Most Liked Content

I am prepping for Sand Wars here in Mesa, AZ on May 18-19.  In order to tweak my Cruisin' for a Bruisin' scenario and get back in the groove so to speak, I decided to run a couple of games at Imperial Outpost which is an FLGS in Glendale, AZ.

The first game was played this last Saturday, April 13th.  I had only 2 players for the game this time with Matt W. taking the role of the British and Jeffrey M. taking the role of the Germans.  Each player had a reduced company with the Germans having 10 Panzer IIIs with 3 being "Specials" and the British side with 11 Crusader IIs.

We played through 4 turns before the game was called but there was a lot of action.  The British got the worst of things but did manage to kill a few German tanks including the German HQ tank.  The British also lost their HQ tank as well.

Both players were fairly new to the game.  Matt had played in the game I hosted in October while Jeffrey had never played Mein Panzer before.  They enjoyed the game and want to play again so I consider it a success.

The next game will be on April 27th at Imperial Outpost.  I think I may have more players for that one.

Here are a few pictures of the game from Saturday.

A Night in Bharu and Singora Too

It was midnight with a Quarter Moon, but the overcast made the moon like new. The wind was a Force 4 Southerly at 15 knots. There were no squalls or sea haze, so it was a dark but not stormy night and smoke was still an option.

0000 hours. Force Z was at sea heading due North at 25 knots looking for those Sons of Nippon. The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was reported to have landed another Beach Party at Koto Bharu the RN intended to voice its objection at this blatant repeat of earlier trespasses at this same location.

The steward brought Admiral Phillips a cup of tea with a bit of brandy in it. It was after all a new year and that called for a bit of cheer. HMS PoW (Prince of Wales) the flagship led a column of cruisers (1^st Div. Exeter, Mauritius & Emerald; 2^nd Div. Danae, Dragon and Durban) under RAdm Palliser. There was a destroyer division in column to the port and to the starboard of the central column respectively. Repulse had been left in port. This would be a torpedo ambush if Phillips had his say. He might not have Enterprise, but he did have Emerald, and he intended to boldly go where he had not gone three weeks ago.

Unbeknownst to Phillips, the invasion convoy was still at sea and was closing on Force Z from the NE on a heading of 225 degrees at 11 knots. That made for a closing speed of about 36 knots. Also unbeknownst to Phillips was that the Port IJN destroyer column could see 16.000 yards (I rolled a 1!) which equaled the best (DesDiv 1) RN radar return but DesDiv 1 was to port of the central column. Those Sons of Nippon would get first peek. This would allow the IJN to accelerate and maneuver to port opening up their arcs.

0012 hours. PoW and Electra both made radar contact some 12,000 yards off PoW’s starboard bow. This was the exact opposite of Phillips’ expectations, whoops. PoW fired star-shell from her SS SB and illuminated the second and third ships of what appeared to be a 4-ship division of destroyers.

0015 hours. Phillips accelerated Central column to 29 knots and turned 2 points to port. He had DesDiv 1 accelerated to 35 knots and for it to take station ahead of the Central Column. Phillips had DesDiv 2 (S&T class) fall in behind the Central Column. PoW now engaged the first illuminated DD with it SS SB and whiffed completely. Mauritius fired at the other illuminated DD and hit it 6 times.

But PoW found herself under fire from very large guns indeed, the Nagatos were putting in their two cents.

The Isonami took a hit to her DC racks that started a minor fire. She also lost 2 turrets, had a bulkhead damaged and suffered critical hits to her bridge and engineering. PoW was straddled but not hit with shell splashes that went as high as her main mast.

0018 hours. Phillips turned the central column and DesDiv 2 away together under smoke to break LOS and used DesDiv 1’s SWR to keep situational awareness. This was not the fight Phillips had hoped for.

0021 hours. Phillips turned back into column on a heading of 340 degrees and continued to smoke. He needed to get them within 8,200 yards to torpedo them and he needed to do it without them shooting his cruisers and destroyer to pieces before they could launch. It was obvious that at least some of the Japanese could see as far his radar. DesDiv 1 could still see the damaged DD. It had put out the fire but still had 2 EDR fires burning.

0024 hours. Phillips decided to separate PoW from the cruisers. PoW radar was currently good out 12,000 yards and her SB could fire star-shell that far. He’d light the DDs up again at 12,000 yards and pray that the Nagatos were further away when he did it. If he could get lucky and avoid damage, he might just be able distract the IJN while he slipped his cruisers and DDs within 8,000 yards. If he could pull that off then he would launch torps and let the chips fall as they may. He was going to get Napoleonic on the Japanese, engage, then wait and see.

0030 hours. PoW illuminated another contact at 12,000 yards that turned out to be anther DesDiv of 4 Asashio class DDs.

0033 hours. PoW engaged the lead illuminated DDs with her MB and her SS SB. PoW MB inflicted 4 hits on the Oshio and her SB hit Arashio once. Oshio took a hit to her DC racks that started a minor fire, lost her fore turret and two engineering hits that threatened to knock her DIW. Arashio took a hit in her DC racks and a minor fire. PoW was fired upon by the Nagatos and they missed again.

0036 hours. Phillips had his cruisers and DDs turn together towards the gun flashes that he believed were the Nagatos and turn back on course together while moving the last half of their movement straight ahead. He then had DesDiv 2 fire star-shell in an attempt to illuminate what he believed were the Nagatos. PoW engaged the DDs again with her MB & SB. PoW hit Oshio 4 more times but missed Arashio. Oshio took 3 hits to her hull and a bulkhead. Nagato hit PoW once knocking out a TB and a SL. DesDiv 2 illuminated Nagato and Mutsu.

0039 hours. PoW engaged Nagato with her MB and Arashio with her SB. Nagato returned fire. PoW missed and Nagato hit her once damaging her hull. Several IJN DDs fired at DesDiv 1 & 2 without effect.

0042 hours. All the RN cruisers and DDs fired their torps off at the Nagatos at 8,000 yards. All of Force Z then turned away under smoke to break LOS.

0045 hours. Phillips continued with Force Z almost in a line abreast away from the Japanese under smoke while Electra kept track of them on radar.

Nagato took 5 torps from the 31 fired at her from DesDiv 1, Exeter, Mauritius and Emerald. Mutsu took 4 torps from the 26 fired at her by Danae, Dragon, Durban and DesDiv 2. Nagato took 11 hull and sank after 7. Mutsu also took 7 hull and sank. Admiral Yamamoto went down with Nagato, never to rise again and that was a first for me.

