The Battle of Utsire Island Redux
24 December 1914, 0800 hours
A What If Scenario
After his victory at Coronel, Vice Admiral Otto von Graf Spee in compliance with the wishes of his captains and Germany's Naval High Command sought to bring his Far East Asian Squadron home to Germany. von Spee used various tricks to try and throw the Englanders off but he was limited by geography to how he could get home. He immediately decided against any effort through the Channel and opted for entering the North Sea from the north and hugging the coast of Norway.von Spee communicated by wireless with Germany to inform them of his intentions and his esitmate of when he would enter the North Sea. The German Naval high Command dearly wanted von Spee's attempt at penetrating the Royal Navy's North Sea blockcade to succeed for the propaganda coup it would be if not for the repatriation of the highly competent crews of von Spee's ships. They resolved to assist him by sending Rear Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers to raid the southeastern coast of England to draw off Beatty's battle cruisers and perhaps the Grand Fleet itself. They further decided to send Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels III Scouting Group reinforced with the V and VII Torpedo Boat Flotillas to escort von Spee home. And just for good measure they detached the Bluecher from von Hipper and added it to the Baron's armored cruisers.
Unknown to von Spee or any other German (for that matter) the Royal Navy had been in possession of the German Naval codes since October and they had intercepted the German wireless traffic. The Admiralty uncharacteristically (it is believed that Churchill was home with a cold) left the "What to do" to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.
Jellicoe considered von Hipper's battle cruisers to be his primary concern. The destruction of the German battle cruisers would affect the blance of capital ships in the North Sea as the destruction of von Spee would not. But, not avenging Rear Admiral Craddock's destruction at Coronel when given the chance would result in a bloody great up roar by the British public when it became known as it was bound to.
Jellicoe thus decided that he would make his major effort against Hipper and a secondary one against von Spee. Jellicoe decided to send his only light cruiser squadron and his three best armored cruiser squadrons against von Spee. Jellicoe determined that he could argue that he had deployed the strength of the Grand Fleet against the greater threat while making a real effort to destroy von Spee. Jellicoe was unaware of the flotillas attached to the Baron and with his shortage of destroyers sent none with the cruisers.
The Royal Navy cruiser squadrons fanned out from Scapa Flow towards the coast of Norway with 1st Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore William Goodenough, CLs Southampton-Flag, Birmingham, Lowestoft and Nottingham) farthest north (because of its greater speed) to pin von Spee against that coast.
Goodenough's light cruisers spotted smoke ahead just after dawn on the 24th of December. Goodenough turned to the northeast to cut the contact off from withdrawing if it turned out to be von Spee. Goodenough determined within a few minutes that it was indeed von Spee heading south and turned east again to get behind him. Goodenough reported von Spee's course and position to the armored cruiser squadrons to hus south.
Rear Admiral Sir Archibald Moore commanding the 1st Cruiser Squadron (CAs Defense-Flag, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince) was the senior flag officer present and the next squadron to the south of Goodenough. Moore was steaming due east when he spotted von Spee's cruisers dead ahead about 9 miles off at 0800 hours. Moore turned to 150 degrees on a converging course and called for 23 knots. Moore then attempted to vector the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons onto von Spee by wireless.
von Spee had sighted Goodenough's light cruisers somewhat after they had sighted him because they were still partially concealed by the now rapidly receding darkness to the west. He recognized them as the beaters with his ships as their quarry but his coal situation and their greater speed left him but little choice but to continue his present course for home. von Spee increased to 23 knots to try and get as far south as he could before any action could start.
The wind was Force 4 from the north and this would cause smoke problems for both side's gunnery through out the coming engagement. It was an uncharacteristically clear day in the North Sea with visibility after full daylight arrived at some eleven and a half miles. There was a sea haze to the north that reduced visibility by about one and a half miles and caused Goodenough's light cruisers to fade in and out of sight as they shadowed von Spee from about 9 miles astern. Utsire Island was visible to the southeast and would lend its name to the fight about to begin.
von See divided his cruisers into two squadrons; armored cruisers (CAs Scharnhorst-Flag and Gneisenau) in one and light cruisers (CLs Dresden-Flag, Nurberg and Leipzig) in the other. von Spee stationed his light cruisers to the east of his armored cruisers where the latter could try to shelter the former.
Rear Admiral Sir William Pakenham (the junior admiral present) commanding the 3rd Cruiser Squadron (CAs Antrim-Flag, Argyll, Devonshire and Roxburgh) was the next British force to sight von Spee's cruisers. Pakenham's cruisers were about 9 miles south of Moore when he sighted von Spee. Pakenham increased his speed to 22 knots and turned to 150 degrees in an attempt to cut von Spee off.
