25 replies to this topic

[healey36]

The Angle

3 July 1863

 

I’m of an age now where tackling new rulesets can be a challenge. The ability to digest and retain the details seems to be slipping away, possibly due to my age, but more likely because I already have two dozen rulesets filed away in “the little gray cells” (not to mention a few hundred board games).

 

About a year ago, some of the folks from the game group approached me about having a go at some horse-and-musket stuff. It’s been a long time, and to be honest I just didn’t feel up for it, especially learning yet another ruleset. Back in the day, we played GDW’s Johnny Reb, which is a decent set, not terrifically complicated but quite detailed and, in my opinion, somewhat cumbersome in places. They advised me that it wouldn’t be a problem as they are using ODGW’s Historical Battle Lines which, they assured me, was easy to learn and they’d help teach me. So here I go, willingly plunging down another rabbit hole.  

 

This past Christmas, I received a copy of Historical Battle Lines as a gift from my son. I would agree, it looks pretty straightforward. The “drop-in” format makes it easy to gradually immerse yourself, and the fact that most of the players I’m joining are already intimately familiar with the mechanics is encouraging. ODGW’s contention that one can play from the “Player’s Quick Reference Card” and only occasionally/rarely consult the rulebook sounds promising. My plan is to learn enough to be dangerous, then pick up the other bits as I go. Sounds do-able…I’ll let you know how it turns out.

 

For the first clash we decided on a something we here in north-central Maryland and south central Pennsylvania are quite familiar – Gettysburg. For simplicity, we wanted something that was predominantly, but not exclusively, an infantry action fought over relatively simple terrain. Gettysburg offers a multitude of vignettes, including many straight-up infantry slugfests. We’ve decided on giving the epic clash at The Angle a go. Simple, a few thousand troops, a couple hundred yards of nearly wide-open terrain, intersected by a stone wall, and the war possibly hanging in the balance. What could be simpler?

 

Background

 

I want to say I’m not a huge fan of Shelby Foote. Don’t get me wrong, the guy was a great writer and he made history eminently readable, but there’s too much “old southern charm” coursing through his story. When he writes about Pickett’s division forming up that hot July afternoon, every man chomping at the bit to take part in this great assault on the center of the Union line, I cringe. It’s a load of rubbish. Following a largely ineffective artillery bombardment (which admittedly they didn’t understand the extent of), those guys were staring out at three quarters of a mile of open ground, advancing into the very teeth of the enemy’s position; they had to have been terrified, as I certainly would have been.

 

Even worse was the utter stupidity of the whole thing (IMHO). Longstreet appealed to Lee not to go forward, to disengage to fight another day on more favorable ground, but Lee was resolute in his decision. He’d convinced himself that, while both flank attacks the day before had failed, one last great push in the center could throw Meade off the ridge. Guys like Trimble, Pettigrew, Brockenbrough, Davis and others exhorted and led the men forward, while Pickett watched from the Codori farm as his division was destroyed at Lee’s behest.

 

This game will center on the action occurring across the couple hundred yards of ground running from the infamous “copse of trees” to the 90-degree bend in the stone wall known as “The Angle”, the frontage extending out as far west as the Emmitsburg Pike (the outer range limit of Union rifle fire). The Union side will feature Hays’ and Webb’s infantry, Cowan’s battery and the three guns commanded by Cushing; the Confederates a gaggle of regiments from various brigades.

 

Likely to go off sometime in August or September, we’ll have a write up and a few pics when we’re done. I’ll share the OOB as soon as that is finalized.

 

Meanwhile, I’m looking forward to getting a run-through of HBL.

 

 

 

Three photos taken on a hazy morning a few weeks ago: (top)The Angle and monument to Webb's 71st Pennsylvanians; (middle) remains of the stone wall running south from The Angle toward the Copse of Trees; and (bottom) the view west from The Angle to Seminary Ridge, from which the Confederate attack came.

 

FYI, if you're looking for a good recap of Gettysburg, I highly recommend Edwin Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1968). It is definitive and sheds many of the romantic notions so many other historians incorporate into their prose. Very readable, it is not only an excellent assessment of the campaign, but provides a glimpse into circumstances of this battle that made it so horrific for commanders (not to mention the foot soldiers).

