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Kido Butai


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#1 W. Clark

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Posted 14 March 2024 - 09:07 PM

Kido Butai

1930 hours 5 April 1942

Rear Admiral Yamaguchi was wondering why he had not conformed to Vice Admiral Nagumo’s fleet maneuver. Hours had passed, the sun had set and he still could not explain it to himself. He stood at the railing out side the bridge of his flagship, the Hiryu. Suddenly there was a report of aircraft passing over. His first thought was; “They are not mine”. Then he surmised that either Tone or Chikuma must still have a floatplane aloft. Then there was the glare of several flares. Yamaguchi slowly came to the realization that this was enemy action and related to the Albacores that had spied on his ships in the late afternoon.

 

AA fire erupted ineffectively (one roll of a D12 without a 1 or 2 result). A few minutes later there were several explosions against Soryu, Ariake, Yugure and Shiratsuyu. None of the ships hit had manage to evade any of eight torpedo hits spread among them.

Soryu was set afire and knocked DIW, then additional hits (I forgot that 1 = 2 hits) sank her. Ariake and Shiratsuyu were sunk outright. Yugure took a hit to her engines, was set afire, had a bulkhead damaged as well two other hull hits.

 

1945 to 2200 hours Yugure repaired her bulkhead and put her fire out. But her damage slowed her to 21 knots. Nevertheless, Hiryu and Yugure picked up as many Japanese sailors and aircrew as they could.

 

2200 hours Somerville could hardly credit the claims of his pilots but now he would see for himself. Warspite’s radar picked up a contact at 20,000 yards off the port bow. Somerville turned the column of Warspite, Enterprise, Emerald and the destroyer division (Hotspur, Foxhound, Paladin & Panther) towards the contact at 23 knots. At 2206 hours Somerville ordered a 45 degree turn in succession to starboard to open up his arcs of fire and Hotspur and Foxhound fired star shell (2 each) at the 2 contacts. Hotspur illuminated the larger contact (w/1 dud) that proved to be Hiryu. Foxhound illuminated the second contact that proved to be Yugure.

2209 hors The IJN ships were trying to get under way when Warspite opened on Hiryu with her MB while her SB and the cruisers engaged Yugure. Warspite hit Hiryu thrice, setting her hanger afire, damaging a bulkhead and her engines. Warspite, Enterprise and Emerald hit Yugure thrice, damaging her hull and knocking out her fore and aft gun mounts. Hiryu and Yugure fired at Hotspur and Foxhound and missed.

Hotspur and Foxhound continued to illuminate Hiryu and Yugure.

2212 hours Hiryu failed to fix her bulkhead and took further hull damage as a result. Yugure put her EDR fire out. Warspite and the cruisers engaged as before. Warspite’s MB hit Hiryu 6 times, setting two more hanger fires, knocking out a starboard gun mount, damaging her hull and two more bulkheads sinking her. The range had closed to 10,000 yards and Warspite’s SB was able to fire rapidly while the cruisers were firing normally. Between them they hit Yugure 4 times, knocking her DIW and damaging her hull thrice which sank her.

2215 hours Somerville turned Force A towards Addul Atoll at flank speed. Force A was split into two groups with the carriers and the N class DDs having a couple of hours head start. Somerville further divided his force sending the cruisers and the 2 A-I class DDs ahead at 32 knots. He kept the 2 P class with Warspite who was going all out at 23.5 knots. Somerville also ordered Force B to Addul Atoll where it was to water and then proceed to Durban at best speed.

 

Nagumo had every FP he could put up from Tone and Chikuma at first light and this time did not restrict his reconnaissance to waters around Ceylon. They missed Warspite at first (rolled a 12) but found it an hour later. Nagumo sortied 12 flights each of Zeros, Vals and Kates against this focal point for his anger and embarrassment. Warspite and her escorting destroyers damaged a Kate and a Val. Warspite took 3 hits to her hull, lost her fore turret and a secondary to the first attack. Warspite and her escorts knocked down and damaged two Kates during the second attack. Warspite took 4 torpedo hits during the second attack damaged her hull thrice, knocked out 2 turrets and setting her afire. Warspite put the fire out.

Warspite damaged another Kate during the third attack. The Vals gave her another half hull, but the Kates torpedoed her twice more. This with the DB caused two more hull hits, sinking her. The P class picked up survivors, but not Somerville, who went down with Warspite.

 

Nagumo was sacked. Midway still occurred except that Yorktown survived and the war went wrong for Japan at even quicker rate then it had historically. And no one could say why Yamaguchi had not stayed with the fleet. Some explained it by saying that Japanese luck ran out bit sooner this time around.

 

WMC

 


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#2 simanton

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Posted 15 March 2024 - 11:43 PM

An excellent scenario and action, Bill!  Somerville will definitely be missed!



#3 W. Clark

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Posted 16 March 2024 - 10:19 AM

I based this on Somerville's known aggressiveness that moved him to seek "a crack at those people" to quote him. He did that over the protests of VAdm Willis and RAdm Boyd, his number two and three subordinates. Somerville is on record as believing that his carrier a/c stood no chance in daylight against Kido Butai, but he also figured that the Kido Butai had just as a great a disadvantage against nocturnal torpedo attack.

 

Of course, he was also (based on his Intel) of the belief that he was not greatly outnumbered and that a successful night torpedo attack followed up by a surface engagement might be possible and he wanted to try and maneuvered throughout the fourth of April with that in mind. A report from Ceylon that was hours old and wrong had the Kido Butai headed towards him and his fleet anchorage at Addul Atol. His own reconnaissance (4 radar equipped Albacores) missed Nagumo but found Yamaguchi's carriers. Unfortunately, one of the locating Albacores was shot down by Yamaguchi's CAP and the other was damaged and only able to get out a partial report. 

 

Somerville realized that if the old (and incorrect) report was true then the Kido Butai would probably find Force A with enough time to launch a strike before nightfall. Somerville felt compelled to observe his primary directive to preserve his fleet and withdrew to the SW for a bit. The 23.5 knot limit imposed by Warspite meant that any lost ground towards the Kido Butai could not be regained by Force A without the Kido Butai assisting. Thus, the opportunity was lost.

 

In addition, as more and complete information on the Kido Butai's attacks on Ceylon and ships in those waters came Somerville's way when coupled with the time frame caused Somerville to realize that there had to be more than two carriers that he was up against. That changed Somerville's perception of the situation as who was the hunter and who was being hunted. Somerville then withdrew altogether.

 

WMC


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