Rear Admiral Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (CAs Shannon-Flag, Achilles, Natal and Cochrane) was about 15 miles south of Moore when he sighted smoke to his southeast. Sir Somerset continued due east to place himself between von Spee's reported position and what ever this new force meant.
Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels commanding the III Scouting Group (reinforced) was steaming due north when he spotted smoke to his northwest-west. The Baron had deployed his group with his armored cruisers (CAs Roon-Flag, Yorck, Prinz Aldalbert, Friedrich Karl, Prinz Heinrich and Bluecher) under Commodore von Jeffski Condon as his western most column while the Baron retained control of his light cruisers (CLs Kolberg-Flag, Strassburg, Stralsund and Augsburg) and the V and VII Torpedo Boat Flotillas (11 boats each). The Baron sent von Condon to check the smoke out and von Condon quickly determined that the smoke came from a squadron of cruisers. It was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The Baron ordered full speed, 20 knots for the armored cruisers, 26 knots for the light cruisers and 32 knots for the boats.
With all the involved parties arrived and steaming at full speed the scene was now set for what has come to be know as the Battle of Utsire Island. von Spee was at first running due south and opened on Moore's cruisers at 15,000 yards (the Scharnhorsts are treated as having DCT) although his funnel smoke was hampering his gunnery the fact that his cruisers were as yet unengaged by the Brits evened that out. von Spee would gradually turn more south-southeast and then southeast as Moore and Pakenham closed the range.
Meanwhile to the south the Baron was expecting von Condon to turn northeast and then onto quarterline to clear his ships of funnel smoke for gunnery but von Condon continued due north obviously with the intent to prevent Sir Somerset from getting east of him but Sir Somerset had a three knot advantage and it appearred to the Baron that Sir Somerset would win the race. The Baron ordered his flotillas forward at flank speed to beat Sir Somerset to the inception point and attack him with torpedoes.
von Condon also opened on Sir Somerset at 15,000 yards (the Roons and Bluecher are treated as having DCT) with the Roon but the fire was at first without effect except for a minor hit on Shannon. The Baron expected Sir Somerset to turn when the VII Flotilla threatened to cross his tee but the Baron under estimated Sir Somerset's resolve to drive on to the east and would continue to do so through out the coming battle.
von Condon now for reasons unknown to the Baron turned to port to a heading of about 270 degrees opening the door to Sir Somerset's push to the east. The turn did have the effect of clearing von Condon's ships of their funnel smoke and his shooting immediately improved. The Baron ordered the VII Flotilla to attack with torpedoes and the Flotilla crossed Sir Somerset's tee within 3.500 yards. The Flotilla fired 18 torpedoes at Shannon and Achilles six of which had the right angle to intercept both ships. It was a bow aspect however and all six torpedoes missed. Both the VII and V Flotillas now turned away due east as Sir Somerset continued due east also.
Meanwhile von Condon and Sir Somerset pounded at each other with all the 5.9", 8.2", 9.4", 6", 7.5" and 9.2" that could bear. The British fire was ineffective at first while von Condon scored some hits. The range closed to 12,000 yards and then closer still. Some time during this gunnery duel the Friedrich Karl suffered a rudder hit that sent her sailing towards Scapa Flow (a very bad place for her to go). Then the 3rd Cruiser Squadron joined the fight but its fire was also ineffective at first.
The Roon during this prolonged ordeal suffered minor damage to her hull, torpedo flats and secondary. Yorck lost her forward main turret. Prinz Aldalbert was slowed to 16 knots from hull damage and had two thirds of her port secondary wrecked. Prinz Heinrich received minor hull damage lost all her 9.4" along with her torpedoes. Bluecher suffered serious hull damage when a bulkhead gave way but her crew repaired it although not before she had been reduced in speed to 16 knots. Bluecher also lost her fore turret and her starboard torpedo flat was wrecked.
But von Condon gave as good as he got. Achilles lost a 7.5". Argyll lost her rear turret and some damage to her starboard secondary and was also slowed to 18 knots by hull damage. Devonshire was reduced to 13 knots by hull damage and Roxburgh lost her rear turret. But the real damage was to Antrim which sank under the weight of von Condon's accurate fire and took Pakenham with her ending what all had believed to be a promising career.