[healey36]

While doing some OOB work, came across this photo:

 

From Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg: Report of the Pennsylvania Commission, published in 1914.

 

Courtesy of the Hathi Trust and the University of Michigan.

[Kenny Noe]

Simply amazing.

[healey36]

Here's another photo encountered recently, taken in July 1922 of Marines participating in a reenactment of the third day's festivities. For me, it illustrated/confirmed a few things:



Overall, it gives a pretty good sense of the distance from the Emmitsburg Road to the stone wall behind which the Union troops were positioned. Here, it looks to be 250-300 yards from the road to the wall, which aligns with most accounts that had the Confederate troops briefly massing here to pull down the split-rail fencing and take cover prior to the final push; it's also a point described as being the outer limit of accurate Union rifle fire (the effective range of the Springfield Model 1861 is said to be 250-400 yards).

I've walked the route of the Confederates a number of times, and this photo confirms the slight upward grade of the ridge. It's not steep, but it's not negligible either. It doesn't look like a grade that would seriously impede troops moving up it, but keep in mind, you're going to break into a run the last 40-50 yards. Interestingly, when you stand at the stone wall looking west, the ground looks nearly flat.

Another thing, and I'll give Foote credit for pointing this out, is that unlike the ground stretching from Seminary Ridge to the Emmitsburg Road, there is no topographic undulation these last few yards from the road to the Union position. When the advance began, broad swathes of the Confederate line would briefly disappear from view as they moved east, marching across shallow depressions in the farmland. Troops were said to disappear only to reappear some 50-60 yards closer as they advanced. This was not the case beyond the road, at least not the bit directly in front of the center of the Union position; there is virtually no cover until one reaches the wall (a big if).

Anyway, thanks to the Library of Congress for the photo. Next time up, I'm going to try to find that specific vantage point so I can get a better appreciation for the distance to be covered. 

[healey36]

We made a pass at an expanded OOB using a number of sources, primarily Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign (1968) and Al Nofi's book of the same title (1986). We used a couple others, chief among them Noah Trudeau's Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage (2002), to corroborate as best we could. Still, we end up with something likely approximate. Rather than make a simple organizational list, we tried to give a graphical representation using Excel:

 

  

 

The heavy black line running across the center represents the stone wall (the southern end of which transitioned to a post-n-rail fence that carried on for a couple hundred yards or so). Not all maps/accounts include this detail, but we found such descriptions credible, especially in light of what remains of the stone on the field today.

 

On the Union side, we attempted to differentiate between who was positioned at the wall and who was some number of yards back. Not easy, especially when the accounts have units falling back, moving up, or moving laterally at various points of time. Generally, we relied on a number of sources, further corroborated where possible using the regimental demarcations on the field. Hal Jesperson produced a sharp graphic representation of the clash which is included in the Wikipedia entry for "Pickett's Charge", but there are a number of issues with it, not the least of which being The Angle's noted location is incorrect. As with anything on the Wik, "trust but verify" is a good policy (I am not one for wholesale dismissal of Wikipedia as a source).

 

We did our best to verify the brigade commanders present at 1600 July 3. Some brigades, like 3rd Division's 2nd Brigade was on its third commander, Smyth having been wounded during the Confederate artillery barrage, and Pierce, second in command by rank, was off to the far right with his regiment, leaving Ellis to take over as the attack developed. On the Confederate side, the leaders of the assault were somewhat easier to identify. Developing a comprehensive list of regimental commanders will be a bigger challenge (but seemingly not impossible). Similar issues on the Union side.

 

So, on the face of it, this looks like 2-1 regimental advantage for the CSA, but of course it's not that simple. Many regiments were significantly degraded by this point in the battle, and they were further degraded in the push toward Cemetery Ridge. Figuring out what their approximate strengths were when they reached the Emmitsburg Road will likely be a chore (and a guesstimate).

 

However, I will say this; it becomes a bit clearer in understanding how Lee may have deluded himself into believing this was attainable. Measuring the opportunity for success almost feels like a math exercise. One has X thousands of men available for the effort, and they will march at some known rate across nearly a mile of ground, stopping once to form up. Having a sense of effective ranges of enemy ordnance and an approximation of how much they have, presumably one could come up with an estimate of casualties incurred before reaching the enemy's line. If the estimated net total remaining appeared large enough to overwhelm the enemy's estimated strength at the point of contact, then roll the dice. It doesn't look like the incredible reach it eventually proved to be (as deemed initially by Longstreet and a number of Lee's other subordinates).