0048 hours. Phillips knew that he had gotten hits but did not know how many or what he had hit. Phillips withdrew and 3 WAF invasions convoys succeeded. The Singapore Index moved to 4.

2nd Vella LaVella continued.

2300 USN begins some radical turns to port and starboard aiming to evade torpedoes. This was initially successful until an 8 point turn to port placed the Selfridge in the path of one of Kazekumos spreads at just beyond 5000 yards. This shot did considerable hull damage and another engineering hit. Quick and effective reaction by the damage control teams restored power but the ship was still limited to 23kts due to the hull damage and previous engineering hit.

Gun fire continues with Kazekumo now taking the brunt. She ultimately takes 15 5” hits leaving her without guns or torpedo tubes and down to 19kts.

Kazekumo attempts to disengage under the cover of smoke while Samidare accelerates to 30kts hearing due north. The USN formation settles on course 270 and just becomes aware of the Transport Group DDs. These old DDs moved to the south to assist their modern sisters who were being roughly handled up to this point.

2309 with Selfridge starting to feel the results of her cumulative damage, Walker orders smoke and a 90 simultaneous port turn to the south. At the same time Samidare takes a Parthian shot with 8 Type 93s (2 groups of 4 each). At just short of 4800 yards they just miss astern of Chevalier but intersect O’Bannon just to starboard. O’Bannon is hit by 1 torpedo from the 1^st spread and unluckily (or not if you were the IJN) 3 more from the 2^nd spread! Hit by 4 Type 93’s O’Bannon disintegrates.

A longer shot of the O’Bannon hits with Kazekumo on fire and trying to disengage.

Additional gunfire erupts between the Transport Group DDs and Walkers formation. The Fumizuki is roughly handled but Selfridge takes another engineering hit and this time she can’t repair the damage. She begins to coast to a stop. At 2309 Yunagi fires 6 old 21” torpedoes and after a run of 3000 yards hits Selfridge 3 times. Selfridge can take no more and Commander Walker is going for a swim.

The Larson formation is closing the action but will arrive too late to do anything but rescue Selfridge and O’Bannon survivors if any, and perhaps pick up some Japanese prisoners. The IJN recall the small craft leaving the garrison to their fate.

The waters off Vella Lavella are still again with 3 IJN and 2 USN DDs on the bottom.

After a few months naval gaming pause we got back to the Central Solomons Campaign. This was the 8th action of the campaign and is based on the historical action off Horaniu. (OOBs are slightly different due to losses in previous campaign actions).

1^st Vella Lavella 8/18/1943

Ref:        “USN Against the Axis” pg. 195-198

                “Dark Waters, Starry Skies” pg 384-392

Time: 0040-0130

WX: Squalls (1x D6 in area with a max of 4), light breeze glassy = Force 2. 6 Kt wind. Smoke last 2 turns. 2 days past full = Full Moon.

USN Forces                                                                                                         IJN Forces

O’Bannon (flag) DesDiv 41                                                                           Sazanami (flag) DesRon 3

Taylor                                                                                                            Arashi

Chevalier                                                                                                      Kawakaze

Jenkins                                                                                                         Isokaze

                                                                                                                     15x barges (5 groups of 3)

                                                                                                                     4x PT {2 groups of 2)

                                                                                                                     2x PC (1 group of 2)

USN Mission: Interdict enemy supply mission. By sinking at least 50% of enemy small craft traffic.

IJN Mission: Deliver troops/Supplies to Horaniu on Vella Lavella to establish a barge base. Small craft must exit south edge. DD escort to exit west edge.

Notes: Torpedo dud rate: USN = 1-3 (D12), IJN = 1 (d12).

USN may launch torpedoes on radar contacts.

IJN has 1xPete floatplane in the air. A roll of 1-2 on a D12 in the detection phase indicates the Pete has located the USN task force. Once located the Pete may illuminate 2x during the game. If illuminating the Pete may be attacked by short range AA fire but only ODD results on the AA table will have effect due to night. AA fire will reveal a ships position but not count as illuminated for gun fire purposes. It will cause a 2 columns left shift for visual detection.

Small Craft are engaged using the AA tables. Due to night engagement only ODD results have effect (unless targets can be illuminated).

Setup:

Vella Lavella is on the south edge of the table with the small craft formation due north at 12k yards.

The USN formation with O’Bannon in the lead bearing 100 at 21k yards from the small craft formation. USN formation in column with course between 270-340 and speed between 25-30 kts (at player’s choice).

IJN Approx. 9-10k yards bearing 020 from small craft formation. Kawakaze and Isokaze in column, Sazanami and Arashi in column echelon to port of Isokaze. Course parallel to USN formation. Speed 20-25 kts (player’s choice).

IJN DD formation initially detected by radar indicated by markers place on contact blips. Small craft to the west of the DDs. Even with a full moon spotting these would prove to be very difficult for the USN player.

USN formation sprinting toward the radar contacts at 30kts. As the models are on the table it indicates they have already been spotted by the IJN formation

The USN visually acquires the IJN formation which has consolidated into a single column and begins a starboard turn. The USN formation is about 15K yards away. Still too far for effective shooting by either side. But visible in this shot is the Pete searching for the USN formation.

Sazanami, Arashi and Kawakaze between them launch 14 torpedoes assuming the USN would continue moving to the west. Unfortunately the US DDs execute a well timed 90 degree turn to starboard causing all torpedoes to miss. In the pic you can see the torpedo markers off the port side of the US formation. Their launch points are visible at the top of the pic. Sazanami's Type 90's lag behind the faster Type 93's fired by Arashi and Kawakaze.

USN illuminates and opens fire concentrating on Kawakaze. Pete manages to find the USN formation and also illuminates. All IJN gunfire misses the mark, but the USN tags Kawakaze 3 times taking out both aft 5" mounts and the aft torpedo mount. (A search light was also lost). The IJN held one mounts worth of torpedoes in reserve and Isokaze prepared to launch another spread of four type 93's.

The USN held course prepping for their own torpedo launch but paid the price with the Jenkins taking a type 93 from Isokaze's spread of 4 sinking her outright. 

Isokaze pays the price for her success by becoming the favored gunnery target. She takes 10 5" hits. She lost 2 5" mounts a torpedo mount her DC rails a fire, bulkhead and bridge critical were added to her woes. Ultimately reduced to 19Kts due to progressive fire and flood she was fortunate that the bridge crit locked her on course toward the cover of a squall. At this time in the action the USN also launch 15 torpedoes on the 33Kt long range setting.

