by your AARs.

 

Also, let me recommend Tom Womack's "The Allied Defense of the Malay Barrier 1941-1942" for additional reading. Womack took the time to learn to read Dutch so he could use Dutch sources and not rely on just English-speaking sources. It makes for a more rounded telling IMHO.

 

WMC

[jwsleser]

Interesting comments WMC. I agree with many of them, but I have never seen the belief in a northern Japanese move against Siberian as an argument that was pressed with any vigor to justify interwar planning/budgeting by The Netherlands. The Dutch always understood that oil would be a main driver of Japanese action against the DEI. They recognized this prior to WW1. The economic downturn between the wars, the belief in the power of neutrality, and the perceived need that the Japanese must first deal with the US and the UK before directly challenging the Dutch drove the interwar spending decisions. A second world war and the breadth and success of the initial Japanese offensive upset the apple cart. 

 

The Dutch understood that the KNIL was incapable of defending the archipelago, hence the plan to use air and sea power. The plan was sound, the resourcing quite inadequate. The airfields built that lacked aircraft and defenses only better enabled the Japanese plans. The British discovered the same on the Malay Peninsula. The change in submarine tactics in 1940 also unhinged that important element of the plan. Like all the western powers, the Netherlands acted too late and didn't have the English Channel or the Atlantic Ocean to protect it. Once overrun by Germany, the DEI had to rely on the ability of the remaining western powers for resources at the time those nations themselves need to draw upon those same resources. Remember that after the failure of neutrality and the overrunning of The Netherlands in 1940, the DEI attempted to abandoned the neutralist stance. The reluctance of the US and the UK to offer any firm defense agreements meant the best policy available was to maintain neutrality in the hope that this would prevent giving the Japanese any cause for action. The Dutch knew neutrality wouldn't work, but to openly deny the Japanese without guaranteed Allied support also wouldn't work. That was the tightrope they had to walk. The US policy of cash and carry also hindered the Dutch efforts to rearm. It wasn't until late 1940 after increased Japanese pressure that the DEI finally told the Dutch Government in Exile that coordination with the Allies must begin to happen. Remember that there was a government in exile that controlled many aspects of the DEI foreign policy. 

 

Nothing I have read state that the Dutch warships were not well maintained. Sumatra had returned to The Netherlands for a refit that didn't happen because of the German invasion. Pressed into convoy duties, the ship was finally dispatched to the DEI for that refit. Then Japanese invaded. While not at war against the Japanese, the KM ships in the DEI were operating at a high tempo safeguarding the DEI against Axis actions and possible Japanese encroachments. While Hart complained about the lack of availability of Dutch ships, these ships were going into planned maintenance after extensive operations. Look at the maintenance required by the US and UK warships during the same time. 

 

Manning was an issue, but what could the Dutch do about it? Dutch personnel were pressed into manning new warships that were being turn over to the Dutch by the UK while manning scores of merchant vessels at the same time. Without access to The Netherlands proper, these crews had to come from what was available in unoccupied territories. 

 

The Dutch were willing to spend on defense, the difficultly was the financial situation didn't support it, the threat wasn't immediate, neutrality had worked before, and much of the wealth that was generated was used to pay off debt. 

 

v/r  Jeff

[W. Clark]

I agree with many of your points at least in part. However Dutch reliance on neutrality ignored Hitler's repeated public statements and published writings that stated in no uncertain terms that he despised the Dutch neutrality during WWI and if left up to him would not be allowed to occur again. Hitler had been in total power in Germany since early in 1933 and had started WWII by invading Poland in September 0f 39. He was allied with Italy and Japan, and arming Holland is directly against Japan's interests. The fleet plan for 1940 absolutely relied on Germany's willing and wholehearted cooperation and Hitler had sole control of a yea or nay on that. I believe (and the timeline of German/Dutch diplomatic interaction supports that belief IMHO) that the superficial cooperation the Germans offered beginning in November 1939 and ending in March 1940 was simply a misdirection play to cover the German intent to invade Holland in May 1940. In other words, it was smoke and mirrors that the Dutch bought hook line and sinker because they wanted to believe it. As for Hitler's true feelings towards the Dutch; let us not forget that he tried to starve them to death in 43-44.

 

The Dutch means of manning their Far Eastern Fleet was based almost solely on recruiting the needed personnel from Holland proper (this includes schools and training facilities). They made no real effort to recruit or any preparations for doing so from their 80,000,000 subjects in the DEI until after the German invasion. And even then, those efforts were restricted almost exclusively to the Europeans present in the DEI. In other words, they ignored the 80,000,000 completely and relied solely on the 8,700,000 population of Holland. I realize that making use of the 80,000,000 would have required a great deal of effort on their part as well as a lengthy period of years to implement (but at least some of them saw the handwriting on the wall since 1908 and even before). They decided against doing that if they ever even thought of it at all.  That does not remove the consequences of the failure to make any effort to utilize the 80,000,000. Nor the responsibility of those in positions of trust and authority and responsible for defending the national interests. 