 

Anyway, comments/corrections? Post 'em here; we'd be glad to have them.

Attached Files

•  The Angle OOB.xlsx   13.37KB   1 downloads

[healey36]

Back to the original theme of this whole thing, I find the epigraph in Trudeau's Gettysburg book especially appropriate:

 

"When I was younger I could remember anything, whether it happened or not. But as I grew older, it got so I only remembered the latter." Mark Twain

[healey36]

Based on a number of comments received, we made a few tweaks to the OOB as follows: (1) Somehow the 19th Massachusetts got completely overlooked and has been added to Hall's brigade; (2) the artillery battery listed as 1st New York Light was in fact the 1st Independent New York Artillery (the 1st New York Light Battery B was actually present and attached to Harrow's brigade further south along the line); and (3) the 56th North Carolina Infantry in Davis' brigade is actually the 55th North Carolina (misidentified on all three sources we were using).

 

We also added a listing of the regimental commanders as best we could determine them (with a bit of work yet to go). Verifying battlefield changes can be difficult; for instance, we have Theodore Ellis listed as commander of his 14th Connecticut, even though he was promoted on the field to command of the brigade after Smyth was wounded and Pierce was indisposed.

 

Muster strengths have been noted (either at the start of the battle or, if possible, at the time of the charge). Recalling that the original strength of a typical infantry regiment is 1000-1200 souls, one gets a sense of how degraded these units were. It should be noted that more than a few of the Confederate regiments were destroyed (less than 50 men made it back to their lines, typically sans officers) in this action, especially on the flanks. 

 

Also noted are the muster numbers/types of ordnance for the Union artillery batteries present. Further review is required to determine/verify the actual strengths at the time of the charge. A number of batteries had suffered equipment losses during Lee's preliminary bombardment.

Attached Files

•  The Angle OOB vers 2.xlsx   15.59KB   1 downloads

[healey36]

I dug out my copy of Peter Young's The War Game (1972) the other day and gave the chapter on Gettysburg a read. I had bought a rather battered used copy some years after it was published, and it, together with a few of Featherstone's books, is what pushed me over into the miniature gaming world and made board games a secondary consideration. It's still a terrific read, especially when you're trying to get an historical sense of what each of the ten featured battles was all about (Blenheim still remains largely a mystery to me, lol). 

 

Clifford Johnson wrote the bit on Gettysburg, and it's primarily an historical recap of the action. Johnson is primarily a puzzle-type game designer, so it's ironic that he drew the task of writing a piece on this epic, some would say decisive clash of the ACW. If you didn't know much about the battle, this would be a good place to start, but it's Phil Stearns photography that really grabs your interest. Here's his take on Pickett's Charge:

 

 

Thanks to Bob Cordery and his Wargaming Miscellany blogsite for the link. As far as I can tell, the only thing missing is the stone wall. 

[healey36]

So I was back up to Gettysburg this AM to try to verify the positions/content of the various batteries arrayed along the Union line. One has to be cognizant of the position demarcations likely being approximate, snapshots made in a fluid situation; still, the info found on the markers is valuable and I was able to clean up a number of misconceptions regarding the OOB and relative strengths.

I took a bunch of photos while there, but here are two that are somewhat illustrative of the scale:



(top) The position of Cushing's battery directly adjacent to and slightly behind the 71st Pennsylvania at "The Angle" is noted. Cushing is a CMoH awardee, only nominated 150 years after the battle.

(bottom) The copse of trees (encircled by iron fencing for preservation) is noted, some 150-200 yards south of "The Angle". The stone fence can be seen fifty yards or so in front, along with the monument to the 69th Pennsylvania (the only Philadelphia Brigade regiment that did not break during the maelstrom). In the far distance, amongst the tree-line that is Seminary Ridge, the Virginia memorial can be seen. It was from there that Lee/Longstreet directed the Confederate advance to commence. That's a long way off, especially under sporadic Union artillery fire that only intensified as they crossed the Emmitsburg Road, some 250-350 yards out.

