19 replies to this topic

[cooldiscodan31]

I'm struggling to understand the Japanese Special Allocations.  My understanding is you roll a D12 and reference the table.  But the Japanese have overlapping ranges and ranges that go up to 16.    Is it intended this way?  

[Dave Franklin]

Jeff,

 

I think it is an error.  I went back and looked at the first GQ3 edition from 2006, and it shows the same.  So it has been messed up, and overlooked, since the beginning.  Unfortunately you'll have to hope one of the actual authors weighs in and says what they actually intended.  I don't recall any posts about it, but you could also search the forum.  I've never used the Scenario Generation rules myself.

 

Dave

[Kenny Noe]

...  calling Lonnie...

[cooldiscodan31]

Jeff,

 

I think it is an error.  I went back and looked at the first GQ3 edition from 2006, and it shows the same.  So it has been messed up, and overlooked, since the beginning.  Unfortunately you'll have to hope one of the actual authors weighs in and says what they actually intended.  I don't recall any posts about it, but you could also search the forum.  I've never used the Scenario Generation rules myself.

 

Dave

 

I've been playing around with the scenario generator as a tool for a way quickly coming up with a "pick up" game with my regular group.   We sometimes just show up on our weekly game night and just toss some ships on the table and fight it out, rather than pre-plan a scenario.

[W. Clark]

Whatever works. I like to game historical what ifs. There are several cases where ships were at sea heading for one another when something (like land-based air) intervened causing one side to withdraw and a surface engagement not to happen.  Or, I have fleets (Spanish & Argentinian) that never fought, and they are good matches for my Dutch fleet in its various possibilities. Then are the plans that worked out differently than intended and less ships showed up (like Operation Rheinland and the fleet sortie Rader envisioned before Allied bombing, dockyard problems and fate intervened). I also use a card system where I take the OBs to a series of historical engagements (like the Solomons Campaign) and list each side of the engagements on a separate index card, making an Allied deck and a Axis deck if you will. We shuffle them up and each side picks a card blindly. You make know the OB you draw but you have no idea what you are up against until you make contact. That works really well at night, and you can make it work for daylight actions also. None of these ideas originated with me. In each case I've seen or played in game using these ideas over the years and adopted them. I've seen the card system adapted the modern land warfare also. So, there are a lot of ways to go about it if you are tired of historical engagements.

 

WMC

[cooldiscodan31]

Whatever works. I like to game historical what ifs. There are several cases where ships were at sea heading for one another when something (like land-based air) intervened causing one side to withdraw and a surface engagement not to happen.  Or, I have fleets (Spanish & Argentinian) that never fought, and they are good matches for my Dutch fleet in its various possibilities. Then are the plans that worked out differently than intended and less ships showed up (like Operation Rheinland and the fleet sortie Rader envisioned before Allied bombing, dockyard problems and fate intervened). I also use a card system where I take the OBs to a series of historical engagements (like the Solomons Campaign) and list each side of the engagements on a separate index card, making an Allied deck and a Axis deck if you will. We shuffle them up and each side picks a card blindly. You make know the OB you draw but you have no idea what you are up against until you make contact. That works really well at night, and you can make it work for daylight actions also. None of these ideas originated with me. In each case I've seen or played in game using these ideas over the years and adopted them. I've seen the card system adapted the modern land warfare also. So, there are a lot of ways to go about it if you are tired of historical engagements.

 

WMC

I like that card system.  That's very interesting.  Might be stealing that

[W. Clark]

LTC (Captain then) Jim O'Neil got me started on naval gaming while we were in the same battalion in Germany in the late 70s. We had played most of the night actions off the Solomons and knew the OBs and headings by heart. So, he thought this up and it made everything new again. I did the same thing here a bit ago for most surface actions in the Pacific (including a couple of what ifs like Force Z and Makassar Strait) from the start until the end of 43 (which is when I cut it off because I don't see the IJN as any chance after that). I'm in the process of doing it again in the Atlantic/North Sea and I'll do it for the Med. In the Pacific where there is a conflict between a day card and a night card, I have the IJN card decide. If you find the range of odds to be too great, just pull that card(s) from the deck. And if an engagement is two big or small do the same thing. If your group discusses what it wants, then you should be able to tailor the deck to that. Now I also took the time to make up ship log sheets (including their historical organization and the flag officers involved) in files that correspond to the cards. That allows me to come to the game with everything needed to pay it and if you are writing AAR (as I hope you will) then it makes it easier to write as the logs tell you what happened to each ship and coupled with a turn record (including some notes) will say when and by and to whom. Heck, it almost writes itself. So, steam on, steam on to glory. 

 

WMC

[Lonnie Gill]

G' Day Cooldiscodan31

 

Looks like Dave is correct.  The Japanese row of the SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS table on Chart 18 D is incorrect.  This table was originally created using a D20 back in 2006.  As a last minute revision before going to print, we decided to simplify it and changed the probabilities to a D12 for better compatibility with the rest of Chart 18.  Naturally, no good deed goes unpunished.  Everything got updated except for the Japanese row of the SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS table.  Those last minute changes are the ones that get you...

 

The correct D12 probabilities for the Japanese row should be:  None = 1 - 5 • DMS = 6 • Submarine = 7 • CAP (daytime) = 8 - 10 • Flareplanes (Nocturnal) = 11 - 12

 

My apologies for the confusion.  I have prepared an updated Chart 18 E to replace Chart 18D and am sending it to Kenny to post on the ODGW website so you and others can download it.  

