15 replies to this topic

[W. Clark]

Fighting Task Force 5

First and foremost you need to avoid combat at night. Your torpedoes are crap, you have no flash-less powder (you self-illuminate every time you fire) and you are blind as a bat. When the sun goes down, run for home.

 

The other problem you have is that you are piece meal at the start. You have the option to sortie a sweep from Tarakan on GT1; don’t take it. You have;

CL USS Marblehead, three 6” D12, one 6” D24 (no rapid fire) & 2 triple TT (American torpedoes with all their issues)

DD USS Paul Jones, Stewart, Parrott, Barker & Bulmer; one 4” D12, one 4” D24 & 4 triple (old) TT (at least they go bang when they hit).

 

Transfer to Surabaya and save your ships for when you have enough combat power to do something. If you get theater event 8 then you will add;

CL USS Boise, seven 6” D12, one 6” D24 (with rapid fire) & = FC radar.

DD USS Edwards, Alden, Edsall & Whipple; one 4” D12, one 4” D24 & 4 triple (old) TT (at least they go bang when they hit).

 

Now you have more than twice the combat power, but not as much as you will have later. Sortie or no sortie, flip a coin on this one, but remember your morale is green. If you get theater event 9 then you add to all the above;

CA USS Houston (along with RAdm Glassford and regular morale), four 8” D12 & on 8” D24

 

You now have the bulk of your combat power, this is a sortie.

 

On GT2 you are going to want to sortie and if you get theater event 6-7 then do so as you for one GT are going to have;

CA USS Pensacola, five 8” D12 & - search radar

Otherwise, transfer Paul Jones and a destroyer division to Darwin to keep the ANZAC squadron in business.

 

Now I know it is tempting to sortie in the eastern axis to mass with the ANZAC squadron. But, you need to examine what objectives the Japanese have taken and what they still need to take. They may very well have a GT where they can sortie only in the central axis avoiding the ANZAC squadron all together and in that case you need to be there.

 

On GT4 rather than sortie, take the reinforcement and gain;

CL USS Phoenix; seven 6” D12, one 6” D24 (with rapid fire) & = FC radar.

 

GT5 & 6, you are getting down to brass tacks and you need to sortie everything you can, filling in with the Dutch and/or the Brits to put out full strength sweeps.

 

Remember, the Japanese EAF has to take all 13 objectives in order to win or they lose.

[Dave Franklin]

As far as being blind as a bat, there is campaign optional rule 3.4.3 U.S. Asiatic Fleet Night Training, which allows ships of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet (excepting USS Boise, USS Pensacola or USS Phoenix) to use the ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY DARK ACQUISITION table for visual spotting.

 

I am completely confused with your dice references.  First, I assume when you say D24 you mean D20.  However, even given that, a statement like "CL USS Boise, seven 6” D12, one 6” D24 (with rapid fire)" doesn't make any sense.  If USS Boise uses rapid fire, she still only throws 7 dice.

[W. Clark]

Boise has fifteen six inch guns which gives her 7 D12 and 1 D24 (for the odd gun).

[Dave Franklin]

Not sure what rules you're using when you're talking about a D24.  USS Boise, a Brooklyn class CL, has 15 6" guns, so she throws 7 D12s:

"1.5.5 Gunnery Attacks

Gunnery attacks are resolved separately for each battery by rolling one D12 for each pair of main battery guns or each secondary/tertiary gun box. Where a main battery has an odd number of guns, round UP for single mounts or DOWN for triple turrets. Example: roll seven D12s for a Brooklyn class cruiser (five triple turrets) or three D12s for a Fletcher class DD (five single mounts). Roll five D12s for USS IOWA’s five secondary boxes."

[W. Clark]

The D24 allows the odd gun to be represented at the same ratio that a D12 represents a pair of guns. That way there is no fudging as we are compelled to do with D12 when there is an odd number of guns. 

[W. Clark]

No on the D24 meaning a D20. A D24 is a 24 sided die.

[Dave Franklin]

So this "D24" thing is a house rule of yours.

[Cpt M]

The D24 allows the odd gun to be represented at the same ratio that a D12 represents a pair of guns. That way there is no fudging as we are compelled to do with D12 when there is an odd number of guns. 

 

So this "D24" thing is a house rule of yours.

 

The use of a "D24" is strictly a house rule.  In fact, there are historical reasons (discussed in previous forum threads), for the rule as written.

[healey36]

We've begun using a D24 for odd numbers of guns in a battery as well, admittedly outside the rulebook. If you have minute, Cpt M, and it's not too painful to find, can you point me to the thread re: odd numbers of tubes being rounded down for "historical reasons"? Thanks.

[Cpt M]

We've begun using a D24 for odd numbers of guns in a battery as well, admittedly outside the rulebook. If you have minute, Cpt M, and it's not too painful to find, can you point me to the thread re: odd numbers of tubes being rounded down for "historical reasons"? Thanks.

 

Below is the gist of the original discussion (the original thread had to do with the problem of the the German Lutzow, et al class): 

 

"This reflects a fundamental design trade off all naval designers faced in which the weight savings of triple turrets was countered by the increased vulnerability to damage. This was certainly a concern for USN designers. who finally decided that the weight savings and reduced lengths of hulls that needed to be armored were worth the risk. That is more of an issue when a ship has only two triple turrets. Additionally, it was generally agreed that triple turrets did not provide much advantage over twin turrets in the fall of shot. When firing salvos of six or nine shells into the impact area, this difference was minor as there was enough cumulative dispersion in the impact zone. But, it became more pronounced when only a single turret was employed. Hence, the rule to round down for a single turret."