[healey36]

My stake in this session seems to have evolved from naive participant to host, primarily for geographic considerations; my place seems to be roughly the mid-point between southeastern Pennsylvania and northern Virginia (ironically), from whence the players will be drawn. While it's still likely months away, it means I'll need to beef up the ACW troop cabinet and the scenery box.

 

The first thing I need to address is the need for a sizable amount of stone wall/fence. I have some I fashioned from strips of basswood and coarse model train ballast many years ago:

 

 

I'm going to need to make a bunch more, so off to Mainline Hobby Supply tomorrow (or a stop by one of my model railroad buddies to raid his supply cabinet). I had looked at offerings by various vendors while at Historicon, but found them too tall and thin. They looked more like the dry-stone walls built in the UK and Europe, rather than the waist-high piles erected at Gettysburg (and typical of most in the American northeast).

 

So we'll be building stone walls once we gather up some supplies. Technique? I don't remember, but we'll figure out something.

[Kenny Noe]

Paul,

 

What scale are you looking for??  Might be able to help.

[healey36]

15mm (1/100-scale); to be honest, I'm okay with making a bunch, just need to find some coarse ballast.

 

Thanks, Ken.

 

Paul

[healey36]

I posted this pic in the "On the Workbench" thread, but thought I'd post it here as well. I'm slowly starting to get some traction on painting the regiments/batteries I've been assigned for this game; first up, 69th Pennsylvania:

 

 

My understanding is that the 69th was positioned on the line just in front of the copse and, as I mentioned earlier, was the only regiment of the Philadelphia Brigade that was not briefly driven back from the stone fence in disorder. They were a Zouave outfit, but shed the vests and pantaloons after the first few months of the war, adopting more conventional Union army dress. Comprised largely of Irishmen from Philadelphia, they carried both the national flag as well as a regimental, a large green banner that featured the Pennsylvania coat of arms on one side and the national emblem of Ireland on the opposite. I created one extra base which could be swapped with the one featuring the regimental flag, thereby making for a generic Union regiment.  

 

Stone fence construction is nearly complete. Once you get going, you can crank it out. I'll post some pics once I flock the bases.

[healey36]

I finished making a bunch more stone fence using some basswood and coarse model railroad ballast; I think I've got enough sections now to put together the immediate locale for The Angle. The fence-line transitions to post-and-rail a few hundred yards south, so I pulled out what I have for that:

 

 

The post-and-rail stuff is something I bought years ago, cast metal; I don't recall who made it. I'll need to flock the base of each section to make it look a bit better.

 

Here's a photo of the post-and-rail fence on the field today, some hundred yards or so south of the transition point:

 

 

In the distance, the "copse of trees" can be seen, along with a few monuments dedicated to the regiments and batteries of Hall's brigade.

[healey36]

The Leister farm sits on the back (eastern) side of Cemetery Ridge, just a few hundred yards east of The Angle. The house served as Meade's headquarters once the Union position solidified in its famous fish-hook configuration, running from Culp's Hill to Cemetery Hill, than south along Cemetery Ridge to the Roundtops.

Here's a colorized photo of the house by Detroit Photographic Company (Detroit Publishing), c. 1903:



It's interesting that this photo shows a monument adjacent to the farmhouse, which I don't think is there anymore (the monument, not the house which still stands). Headquarters are traditionally marked with a bronze cannon barrel standing vertically on a stone or concrete plinth, which I do recall seeing. My monuments-list book makes no mention of the marble or granite marker seen in the photo.

What's really interesting is that some thirty years ago I took my five year-old kid to walk this part of the field with me. I distinctly remember this as there was a shallow drainage ditch on the western side of the Leister farmhouse and he fell in it, lol. I think even he remembers this. He was hell for filling his pockets with stones and other bits he discovered on walks, and this time was no different. When we got home, he emptied his pockets onto the kitchen table and showed me his treasures. Most of what he had was bits of limestone and shale that the Park Service paved the walking paths with, but this day there was one unusual "stone" in his collection:



At the time I wasn't sure what it was, but it felt heavier than a stone and was chalked with dirt and oxidation, so I threw it in a dish of white vinegar overnight and took a look at it the next morning. Turned out to be a crushed mini-ball, presumably fired. Still have it, laying here in a desk drawer.