Fortunately for the IJN they were fast enough to outrun all these torpedoes (markers visible in lower right corner). The small craft commanders were less than thrilled when the DD's tore through their formation while heading for the cover of a squall line. 

The action ends with the IJN DDs reaching the cover of the squall line. Isokaze manages to control the fire and flood and the small craft are never actually detected by the USN. Unknown to the IJN the US force was out of ammo firing prodigious amounts of 5" using rapid fire rates the entire action. Even had the US remained in the area to hunt for small craft they would have been limited to close range AA weapons. 

These French are Free and at Sea and Fighting for Thee in the Java Sea

0800 hours.     The wind was a Force 5 Southerly at 20 knots. The sky was overcast, and max visibility was 12,000 yards. No sea haze but there three squalls scattered about that reduced visibility into or through them by 1,000 yards.

Force X under VAdm Godroy was steaming at 25 knots on a heading of 45 degrees into the Java Sea. Godroy was also steaming. To think that a junior VAdm and Dutch at that had the gall to order him to be more aggressive. He had his flag Lieutenant answer the message as he had not trusted himself to make a reply that would maintain their alliance.

Nevertheless, Godroy was ecstatic over the weather and lack of visibility. His cruisers were too poorly protected to engage in a lengthy approach to Japanese heavy cruisers and Glassford’s report made it quite clear that he would probably engage at least 6 of them. Godroy had all his spotter a/c up.

0818 hours. The masthead reported enemy in sight bearing 8 points to port on a heading 165 degrees at max visibility.

Suffren (flag) opened on Kumano who replied with her fore turrets. Duquesne and Tourville opened on Suzuyu and Mikuma who also replied with their fore turrets. Suffren missed as did Kumano. Dequesne hit Suzuya 4 times and Suzuya;’s return fire hit Duquesne once. Tourville hit Mikuma once and Mikuma’s return fire missed. Suzuya lost three turrets, and a port SB. Duquesne took a hull hit that restricted her to 30 knots. Mikuma lost a fore turret.

0824 hours. The French made a 2-point turn to port to close the range, and the Japanese accelerated and turned 2 points to starboard to open up their arcs. Both admirals ordered their destroyers to attack the enemy cruisers. Everybody’s destroyers accelerated and turned towards the enemy cruisers.

The range was now down to 9,000 yards. Suffren fired at Kumano and missed! Kumano’s return fire hit Suffren 6 times. Duquesne hit Suzuya 6 times. Suzuya’s return fire hit Duquesne twice. Tourville hit Mikuma twice and Mikuma’s return fire hit Tourville 6 times. Duguay-Trouin hit Mogami twice and Mogami’s return fire missed. Lamotte-Picquet hit Takao twice and Takao’s return fire hit Picquet thrice. Perth firing rapidly hit Atago thrice and Atago’s return fire missed.

Suffren took a hit to her a/c facilities that started a minor fire, she lost SB secondary, her fore turret, 2 hull hits and a hit to her engineering that reduced her to 20 knots. Suzuya took 2 hits to her a/c facilities that started 2 minor fires, she lost her starboard fore TT and a major fire, 2 hull hits and a hit to her engineering that slowed her to 23 knots. Duquesne lost her fore turret and a critical hit to her engineering that reduced her to 21 knots. Mikuma lost a starboard secondary and another fore turret. Tourville lost a TT, a starboard secondary, a hull hit, damage to a bulkhead and 2 engineering hits that knocked her DIW. Mogami lost a starboard secondary and had a bulkhead damaged. Takao lost a starboard secondary and a hull hit. Atago lost a turret and took 2 hull hits.

0830 hours. Suffren failed to put her fire out and took minor hull damage. Suzuya failed to put out her major fire and took 2 more hull damage from her 3 fires. Duquesne broke her engineering attempt and needs a dockyard to fix now. Tourville failed to fix her bulkhead and took more hull damage as well as remaining DIW. Mogami fixed her bulkhead.

All the cruisers on both sides that could, fired off every TT that could bear at the enemy cruisers.

The Allied destroyers having been able to go to flank speed in one move now fired off every TT at the Japanese cruisers and turned away under smoke.

Suffren fired at Kumano and hit her twice. Kumano fired back and hit Suffren 5 times. Duquesne fired at Suzuya and hit her twice. Suzuya fired back and hit Duquesne once. Mikuma fired unengaged at Tourville and hit her once. Duguay-Trouin fired at Mogami and hit her twice. Mogami fired back and hit Trouin once. Lamotte-Picquet fired at Takao and hit her thrice. Takao fired back and hit Picquet twice. Perth fired rapidly at Atago and hit her once. Atago fired back and missed.

Kumano took 2 hull hits. Suffren lost all her turrets and took a critical hit to her bridge that killed Godroy. Suzuya had a bulkhead damaged and took a hit her engineering that slowed her to 23 knots. Duquesne lost a TT. Tourville took a hit to her a/c facilities that started a minor fire. Mogami lost another turret and took a hull hit. Trouin took a hull hit. Takao lost a TT with a major fire, lost another turret and a hit to her engineering that slowed her to 23 knots. Picquet lost a TT and secondary. Atago took a hull hit.

The flag captain obeyed Helfrich’s order to engage to the last (he rolled a 1).

0836 hours. Suffren failed to put her fire out and took minor hull damage. Suzuya failed to put her fire out and with her 3 fires unchecked as well as a bulkhead took 3 more hull and slowed to 11 knots. Tourville repaired her bulkhead but remained DIW. Takao put out a major fire.

The 8 Japanese destroyers fired off their torpedoes at the Allied cruisers.

Both cruiser lines were in disarray and continued on course while they attempted to sort out their problems. The torpedoes from both sides’ cruisers and the Allied destroyers arrived; all were in their second range band.