 

And this was from another thread regarding the 'rounding down for triple mounts', 'rounding up for single mounts' issue:

 

"Generally, the rate of fire for guns in a triple turret was somewhat lower than that for a twin turret.  The reason for this was due to the more cramped design of a triple mount vs a twin mount, ammo supply restrictions due to having to service 3 guns vs 2 guns, and increased shot dispersion (this was a particular problem when the first triple mounts were introduced).  The net impact was that a triple mount was not that dramatically different in overall effect over a twin mount."

 

Using the rounding rule elegantly reflects this situation.

 

As for rounding up for single mounts.  Most of the guns impacted by this are the smaller caliber weapons that were generally hand loaded (or had some limited power assist) and were limited in rate of fire by the muscle power of the loaders.  For example, the US 5"/38 rate of fire could range from 12 to 22 rounds per minute (and, in some instances, get up to 25 rounds per minute for single mounts).  Additionally, the rate of tire per gun tended to be slightly higher for single mounts as compared to twin mounts of the same gun.  By rounding up for those situations (such as rolling 3 D12s for a 5x5" DD), this advantage can be reflected.              

[healey36]

Thanks, mate. Previous to your response, I flipped a note to a couple of instructor friends at USNA for their take...haven't heard back yet. It's always fun to hear/contemplate the thought process.

 

I'm not one for arguing people's historical take on various circumstances; however, I would respectfully say that there are holes in the argument. Most glaring is the contention that "Generally, the rate of fire for guns in a triple turret was somewhat lower than that for a twin turret." For this to be true, the rate of fire, i.e. the number of times a triple-mount could fire as compared to the number of times a twin-mount could fire in a specified period of time, would have to be less than 50%. In other words, if a twin-mount could fire once-per-minute, it could deliver six rounds onto the target in three minutes. To deliver the same number of rounds onto the target, the triple-mount would only fire twice in those same three minutes, implying that the triple-mount required 50% more time to load and fire as compared to the twin-mount, something we surely know not to be the case. Most contemporary naval historians will tell you that the rate of fire, say between a New Orleans-class cruiser versus a Mogami-class cruiser, was nearly identical, and that the number of shells landed on the target only differed due to Mogami's one additional tube in her five 8-inch twin-mounts broadside versus New Orleans' three 8-inch triple-mounts. In light of this, it seems reasonable to throw in the D24 for any odd tube.

 

The issue of dispersion is more subjective, nearly requiring a look at gunnery tech by navy. The Italians, who suffered abysmal gunnery throughout the war, deployed their turreted twin-mounts close together in single cradles. The jarring simultaneous firing of such closely mounted guns had a disruptive effect on aim. The USN also used single cradles early in the war, but they were able to mitigate much of the disruption by not firing simultaneously, instead developing a system to delay the firing of each tube by a few microseconds. The Japanese, who never used single cradles on their primaries, still suffered significant dispersion problems, probably due to the fact that they fired simultaneously rather than in a delayed fashion. 

 

Looking at these types of things is pretty fascinating stuff. The concepts deployed by naval architects during the interwar period which then saw proof-of-concept in the early years of the war is very interesting. At the end of the day, however, for our purposes it's likely all splitting hairs. Other factors such as tube wear and powder performance all play into it, and trying to take all of the many intangibles into consideration kills much of what makes GQIII so enjoyable (the fact that it's not a rivet-counting nightmare).  

[W. Clark]

​In looking my columns on DTMB over I found a mistake that I've not corrected and no one else corrected either. It involves IJN LBA in the EAF area on GT 1. There is none. I know, how did I miss that? Well, I did. The EAF OOB clearly states that it LBA (21st & 23rd Naval air Flotillas) arrives on GT2. The only IJN air cover for the EAF is the CAG of Ryujo (5 TB & 4 Ftr flights) on GT 1.

 

WMC

[Jim O'Neil]

Mr Clark is mistaken about these ships torpedoes as they are all old Mk 8 torpedoes, which run at the correct dpth and explode on contact without issue. However their explosive charge is on the small side for WW2  Regardless, they do go boom. The newer Mk 15 torpedoes are unlikely for a 4 piper. Only the new "Gold Platers" get those.

[W. Clark]

The mark 8's go boom. But they go boom like 18" torps per the rules and not with the power of a 21". And that satisfies one of my designations of a "crap" torpedo. But you are right in that any boom is better than a dud.

[healey36]

Hmmm...the Mark 8 was a 25 year-old design by 1939; I didn't realize they were still in service that late.

 

Manning's book on British DD's has a bunch of Mark 8's going over to the RN as part of lend-lease. I guess that makes sense as the DD's that went over were the older four-stack types. I presume the smaller warhead (some 20% smaller as compared to the 21") accounts for the lack of punch.

[W. Clark]

I believe you are right that the small warhead accounts for the lack of punch. But whatever the reason, the halving of hull damage inflicted (per the CRT) causes me to not consider these to be good torps.

 

WMC