Leister farmhouse photo courtesy of the Library of Congress.

[healey36]

Looking at getting this on the table for a run-through the week of Thanksgiving. Depending on how many players are available, we'll likely focus on The Angle position, then expand north and south along the line with additional heads.  

[healey36]

Played through a slimmed down version of this, covering just the 150-250 yards of fence-line running from "The Angle" to "The Copse of Trees". It was basically the Philadelphia Brigade and Cushing's battery up against Garnett's three regiments and three of Armistead's five regiments. It ended in a rout of the Confederates, possibly because we are misinterpreting the rules of melee, specifically what happens to the loser of the scrap.

 

Here's how we played it: The loser of a melee has to retire, takes enough disorders to become unformed, then has to make a morale check, which in our play nearly always resulted in a fail (troop quality adjusted -5 for disorder, -2 or -3 for casualties taken during the charge, then if the die-roll result is greater than +5 over the adjusted troop quality, then the regiment is broken or routed and either runs away or is removed from the table).

 

For example, five stands of Confederates (one regiment) charge five stands of Federals (one regiment) behind the stone wall. The Confederates inflict one casualty on the Federals, while the Union regiment inflicts three casualties on the Confederates...the Confederates lose the melee. They have to retire a couple inches, then suffer five disorders to become unformed, then must make a morale check. If they have a base TQ of 13, it is adjusted -5 for disorder, -3 for casualties during the charge, so their adjusted TQ is now 5. If their morale check on a 20-sided die is greater than 5, they fail, if greater than 10, they break and run.

 

I'm thinking we're doing this wrong, as every melee played went against the Confederates with dire results. Losing melees may have to some extent been just bad die-rolling, but the effect of losing a melee was catastrophic, especially if another regiment was advancing directly behind the recoiled regiment, which then found itself disordered when the repulsed regiment retreated through it. After just a few turns, all six Confederate regiments were in retreat (one routed and removed from the table), having either been repulsed at the wall or disordered and failing a morale check when a retreating broken unit passed through it.

 

A reread of the rules is in order, but any thoughts would be appreciated. 

 

Just a single photo from today's confused play, this the moment the 57th Virginia crashed over an undefended stretch of wall, running headlong into Cushing's battery:

 

 

This, like every other encounter for Pickett's division this day, ended poorly.

[Kenny Noe]

Paul,

 

I'll ping Don or Bob to review and chime in.  Stay tuned and Happy Thanksgiving.

[healey36]

Thanks, Kenny. We downloaded the latest version of the HBL ruleset this AM, and a careful revisit has us thinking we're sorta doing it right (repercussions of a lost melee). Still a wee bit confused differentiating between "unformed" and "disordered", i.e. is it possible to be unformed but not disordered? It seems possible to be disordered but not unformed. I guess the specific question is, what level disorder results when a unit recoils following a failed/lost melee? Is it a Disorder-1 or a Disorder-5? We were presuming a Disorder-5, but now guessing this was incorrect.

 

Hope you, the family, and all of the ODGW team have a great Thanksgiving. Got 2-1/2 inches of rain yesterday...thought we might get washed away   

[Bob Benge]

Hi Paul

 

Unformed simply refers to the unit losing effective cohesion and, as a result, not being in any formation. Melees are all-out brawls between units and there is no unit cohesion after the melee begins and as a reult the units involved will not be in any type of formation; unformed. So when a melee ends the units involved will be unformed and will need to spend an action to reform. This signifies that the units have lost cohesion and need to reform to retain the unit cohesion. When a unit reaches -5 disorder OR a level of disorder that equals the number of stands in the unit, if less than 5) then unit will become unformed and must be recovered and reformed using Change Formation action to recolve the units unformed state and Reform action to revcovery Disorder level(s).

 

As to your question on "what level disorder results when a unit recoils following a failed/lost melee", this is dependant on the Morale check. If the morale check is failed then the unit(s) will be -1 Disorder (see page 5.1 and the Quick Reference Card "Morale" section. Disorder is a result of the Morale check and recovery of disorder is accomplished by a Reform action.

 

Hopes this helps some!

 

You have a great Thanksgiving also!