Radar spoting Aircraft
Posted 07 June 2010 - 06:38 PM
Posted 09 June 2010 - 09:24 AM
Posted 10 June 2010 - 05:10 PM
Andrew,I think there may be some possible confusion here. In GQ III, we are simulating related, but different functional aspects of SW (Surface Warning) radar and AW (Air Warning) radar. Rule Section 11 covers employment of SW radars and provides that the more accurate R + radars have better target discrimination than medium capacity R or the limited R = radars. Thus, Section 1.11.2 on page 1-17 provides for fewer blips for less capable radars.For air defense, time is the key factor. So with AW radars, we are concerned with the range at which a raid or snooper is detected rather than the specific number of participating aircraft. Longer-range detection provides more time for assembling and directing defending CAP flights to intercept the raid or snooper and scrambling (launching) additional fighters. But, to be effective, this must employ Fighter Direction Officer team (FDO) control to coordinate and direct the CAP flights to make the intercept as distant as possible. This is built into the FORMATION INTERCEPT table on the Tactical Air Ops chart (chart 17) with different columns to reflect improving radars and FDO procedures as the war progressed, resulting in longer-range intercepts and more time (listed as Air Phases) for launching reinforcing fighters. On the SNOOPER INTERCEPT table this is shown as a greater probability of intercepting distant snoopers, especially before they can send a contact report. The equivalent tables on the Campaign Air Ops chart (chart 9) reflect this though the number of CAP flights that intercept a strike and similar probabilities for snooper intercepts.Fleet air defense was an area where the Japanese Navy lagged far behind. AW radars had limited performance and were late in arriving. Equally important, Japanese radio communication systems were deficient, greatly hindering the ability to control and direct CAP fighters in making interceptions. Many IJN pilots considered the radios so useless that they had them removed to reduce weight for improved maneuverability. Thus, IJN capacity moved from Visual (no FDO) on the tables for 1942 3 to some AW radars with limited fighter direction by 1944, approximately equivalent to American and British capacity in 1939 40. This is reflected in the IJN radar column on the CAP INTERCEPT table.Details of aerial intercepts and how to use these tables can be found in rule Sections 2.7.2 2.7.4 for tactical aerial operations and Sections 4.5.4 4.5.5 for the equivalent, but less detailed campaign aerial operations. Hopefully, this clarifies the difference.
While spotting ships at night the Radar + you see all the ships and class they are, and with Radar - you see every other ship in the formation. So on a carrier when seeing at what range you can engage the incoming aircraft what is the difference in using Radar + that the US has verses Radar - that the Japanese use. Just need to know what is the difference there is if there is any. Have lots of Questions from the Americans in this Campagin, what is the difference there is? Like the Americans do not already have enough advantages in carrier strength and numbers.A poor dogpaddling Japanese Player,Andrew Burton
Posted 10 June 2010 - 06:09 PM
Dave,I hope I can clarify matters for you. The "Aerial Intercept table" is the FORMATION INTERCEPT table found in the aerial tactical rules and referenced in section 2.7. Certain low rolls on the FORMATION INTERCEPT table may allow the CAP to not only intercept an incoming flight further away from the fleet, but inserts a number of air phases during which time more CAP can possible get airborne, as you supposed. What I wanted to guard against is the withholding of additional fighters for CAP once the attacked player realizes he is under attack. I hope this clarifies things.I know most people do not use the GQIII tactical aerial rules, but being the son of a WWII USN aviator has made me love the challenges of putting an air strike on target. However, I realize that is not everyone's cup of tea.
At the risk of being presumptuous, as I am not the Solomons Campaign author...The main advantage of R+ AW radar over R- would be range and durability. For durability, see 1.11.5. The greater range, combined with better doctrine and experience, is reflected in the CAP Intercept and Formation Intercept tables.That being said, for the Solomons Campaign, the Engagement Type A description is somewhat confusing. First, there is a reference to an "Aerial Intercept table". I don't know what that is. So then what does the part about "cannot alter their initial CAP unless allowed by the Aerial Intercept table while under attack" mean - especially since later it says "The side under attack consults the CAP Intercept Table on Chart 9A for Campaign Aerial Ops or FormationIntercept table on Chart 17A for Tactical Aerial Ops to determine how or if the incoming strike is discovered." I guess maybe the Formation Intercept table allows you to launch more CAP? I never play the tactical air rules, so I'm unfamiliar with that process. I know the campaign CAP Intercept table doesn't have anything about launching more CAP, it specifically says "...limited to flights airborne".Dave
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