Moore despairing of catching von Spee latched onto the rudderless Friedrich Karl with all four of his cruisers. Moore's cruisers took their ire and frustration out on the Karl reducing her to 9 knots, wrecking her torpedo flats and destroyed part of her secondary. During her trail by fire the Karl's crew so botched their efforts to repair her rudder that became apparent that a dockyard's efforts would be needed to correct her problem. Unfortunely for the Karl she was locked onto a course 180 degrees away from the needed dockyard. All was not all one sided though as Karl hit back and rather hard given her situation. Defense was slowed to 20 knots by hull damage. Warrior lost her forward starboard 9.2". But the Black Prince lost her starboard 9.2" and a shot to her engineering that reduced her to 15 knots. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was also shot at by only Southampton was hit by a very accurate straddel that hit her three times taking out her spotters, bridge and jamming her rudder amidships. The Commodore was injured but would remain good enough to continue in command.
Let us now return to Sir Somerset's duel with von Spee and the Baron. The Baron was desperate to place his flotillas and light cruisers between von Spee and harm from either Sir Somerset's cruisers or the pursuing light cruisers.
The Baron now reversed course with both Flotillas making smoke with the VII to shield von Spee from fire to von Spee's north and and northwest. The Baron placed his V Flotilla directly between von Spee and Sir Somerset's on coming cruisers. The V Flotilla crossed Sir Somerset's tee within 3,500 yards and launched 33 torpedoes at him. Again, sir Somerset was not to be deterred by torpedoes and continued to steam due east in his ongoing effort to cut von Spee off. All 33 torpedoes were angled correctly to intercept Sir Somerset, but it was a bow aspect again and again all 33 torpedoes missed (I needed ones and I could not roll one). The V Flotilla then made smoke to cover von Spee as the VII Flotilla attempted to get into place to fire its remaining 15 fish. The Baron expected Sir Somerset to turn south rather then penetrate the smoke with von Spee crossing his tee at 6,000 yards but, again this was another under esitmation of Sir Somerset's determination.
Sir Somerset plunged through the smoke and exposed himself and the Shannon to a destructive fire from von Spee's cruisers at almost point blank range. Both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau hit Shannon reducing her to 20 knots from hull damage and knocking out her forward turret but otherwise just dinging up her searchlights and a torpedo flat. Shannon responded with a hit to the Gneisenau's hull that reduced her also to 20 knots.
Sir Somerset remained undeterred and continued east to cross von Spee's wake. Sir Somerset's obsessive push east headed the VII Flotilla's course and it was forced to turn radically to avoid collision, but its last three boats retained their firing solutions and launched 6 torpedoes at Natal and Cochrane. Again all 6 torpedoes were angled correctly to hit with a broadside aspect and one did cutting the Natal in half and sinking her immediately.
The Baron had crossed von Spee's course with his light cruisers and these took station well to von Spee's rear laying smoke to cover his withdrawal but too far north to protect him from Sir Somerset's cruisers. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron fired on them hitting Kolberg and destroying her starboard rear 4.1".
The Baron also ordered V Flotilla to reverse course and intervene between Sir Somerset and von Spee. Sir Somerset now turned south together and steamed directly through the torpedoless V Flotilla to keep it from smoking up his shot at the Gneisenau. All the boats held their collective breath as huge cruisers steamed through their line without so much as scraping any paint.
Sir Somerset's cruisers suddenly found the range and sunk Gneisenau in 12 minutes of very accurate gunfire. Sir Somerset's cruisers had been firing at the flotillas with every gun that would not bear on a cruiser but only inflicted three hits, two of those each reduced a half flotilla to 24 knots.
During the entire battle Shannon lost her main armament, two starboard 7.5", most of her torpedoes and some additional minor hull damage besides the earlier hull hit. Cochrane lost her forward starboard 9.2" and Achilles lost another 7.5".
The Baron had just got the remaining boats of the VII Flotilla with 9 torpedoes in postion to fire at Shannon at less than 3,500 yards with a broadside aspect when we regretfully called the game to return to our real lives.
The German had sunk Antrim and Natal (4 & 5 VP respectively) and reduced Shannon to no main armament (3 VP). von Spee's remaining 4 cruisers had escaped unscathed (12.5 VP). This gave a total of 24.5 VP.
The Brits had sunk Gneisenau (5 VP), reduced Prinz Heinrich to no main amrament (2 VP) and God determined that Friedrich Karl should count as sunk (4 VP) as her fate was certain at this point. This gave the Brits a total of 11 VP and the game to the Germans.
In retrospect I will drop the VII Flotilla as one too many even though Sir Somerset probably would not have been deterred by any amount of torpedoes. I fired 52 torpedoes at Sir Somerset at point blank range and got one hit. It is almost as if the torpedoes were impressed by his sheer will and gave way to it.