Please replace your old chart with the new Chart 18 E.  As several of the other posts have noted, there are many ways to generate scenarios.  You can use the SCENARIO GENERATION SEQUENCE, in whole or in part, along with the other methods mentioned to find a process that works best for you and your local game group.

 

Lonnie Gill

[W. Clark]

I never even knew that there was a scenario generator in the rules until this tread got started. I think it's time I went back to rules for a refresher. Thank you all.

 

WMC

[healey36]

Hey Ken, did you ever get a chance to post Lonnie's updated Chart 18E? Does anyone know if there was ever a write-up on how best to use the scenario generator chart(s)? 

[Kenny Noe]

Will check this evening after work.

[healey36]

Will check this evening after work.

Thanks, mate!

[Kenny Noe]

All,

 

File has been uploaded to the GQ3 Private Access Library.   Lonnie sent it to me back in March and I let it slip off the radar.  Apologies.

[W. Clark]

Speaking of scenarios. I was listening to Jon Parshall on YouTube talking about 2nd Guadalcanal and he suggested that the Japanese could have easily added Kongo and Haruna to the fight. I brought it up with my gaming buddy, Rob (he who invented the quick torpedo plot gimmick we are now using) and he did a bit of research. It appears that Kongo and Haruna were in the area at the time in some kind of support role but in the event did not actually support Kondo's Bombardment Group. So, as another What-If, Rob and I when we get together for our monthly gaming will run a Friday the Thirteenth Scenario with a twist. The IJN player will get to add Sentai 3 under RAdm Kurita or Sentai 9 under RAdm Kishi (it was anchored at Truk at the time) which give the Japanese another chance to have Oii and Kitakami put massive amounts of Long Lances in the water.

 

WMC

[healey36]

Likely a reason Haruna and Kongo were not sent along, Wasn't there an ammunition issue with these guys (or is my near-seven-decades-old memory failing me...again).

[healey36]

All,

 

File has been uploaded to the GQ3 Private Access Library.   Lonnie sent it to me back in March and I let it slip off the radar.  Apologies.

No sweat, Kenny. Thanks for the update.

 

Paul

[W. Clark]

I believe there was a shortage of HE suitable for a bombardment, but I don't think that is the primary reason they were not included. IMHO the Japanese had a view of what they expected their long desired decisive battle to look like and Guadalcanal was not it. They were slow to realize just how important it was and kept trying to do it on the cheap. They had a lot more ships available in Truk Lagoon and choose not to send them. Just think if Lee's force had faced Yamato, Mutsu, Kong and Haruna as well as Kirishima. Now, I'm looking at this with 20-20 hindsight. But then again, I'm not an admiral with the fate of my countries' war effort in my hands. They cannot say the same. It was their job to win, and they botched it.

 

WMC

[healey36]

I flipped a note to my IJN guy in Annapolis, who had this to say:

 

"It's not as easy as K and H were in the area and therefore they could have showed up.  I'm surprised Parshall said that. As I understand things, the Japanese fail to synchronize the ops of K and H and they would not have been able to rendezvous with Hiei in time. Just like the USN botched getting S. Dakota and Washington to Guadalcanal until two nights after First Guadalcanal giving the Japanese a chance to bombard Henderson Field on the night between the two battles. Also, as I understand things, there were no special 14-inch shore bombardment rounds for K and H."  

 

"Taking the two torpedo cruisers is plausible but not likely. For some reason, the IJN never employed these things and rather quickly reduced the number of TT on them. Why not just take some CA's to reinforce the Hiei force?  This would have been more likely." 

 

With regards to my recollection of ammunition issues, his response was:

 

"When Hiei tangled with the USN BBs, she had both AP and HE but since she was getting ready for a shore bombardment, only the HE was readily at hand."  

 

"The special shells I mentioned earlier were the Type 3 incendiary shells.  Much more effective than HE for hitting the airfield.  Kongo had 104 of these for the October bombardment."

 

I recall playing the old SPI game "CA" to death back in the 1970s. With regards to these specific scenarios, there were special rules for the IJN's BBs, in light of their primary mission of shore bombardment. 

 

Lots of circumstances to consider here when putting together a hypothetical scenario involving all those IJN BBs. Doctrine and the intangibles are often what gets you in the end.

 

[W. Clark]

I'm not surprised that there are other reasons and possible reasons for the IJN not adding K and H to the fight. And there is no question that the IJN was reluctant to commit Oii and Kitakami as they never really did. But they could have made the effort and it appears that they chose not to. The What-If IMHO proposes that they had a change of heart and decided to commit more. I don't see the shortage of bombardment ammo as an issue in that they fully expected Kirishima's bombardment to be sufficient to knock Henderson Field out. The issue for the IJN IMHO was ensuring that the IJN prevented the Allies from interfering with the bombardment as they had two nights earlier. Either Sentai 3 or 9 if present would have been another asset to intervene against such an Allied operation.

 

WMC

[healey36]

At the end of the day, it's a "What If", so run without guardrails. There's no right or wrong; heck, I've run scenarios with ships that in reality had been sunk two or three years earlier or were on the other side of the world at the time. You can always dial it back for matters of availability or doctrine (if you have those concerns).

 

Still looking for any write-up that goes with the Scenario Generation Sequence chart...