Suffren had targeted Mogami with 2 tripple TT in the which Mogami failed to evade and took 1 hit. Mogami had targeted Suffren with 2 triple TT and Suffren unable to turn could not evade and took 2 hits. Duquesne and Tourville had targeted Mikuma with a triple TT each which Mikuma failed to evade but both missed. Mikuma targeted Duquesne with 2 triple TT and Duquesne evaded 1 and took 1 hit. Trouin targeted Suzuya with 2 triple TT which she failed to evade and took 1 hit. Suzuya targeted Tourville with 2 triple TT which Tourville being DIW could not evade took 1 hit. Picquet targeted Kumano with 2 tripple TT that Kumano failed to evade but both missed. Kumano targeted Trouin with 2 triple TT that Trouin failed to evade and took 2 hits. Atago targeted Picquet with 2 quad TT that Picquet failed to evade and took a hit. Perth targeted Atago with a quad TT that Atago failed to evade but missed. Takao targeted Perth with a quad TT that Perth failed to evade and took a hit. Napier targeted Mogami with a quin TT that Mogami failed to evade and took 2 hits. Nestor targeted Mikuma with a quin TT that Mikuma failed to evade and took a hit. Nizam targeted Suzuya with a quin TT that Suzuya failed to evade and missed. Le Terrible targeted Kumano with 2 triple TT that Kumano failed to evade and took 3 hits. Basque targeted Atago with 2 triple TT that Atago failed to evade and missed. Forbin and Fortune targeted Takao with 2 triple TT each that Takao failed to evade and took 2 hits.

Mogami took 11 hull and sank. Suffren took 8 hull and sank. Mikuma took 2 hull and sank. Duquesne took 4 hull and sank. Suzuya took a hull hit and lost a turret but remained afloat. Tourville took 4 hull and sank. Kumano took 7 hull and sank taking RAdm Kurita with her. Trouin took 11 hull and sank. Takao took 8 hull and sank taking VAdm Kondo with her. Perth took 4 hull and an engineering hit.

Commodore Collins (RAN) ordered a withdrawal (he failed his morale and to hell with Helfrich). But the captain of the barely afloat Atago decided to carry on (he made his morale).

The action ended because Force X had withdrawn. Perth would fix her engineering hit and survive. The invasion of Surabaya was still on, but the 16 destroyers would have to carry the entire burden now and half of them had expended their torpedoes. Now it was RAdm Palliser’s turn with his Brit/Dutch light cruisers and destroyers; but that is another story.

WMC

Springtime for the Kaiser

March 1915 (Part II)

The other actions this day (and the day following) were pitifully documented. While I was up to my elbows trying to extract Bradford from his (my) misguided challenge of Gadecke, the rest of Beatty’s charges were sent hither and nigh desperate for a scrap with the HSF. Other than a few notes on scraps of log sheets, copy paper, and envelopes scavenged from my wife’s recycle stash, together, with some disjointed snaps of the maps by the umpire, there was precious little to make sense of. Still, after a few phone calls and the personal recollections of the other players, I was able to cobble together what I think is a fair representation of the proceedings.

Bradford attempted to regroup even as he slipped away in the gathering gloom. Gadecke and his first-gen dreadnoughts had hastily turned south. Grant’s Third Cruiser Squadron, having arrived late to the scene of the fight, made a feint toward the Germans that went unnoticed by Gadecke; it was a move that could have ended disastrously had it been a bit earlier in the evening. By 2100, Britannia had a tow on Hindustan, and together they moved off at an agonizingly slow three knots.

Beatty was left to take stock of the general situation. With the exception of half of Bradford’s Third Battle Squadron, his force was intact, albeit seemingly scattered. With little useful intel, he was left largely blind as to what laid before, or possibly behind him. He decided to make a few uneducated guesses and push on into the night.

His first action was to remand Bradford’s orders for the balance of Third Battle Squadron to rejoin what remained of his battered column. Alexander Lowndes, appointed by Bradford as commander of the detached units (now designated Force G), was ordered by Beatty to turn back onto an eastward heading and to proceed on a slow sweep toward the Danish coast. Beatty was willing to sacrifice Lowndes and his old battleships on the chance they might encounter elements of Hipper’s force and reveal their position. Hilariously, or tragically depending on one’s viewpoint, Lowndes misinterpreted the order, or just screwed up, instead continuing on a southwestward course.

Lowndes sent scout-cruiser HMS Blanche to take the point some 4000 yards ahead of the main column (Hibernia, Africa, Dominion, and Zealandia). Chugging along at ten knots, he ordered the watch doubled and the crews to maintain action stations. By 0200, the early hours of the 12th, the weather had improved substantially and the stars were out.

Beatty simultaneously signaled Pakenham to bring his battlecruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers northeast to join Brock’s Force W at a position some 65 miles north-northwest of Heligoland. There Beatty hoped to be in position to catch/challenge the Germans as they made their way home. If he missed them, or if they were already south of that position, he had no interest in pursuing them further into a corner of the North Sea populated by an ever-expanding and largely unmapped mine belt.

The dearth of meaningful sighting reports struck me as a peculiar circumstance, one that had me wondering if the gamemaster’s random events table was flawed. Being 1915, it was understandable that the sea was not actively patrolled by aircraft (other than the occasional Zeppelin), but the fishing fleets were active, numerous U-boats patrolled, and the efforts of the minelayers/sweepers were just coming into their own. I made a note to review the historical record for such things.

The British fleet commander now attempted to organize his search routine to enhance the likelihood of success. He adopted a carefully developed scheme, one that on the face of it reminded me of the tactics we used as children when playing the old “Battleship” game, i.e. no need to search every square on the grid, just every second square (no ship occupied less than two squares), and do it on a diagonal (ships could only be positioned north-south/east-west, not on a diagonal). This method effectively reduced the search coverage by fifty-percent. With this in mind, he set the positional bandwidth at three hexes between units for his search width (roughly 40 miles across), which yielded a 20 mile range to port and starboard. It seemed, to him (and me, if I’m honest), unlikely that anything could slip through (as long as the weather held up).

If he’d stuck to his plan, there might have been a chance of making contact with much of his force in striking range; unfortunately, the British fleet commander quickly grew frustrated with the immediate lack of success, abandoning his attempt to concentrate his forces and the associated search regimen. Instead, he sent Brock’s Force W roaring off to the northeast on the suspicion that the German might be maneuvering on a westward arc toward the English coast. His subordinates argued that this was unlikely, given the German’s distaste for a fight. They opined that it was more likely that, given the dust-up between the old BB’s just two hours earlier, the German main force had likely turned for home. Undaunted by their pleas, the misguided decision effectively removed Brock’s three battlecruisers and its associated light cruisers and destroyers from the mix.