 

Sumatra's (and Java's for that matter) refits had been deferred more than once and in Sumatra's case meant she was mechanically limited to 18 knots rather than her normal 31 knots by her mechanical defects. They had their reasons (I suspect that money was a major one) for delaying the refits. However, that left the major striking units (cruisers) of the fleet reduced by a fourth with another rapidly reaching the same condition. I'm not saying that Java and Sumatra being in good working order would have saved the DEI. II am saying that those responsible for the decision placed an inadequate Fleet in an even more precarious position when the shooting started.

 

None of what I'm saying is intended as a special indictment of the Dutch. Their politicos made political decisions (as all politicians do) that while going easy (at the time) politically on the politicians ended up hurting their country's interests and cost them their colonial empire in the end. Doing otherwise would have required some foresight on their part that they obviously lacked. But they were warned repeatedly about Japan's intentions and instead of mobilizing their greatest resource (the 80,000,000) they chose as they chose and rest as they say is history.

 

WMC

[jwsleser]

Thank you WMC

 

It appears the technical issues have been resolved.

 

A few factual points. 

 

Germany wasn't allied with Japan in 1939. They only joined in September 1940. Japan's interest in the Pact was against Russia, not the DEI. Germany's decisions had nothing to do with respecting Japanese interests, in fact the Pact was best known for each ally doing what they want to do in their own self-interest. 

 

Germany had no intent/plans to invade The Netherlands until early 1940. It was Goering pressing for the use of bases in The Netherlands against the UK that finally made the change in the German plans. Before then, nothing.

 

The Netherlands was already looking at other suppliers of the heavy weapons needed for the fleet plan given Germany's delays. Those delays were mainly due to Germany being in the middle of its own rearmament plans. A new supplier would mean further delays in any actual construction.

 

Sumatra's refit was delayed for various reasons. First she had to await Java's return from its own refit in The Netherlands. That happened in May 38. Upon return, she was needed to escort Dutch shipping during the Spanish Civil War. Then she was needed for training as newer ships joined the Dutch squadrons and the annual new recruit training requirements. She had a brief refit in 39, took part in exercises, and then finally began a full refit when Germany invaded. Small fleet, many missions, not enough time. Nothing in the sources I have indicate that that her refit was delayed for any other reasons than 'stuff happens'. 

 

I won't even begin to address the issue of recruiting Indonesians. There is so much involved in that discussion and its really doesn't matter. It didn't work all that well for the KNIL.

 

The Netherlands was like many other small nations: they lacked the resources to compete in war on their own yet allying themselves to a major power had its own set of drawbacks. A major one was whether the major powers would honor their commitment. How did that work for Czechoslovakia and Poland? The Dutch had foresight, they just didn't have any good options. Unlike other small neutral European nations, they mobilized in 1939 (along with Belgium). They were a colonial power but no longer a world power. The inadequate fleet was merely one indicator of that reality. 

 

v/r  Jeff

[Mark Hinds]

Interesting comments by W. Clark.  FWIW, one of the reasons I have avoided playing GQ3 (which I own) is disagreement with some of the national characteristics.  For example: "The French shoot about on par with the IJN (so a down grade compared to the RN CRT)".  The few historical sources I have on this matter indicate that the French shoot better than the RN (at least their destroyers do).  For example from O'Hara's "Struggle for the Middle Sea", page 130: "The Admiralty concluded that ... the French 'produced long range gunnery of an accuracy considerably above our destroyer standard' ".  Might have something to do with crew quality dilution in the RN, or perhaps other factors.  

[Mark Hinds]

(text deleted)

 

I won't even begin to address the issue of recruiting Indonesians. There is so much involved in that discussion and its really doesn't matter. It didn't work all that well for the KNIL.

 

The Netherlands was like many other small nations: they lacked the resources to compete in war on their own yet allying themselves to a major power had its own set of drawbacks. A major one was whether the major powers would honor their commitment. How did that work for Czechoslovakia and Poland? The Dutch had foresight, they just didn't have any good options. Unlike other small neutral European nations, they mobilized in 1939 (along with Belgium). They were a colonial power but no longer a world power. The inadequate fleet was merely one indicator of that reality. 

 

v/r  Jeff

WRT recruiting Indonesians, keep in mind that the Dutch had been there for several hundred years, so the time was available, just not the willingness.  

WRT resources, the Netherlands pre-war GDP (including colonies) was about half that of Japan (including colonies).  So how much better would the Dutch have done with a navy half the size of Japans? 

So I tend to agree with W. Clark.