6 replies to this topic

[jc Prudhon]

Bunjurno

 

Preparing for using (more) my Italian fleet, I noticed that in many of the historical fights they tend to keep a sort of pre war division organisation. Does that mean they would be more likely to have a proper team training (such as th concentration fire rule) than the RN who mix up  and down ships for missions?

 

Any one with right doc did a sort of sorting out who can or not (also for Pacific) 

[Mark Hinds]

FWIW, I don't recall concentration fire being used in any significant way in WW2, despite pre-war theories.  IIRC the British tried it at River Plate, and it didn't work out very well...  For example, in the annual "Warship 2018", from the article "The Battle of the River Plate: A Tactical Analysis":  "... One consequence of the Battle of the River Plate was that expectations in the British fleet changed.  King George V and Rodney engaged Bismarck without employing Flank Marking or Concentration Fire."

 

MH

[W. Clark]

My understanding of RM gunnery limitations besides their gun tubes being too close together was their doctrine which they followed rather closely. As an example, their inability to rapid fire is based more on their using ranging shots and adjusting each salvo rather than limitations imposed by shell supply or the ROF being too slow. So, it appears to have been self-inflicted rather than an equipment issue. They actually shot fairly accurately because of that, just slow. I'm not aware of any record of the RM using divisional fire. But that may well be a result of poor coverage the RM has received in English publications. Our understanding in that area may very well change as more information currently in Italian get translated to English. There has already been some movement in that area.

 

WMC

[Jim O'Neil]

Doctrinally, the RM did not  allow more than one ship to engage each target. Can't quote the source from memory, sorry.

[Lonnie Gill]

Adding a more general comment on this subject which applied to most navies.  Almost all the major navies spent considerable time in the interwar years developing and frequently practicing their concentration fire tactics and procedures.  But, as mentioned above, they universally found out they didn't prove very useful during actual, sub-optim war conditions.  Frequently moving ships from one division/formation to another was a major impediment (especially prevalent in the Royal Navy and USN) as a subset of the prime problem - lack of practice.  It turns out that it required frequent live fire practice with the same ship divisions to make it effective.  Most every navy had trouble sidelining formations for the time required to practice or a safe location (minimized risk of submarine or air attack) to practice it.  In fact, it proved such an ineffective process that it is seldom mentioned in accounts available to the general public.  Where a few detailed, non public descriptions of gunnery actions for use by naval personnel have become available there is some mention, usually concluding that the difficulties made concentration fire of limited use.  These include such actions as the Battle of the River Platt (where the RN 6" cruisers employed Gun Master Control - and found that when the ship directing fire has a bad solution you've just wasted two ships fire - and communication problems), Cape Spada by the RN DD division with poor results, and partial details of several Italian efforts in the early fleet actions.  The RN did employ it in the final battle with the Bismarck, but even there where Rodney and King George V had two very different batteries with different guns, there were problems suggesting that concentration fire was as much of a hindrance as a help.  Similar problems attempting to employ it in the North Cape clashes.

 

Thus by 1942, it would seem that most naval officers were aware that concentration fire was not a practical tactic in the combat conditions they would encounter.  It remained a prominent tactic in the theoretical playbook, but soon discounted in actual practice. That's just my opinion, of course, but I think that's why it is seldom even mentioned post war.  One of those nice theories that just didn't work under the pressures of actual wartime conditions.

 

LONNIE  

[Mark Hinds]

Bunjurno

 

Preparing for using (more) my Italian fleet, I noticed that in many of the historical fights they tend to keep a sort of pre war division organisation. Does that mean they would be more likely to have a proper team training (such as th concentration fire rule) than the RN who mix up  and down ships for missions?

 

Any one with right doc did a sort of sorting out who can or not (also for Pacific) 

 

You could add a house rule for players to allocate pre-game practice/training resources to a particular skill, such as concentration firing.  This would also add an element of uncertainty for their opponents. 

[Jim O'Neil]

Doctrinally, the Italian RM had each ship take a target and no one else fired at that target to ensure the firing ship did not have it's gunnery confused.

In one of the early war battles Littorio and Veneto were up against a RN BB, but only Littorio engaged it! 

The RM put a lot of effort into getting accurate fires on target, which shows in the better hitting average for fewer shells expended.

 

This quite different than concentration firing, which they would seem to have dismissed before the war.