Pakenham’s Force A had made its big turn east-northeast while just 60 miles northeast of Norwich. His orders were to proceed on this line with the outside chance that, if the Germans had indeed turned for home, Force A might be in position to head them off. At 22 knots, his best sustainable speed, he’d be just south of Heligoland by midnight. He could have sent the light cruisers ahead, but he chose not to, instead directing them to parallel his course and speed 15 miles north of his line.  He received no sighting reports and no further direction from the fleet commander. By 1900 he was operating in darkness (both optically and intel-wise).

A postwar (Nov. 1920) photo of Vice-Admiral William Pakenham (courtesy of the Library of Congress)

The good news was that there was a bit of moonlight and the seas were relatively calm. This would make the luminescent bow wave and wake of a ship a bit easier to spot (should they encounter one). Pakenham and his staff pored over the charts, speculating on whether to tweak their course but, in the end, decided to continue on their present line until they reached the southern waters of the Bight.

At 2236, the light cruisers passed within twenty miles of Eckermann’s south-bound 1st Battle Squadron, Hipper’s westernmost cover force for the German withdrawal. Goodenough, pacing the bridge of HMS Southampton, barely missed an opportunity, instead plunging on into the night unawares.

At 0024, 12 March, Pakenham sent a message to the fleet commander that he had reached the area south of Heligoland. They had seen nothing in over ten hours, had received no reports, nor intercepted any German signal activity. Beatty ordered Force A to turn south, proceeding no more than 25NM to a position likely on the very edge of the German mine-belt. Pakenham ordered Force A into a quarter-line formation and proceeded south at 15 knots.

At 0054, the umpire reported to Pakenham that there were ships moving due south directly ahead of him at a range of roughly seven miles, or approximately 12100 yards. Given the funnel-glow, moonlight, and sea conditions, he was advised that he could begin attempting to acquire a target once he closed an additional few hundred yards. A one on a d12 was required to acquire, and at 0112 he had closed to within 11800 yards and began his dark acquisition attempts.

The German player was similarly alerted, but elected to ignore the trailing enemy ships as he would reach the safety of the mine-belt within twenty minutes. Knowing that the British player would have to acquire a target, range his shot, then fire a salvo likely with bow guns only, and using a d20 (British battlecruiser penalty) at that, he felt relatively safe. His notions proved well-founded.

Eighteen minutes passed without any success at locking onto a target. By 0130, the German had reduced speed and entered the channel through the mine-belt. One final series of acquisition die rolls yielded no contacts, forcing Pakenham to break off or crash headlong into the German field. Choosing not to risk that, he instead turned away to the west, hopeful that he might catch a bit of the cover force as it made its inbound voyage. However, the search proved fruitless and by sunrise, the sea appeared bright and empty. The fleet commander signaled that the operation was at an end and that all ships should return to base.

Results

After a long afternoon on the game table and nearly 40 hours of elapsed scale time, precious little was achieved (not unlike many of these operations historically). The umpires did a reasonably good job of managing the game, and other than the frequently heard complaint of “bad dice”, things seem to work fairly well. While there was precious little “coming to grips with the enemy”, one can still have quite a bit of fun thrashing about operationally.

That said, I think we’ve learned much of what we set off to do with these exercises, that being an understanding of how large numbers of ships might put to sea in a relatively confined area, yet fail to make contact. It happened repeatedly during the war, and we’ve managed to replicate much the same here. I don’t think we have the background intel part of it quite right, but then the results seem to largely track to those of history…who knows.

Which then brings us back to the notion of a scripted campaign, a premise we’d been feeling uncomfortable with, but now acknowledge that if the point is ships on the table, then perhaps that’s the best way to go. At this point, I leave it in the hands of the game group brain-trust. We’ll see what they come up with next.

I am prepping to run a North Africa game at our local Sand Wars Convention in Mesa, AZ in May.

I am adding more Panzers for my Afrika Korps, in this case more Panzer IIs and IVs.  I realized that prior to this, I only had 5 Panzer IIs for the whole battalion and 3 of the short Barreled Panzer IVs.  I added 5 more Panzer IIs and 3 more Panzer IVs in this batch with 4 more Panzer IIs and 3 more Panzer IVF1s currently in the works.

Here are a few pictures.

Springtime for the Kaiser

March 1915

At long last the game group has reconvened in recent days, albeit down a few members. Two additions following the holidays, together with a general subsidence in recent plague-like conditions, has the table active once again. With the weather favorable for travel and this season’s tax filings completed and mailed, my calendar opened up significantly. I, for one, am grateful for it.

A number of ideas were proposed, with considerable interest found in the three to four months that followed the January 1915 dust-up at Dogger Bank. This was a period when the Royal Navy vigorously patrolled the North Sea, ratcheting down their blockade while hopeful for another crack at the High Seas Fleet. For its part, however, the HSF remained largely in port, its strategic focus shifting from the North Sea to the Baltic, together with a reemphasis on submarine operations in and around the British Isles.

Dogger Bank had provided a glimpse of combat in terms of training, tactics, and a susceptibility to damage. The notion of and vulnerability to “plunging fire” had been demonstrated, and the inadequate armor protection of horizontal surfaces in some designs was exposed. Thinly armored decks and turret-tops were now revealed as problematic. The Royal Navy acknowledged it, made a few cursory changes in tactics, then pressed on. The HSF, somewhat better armored but with fewer platforms, hung back while revisiting the damage they’d absorbed.

It was also the first time that the absolute lack of proficiency in gunnery by the British battlecruisers had been witnessed. Massie writes that Beatty had recognized it months earlier during exercises, but Dogger Bank revealed it to be more than just a veiled suspicion. He regaled the commanders for improvement, yet little seemed forthcoming.

All that aside, the HSF could have come out had the War Staff, and more importantly the Kaiser, had the stomach for it. The RN’s North Sea “parading” would continue until mid-summer when the British mine strikes bit, then Jellicoe dialed back the patrolling/sweeping in the interest of preserving his coal stocks. This campaign centers on the supposition that the HSF might have been so moved during the spring of 1915 to answer Jellicoe’s challenge.

The Operational Game

For this campaign, we went back to the double-blind system we’d used for North Sea – December 1917, played just a bit more than a year ago. We made a few minor changes after having reviewed the post-mortem notes from that debacle, but the basic structure remained the same. We had ten players available, so we set one aside as game-master/umpire, a second as another umpire, two as fleet commanders, and the other six as squadron commanders. This might seem administratively heavy, but having a couple of umpires had proven fortuitous during the other session, especially given the double-blind system.

This scenario, the first in a planned series, is built around one of the RN’s sweeps of the central North Sea, of which there were a number executed during the March-May period of 1915. It followed the action at Dogger Bank, a time when Jellicoe must surely have been thinking that the HSF would soon try again. They didn’t, primarily for the reasons outlined above. According to Scheer, there were those in the Staff that firmly believed that a pause was unwise, and this series looks to explore the possibility that they’d acted otherwise.

The game-master drafted a fairly large multi-layered random events table, a cursory review of which was held with his counterpart umpire and the fleet commanders beforehand. Similar to ODGW’s North Sea Campaign, some random events were serial in nature, i.e. inclusion of if-than statements based on die-rolls, adding to the “randomness” and/or “downstream effects” of outcomes. The overriding consideration, however, was that the HSF, under orders from the Kaiser himself, should lose nothing (the primary reason the fleet remained bottled up through much of 1915).

An added wrinkle: All orders/communications were to be made in hand-written note form between parties, passing through an umpire. All communications were subject to a single d12 die-roll by the overseeing umpire. Any result other than a “12” had the order passed to the other party; a result of “12” had the slip torn up and thrown away, undelivered. A communications log was maintained by the umpires for the purposes of tracking numbers of communications. Fleet command initiated communications were limited to four per hour; squadron command initiated communications were limited to six per hour, with all inter-squadron command communications having to pass through fleet command. Poorly written communications requiring clarification were to be handled by hand-written note, counted against the four or six-per-hour limit.

Order of Battle

An order of battle was drafted by the game-master based on an approximation of forces available, developed from multiple sources. Ships undergoing repairs, refit, or detached have been removed based on the best information available. Destroyers divisions were randomly compiled from the fleet lists. A full list of capital ship commanders was drafted, but is not included here.

Grand Fleet

Force W - First Battle Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock)

                HMS Princess Royal

                HMS Queen Mary

                HMS Tiger

Force H - First Light Cruiser Squadron (Capt. Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair)

                HMS Galatea

                HMS Caroline

                HMS Cordelia

                HMS Inconstant

Force A - Second Battle Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham)

                HMS Australia

                HMS New Zealand

                HMS Indefatigable

Force B - Second Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore William E. Goodenough)

                HMS Southampton

                HMS Birmingham

                HMS Lowestoft

                HMS Nottingham

Force D - Third Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir Edward E. Bradford)

                HMS King Edward VII

                HMS Hibernia

                HMS Africa

                HMS Britannia

                HMS Commonwealth

                HMS Dominion

                HMS Hindustan

                HMS Zealandia

                HMS Blanche

Force E - Third Cruiser Squadron (Vice-Admiral William L. Grant)

                HMS Antrim

                HMS Devonshire

                HMS Roxburgh

Force C - Third Destroyer Flotilla (Capt. Francis G. St. John)

                HMS Undaunted (Leader)

                First Division

                                HMS Laurel

                                HMS Liberty

                                HMS Lookout

                                HMS Loyal

                                HMS Lysander

                Second Division

                                HMS Laforey

                                HMS Lance

                                HMS Lark

                                HMS Lawford

                                HMS Legion

Force F - Fourth Destroyer Flotilla (Capt. Charles J. Wintour)

                HMS Swift (Leader)

                First Division

                                HMS Acasta

                   HMS Owl

                   HMS Sparrowhawk

                   HMS Spitfire

                Second Division

                                HMS Achates

                                HMS Midge

                                HMS Paragon

                                HMS Shark

                                HMS Unity

High Seas Fleet

Flot 101 - First Scouting Group (VAdm Hipper)

            SMS Derfflinger

            SMS Moltke

            SMS Vonn der Tann

Flot 102 - Second Scouting Group (KAdm Georg Hebbinghaus)

SMS Kolberg

SMS Graudenz

SMS Rostock

SMS Stralsund

SMS Strassburg

Flot 100 - First Battle Squadron, First Division (VAdm Richard Eckermann)

            SMS Ostfriesland

            SMS Thüringen

            SMS Helgoland

            SMS Oldenburg

Flot 106 - First Battle Squadron, Second Division (KAdm Friedrich Gadeke)

            SMS Posen

            SMS Rheinland

            SMS Nassau

            SMS Westfalen

Flot 103

Ninth Torpedo-boat Flotilla – Seventeenth Half-Flotilla (KptL Hermann Ehrhardt)

                S51

                V26

                V27       

                V29

                V30

Ninth Torpedo-boat Flotilla – Eighteenth Half-Flotilla (KKpt Werner Tillessen)

                S31

                S32

                S33

                S34

                S35

Submarine and Zeppelin activity was incorporated into the random events table; these units have been excluded from the OB.

The players had access to their respective OB only; no information regarding enemy ships/group-content was provided.

The North Sea minefields were already extensive in 1915, but certainly less so than just twelve to eighteen months later. Those that had been sewn by the spring of 1915 were generally known and mapped. Of far greater risk were the fields spontaneously laid by German submarines and raiders (see HMS King Edward VII and/or HMS Hampshire less than a year later). Drift mines were also a constant risk. For purposes of this scenario, the effect of mines has been incorporated into the random events table.

Table actions were fought at 1/6000-scale.

Operations – Part I

Beatty’s battlecruisers set sail from the Orkneys at 0330, 11 March 1915. Brock’s Force W (BC’s Princess Royal, Queen Mary, and Tiger) was first to depart, along with Alexander-Sinclair’s light cruisers. At 0616, they were joined by Wintour with Swift and the Fourth Destroyer Flotilla. Their orders were to sweep the western edge of Dogger Bank, then continue southwest toward the Dutch coast.

Pakenham’s Force A (BC’s Australia, New Zealand, and Indefatigable) weighed anchor at 0254, with orders to proceed due south along a course parallel with the coast, joining Force W at a point some 130NM east of Atwick. They rendezvoused with Goodenough’s light cruisers at 0342, along with St. John’s destroyers at 0406 (40NM southeast of Aberdeen).

Third Battle Squadron departed Rosyth at 0100, 11 March 1915, having raised steam the day before. They were joined by Grant’s Third Cruiser Squadron some five hours later, where they then proceeded due east in support of the BC’s, albeit at some considerable distance.

Hipper and the five battlecruisers of First Scouting Group had slipped the Jade at 1018 the night before. The light cruisers of Second Scouting Group followed an hour later. Both groups sailed 35NM northwest before turning due west. Their orders were an eventual turn north for a sweep of the eastern half of Dogger Bank, then to turn eastward toward the Danish coast before eventually making a southerly turn to return to port.

First Battle Squadron departed Cuxhaven around Midnight, shadowing Hipper’s Scouting Groups some 100NM due east. At 0518, Kameke’s Helgoland developed engine trouble that would reduce her flank speed by nearly half. Admiral Gadeke, commander of the Second Division, ordered her back to port, sending Oldenburg with her should a tow be required. The balance of the squadron continued north.

Weather conditions off Scotland were generally good early on the morning of the 11th, but they deteriorated as time went on. A number of storms were soon moving across the center of the North Sea and the Dogger Bank, just as Brock was reaching his sweep area. Visibility was poor, at times just a few thousand yards. At 1124, they received a report by a trawler having sighted a number of German destroyers on a northerly heading less than 30NM east-northeast of Brock’s position. Presuming this might be the van of an HSF force, Brock ordered Force W to turn due east. This, unfortunately, took him into the backend of a line of storms running ahead, enduring gale-force winds and reducing visibility even further. This, combined with Hipper’s actual position some 25NM northeast of the destroyers, and Brock missed everything/everybody.

Pakenham was 75NM east of Scarborough when the trawler report was heard. He continued another 70+ minutes and 30NM south before receiving orders to change course to the northwest and join Brock at his earliest convenience.

Bradford and his Wobblies were 130NM east-northeast of Brock, having only just made their planned turn southeast, when they were spotted at some considerable distance by LZ-26. The report was relayed to the HSF squadrons some forty minutes later, by which time the intervening distances had slightly increased. LZ-26 was unable to maintain contact, forced to leave its patrol area due to dangerously high winds.

A wartime photograph of Admiral Edward Eden Bradford (courtesy of the Library of Congress)

Bradford, unaware that Third Battle Squadron had been sighted, received a message from Beatty at 1406 that he was to expand his search by dividing his force, sending a group southwest to meet up with the onrushing Pakenham. The rest of Bradford’s command was to head due south, then turn southwest on a course some 30-40 miles south of and behind his detached battleships. Since Hipper and his BC’s and light cruisers were well north of these positions/headings, it achieved nothing other than to bring Bradford’s remaining four battleships and the trailing cruisers crashing into Eckermann’s First Battle Squadron support force.

Action at Bruceys Garden

The weather in the area had marginally improved; the seas had calmed slightly and the cloud ceiling had risen to about 4000 feet. Bradford, skeptical of the intentions of his part of the planned sweep east of the Bank, prematurely ordered his line of four battleships to make an eighteen-degree turn to the southwest, a heading he believed replicated that of his detached group some 40NM ahead and northwest of him. Grant’s Third Cruiser Squadron was eighteen miles astern.

At 1612, a lookout high on King Edward VII’s director position reported the smoke of approaching ships, broad on the port bow, the range estimated at 18000 yards. Bradford ordered the column to maintain its heading and speed at 12kts while monitoring the possible transgressors.

Gadeke was alerted to a group of ships ahead at 1618, a column of four moving across his bow at some 16000 yards. Clearly capitals, he ordered KptzS Lange, commander of Posen, to hold the heading and maintain his speed at 13kts.

At 1630, Bradford ordered KE VII to fire a ranging salvo on the lead ship, now identified as a Nassau-class dreadnought. The salvo, falling short, allowed a quick adjustment to the target.

Six minutes later, the range down to 11000 yards, KE VII sends a volley of 12-inch toward Posen, straddling the German battleship, incurring no damage other than a bath of seawater and a few shell splinters. Posen responds with a ranging shot from her forward 11-inch, hitting KE VII just below the waterline at her aft port-side torpedo position. The compartment floods, the torpedo crews drown, and she loses half a hull-box.

Gadecke sends a message to Eckermann and Second Division, now nearly twenty miles aft of him, to turn northwest and raise speed to join him. He orders Posen and the column to begin a 90-degree course change to the northwest, attempting to close the range on Bradford while bringing the rest of his column into a firing line.

As the German battleships comes around, Bradford’s old pre-dreads hammer away, the range falling to less than 8000 yards. Hits are hard to come by, however. At 1654, KE VII manages to take out Posen’s foremast, destroying her fire-director position and collapsing the searchlight platform. It’s a gruesome scene, but the structural damage is light. German return fire is ineffective.

The two lines settle into a running battle, separated by some 7500 yards of water. At 1700, the British line fires at Gadecke’s column, just as the German is completing his turn to the southwest. Their shooting is poor and they miss everything. The German replies, however, begin to find the range; Rheinland scores two hits on Hindustan, the first a hull hit below the bridge that disables and floods the forward torpedo position (1/2 hull box), the second an 11-inch round that slams into the bridge, severely damaging the conning tower, the radio room, and killing Capt. Nicholas and most of his immediate staff. Nassau scores a single hit on Commonwealth, disabling her forward 12-inch turret.

Within minutes, Commonwealth’s damage-control parties have her forward 12-inch restored and on line. At 1706, Bradford signals all four of the old BBs to execute a torpedo attack…six fish are soon observed streaking toward the German line. British gunfire inflicts scattered damage amidships on Posen and Nassau, disabling a 5.9-inch secondary on each. Posen, however, delivers two 11-inch into KE VII at the waterline, increasing her flooding and reducing her speed to 12kts; Capt. Maclachlan orders counter-flooding to maintain an even keel. Britannia takes an incoming 11-inch through her mainmast, destroying the aft searchlight position.

Six minutes later, Bradford receives a welcome signal from Vice-Admiral Grant that the cruisers of Third Squadron should be on Bradford’s position well within thirty minutes. Folding the message and placing it in his pocket, he feels KE VII stagger as she takes another hit amidships, this forward of her main engine room, knocking a boiler offline. Attempts to repair the boiler are unsuccessful, and the interruption of power hinders the operation of her pumps. Britannia absorbs an 11-inch into her conning tower from Westfalen; her radio room is wrecked and the shelter deck is torn up, with a large number of casualties found behind her bridge.

The British torpedoes, fired anticipating the Germans would continue to close the range, run short of the target by some 500 yards. The lively exchange of gunfire continues, however, with the Wobblies getting the worst of it. Hindustan is severely battered, enduring multiple hull and bulkhead hits that reduce her speed to just six or seven knots. Capt. Nicholas orders her to turn out of line as all efforts are made to save the ship. By 1742, the flooding has been stanched, but she sits dead in the water, barely afloat.

Britannia soon avenges Hindustan with a 12-inch hit on the barbette of Nassau’s aft turret, sending red-hot splinters into the shell-handling room. A quick order to flood the magazine saved the ship but not the turret crew, incinerated in the resulting fire.

At 1748, a lookout on Westfalen spotted smoke on the darkening horizon, well aft of the German column. The report is passed along to Gadeke, who initially thinks it’s First Division. However, within minutes a second signal is received indicating these are cruisers coming up from the northeast, almost certainly not friendly. Gadeke reluctantly makes the decision to disengage from the battered British battleships and move away to the southwest where he hopes to rejoin First Division. He has suffered some damage, but nothing critical. Second Division will survive to fight another day.

Bradford watches the German line turn away in the gathering darkness. He orders his guns to stand down while an assessment of the damage is made. At 1830, he sends Beatty a report of the action, together with the disposition of and direction of the German withdrawal. A few hours later, a tow by Britannia is secured for Hindustan, and this part of Third Battle Squadron begins the long trek home.

Beatty, his battlecruisers recalled, regroups while planning his renewed search for Hipper east-southeast of the Dogger Bank. But is he there?

(Part II to follow)

I thought I might return to this old thread to post 'em up, to inform, entertain ... those who see the topic and open the thread.[/quote]

I am returning to the thread to post one more tidbit.  This is more along the lines of entertaining, but may also be valued as informing those who are interested...

The platoon consisted of 3 rifle squads, an MG support squad with 3 MGs (2 x .30cal, 1 x .50cal), and an 81mm mortar squad.  Here you see them all dismounted and ready for action.

This past weekend I visited, for the first time, the Charles M. Schultz / Peanuts Museum in Santa Rosa.  Just a Sunday outing, but certainly a worthwhile destination for a few hours of weekend enjoyment if you are in the area.

In the display on Schultz's life story, I read that he was a Sargent in the US Army in WW2.  I was interested to find out he was the leader of an MG squad in the armored infantry regiment of the 20 Armored Division in ETO during late 1944 and 1945, in that division's advance across France, Austria and Germany.

I always enjoy doing research on my gaming units, to make sure I get them right!

Respect to you, Charlie!

-Mark

(aka: Mk 1)

Force Z in the Dark

Admiral Phillips peered ahead into the gloom. He could see little or nothing in this soup. The steward handed him a cup of tea and he looked at it blindly while he considered asking Flags his opinion on whether they should slow down. But Admirals do not ask lieutenants what they think and Force Z continued at 25 knots.

Force Z was heading due North parallel to the Malayan coast out of Singapore for Kota Bharu-Singora where aerial reconnaissance said another landing was on. They were a week into a war with Japan and there had already been one landing at Kota Bharu. Force Z’s last foray had been in daylight and ended abortively when what seemed like every Japanese bomber in their inventory had swarmed them. And if British AA fire had not been any more effective for real then it had in practice, they had enough luck to survive with only near misses before escaping into a series of squalls and running for home. Phillips had vowed, no air cover, no daylight sorties after that.

It was midnight and Phillips hoped to be in and out before dawn and that was the real reason that slowing down was not an option. All the rest was the jitters.

Force Z was led by the only relative modern destroyers (Electra, Encounter, Express & Jupiter) that he had in line abreast as a sub screen, 3,000 yards ahead of the column that was comprised of the battleship squadron (Prince of Wales FF & Repulse) and a cruiser squadron under RAdm Palliser (Exeter SF, Danae, Dragon & Durban). A destroyer division of old S&T class (Scout, Stronghold, Tenedos & Thanet) was 3,000 yards to port to guard his inshore flank. Phillips would trust to radar to seaward.

The wind was a Force 2 from the Northeast at 4 knots. Smoke, squalls and haze were just going to hang there in these conditions. There was sea haze to the east that reduced visibility by some 6,000 yards in that direction. They were presently in a squall that they could not see more than 1,000 yards in and he was sure there was more to come. The moon was in a quarter state but out side the squalls the sky was only partially cloudy.

The 4 leading destroyers’ radar was performing rather poorly (die rolls of 9, 10 & 12) except for Jupiter who had a sharp operator (rolled a 1) and he picked up on a contact at 16,000 yards.

The contact report put Phillips in a quandary. His original intention had been to use star shell and his big guns to shoot the hell out of the Japanese before sending his cruisers and destroyers in to finish the matter. But in this soup visibility was so constricted that he now doubted that would work. Phillips now decided to send in the old S&T. Their 4” popguns range was so limited that the soup wouldn’t affect them as much. Phillips would have Palliser’s cruisers and the newer destroyers follow them in. He’d start this with torpedoes and go from there.

At 0012 hours DesDiv B (S&T class) accelerated upon order to 36 knots and turned towards the reported contact on a heading of 315 degrees.

Mean while the Japanese under VAdm Kondo were split into three groups. The 12 APs and AV Kamikawa Maru were anchored in 2 lines, facing NE about 2,000 yards off shore. DesDivs 11 (Hatsuyuki, Fubuki & Shirayuki) & 19 (Uranami,
Ayanami, Isonami & Shikinami) were 2,000 yards further from shore in a 10,000 yard race track patrol pattern. Cruiser Sqdn 4 under VAdm Kondo (Takao FF & Atago) followed by Battle Sqdn 2 (2^nd section, Fuso SF & Yamashiro) and then the rest of DesFlot 3 under RAdm Hashimoto in Sendai DF with DesDivs 12 (Shirakumo, Murakumo & Shinonome) and 20 (Yugiri, Amagiri, Asagiri & Sagiri) were 4,000 yards further out in a 7,000 yard patrol box.

At 0024 hours Scout emerged from a squall and immediately acquired a long column of ships led by cruisers 8,000 yards off her port bow. If it had not been for the squall Takao would have seen Scout 4,000 yards earlier but she just come out of the soup as Takao was turning 90 degrees to port to a heading of 360 degrees to continue her box patrol. The sighting was Kondo’s first awareness that his patrol under VAdm Ozawa had failed in its purpose. The convoy’s defense now devolved onto its escort.

 Scout followed her division turned starboard to a heading of 360 degrees and got off her sighting report that would alert Palliser that it was better to head due north now. Scout and her division fired star shell (2 each) to illuminate the enemy.

Takao followed by the remainder of the column accelerated to 20 knots and engaged Scout. But the turn and the fact that the targets were destroyers resulted in a total whiff. The Brit star shell must have come from a batch either newly made (unlikely) or stored properly as all 8 rounds functioned correctly (none rolled over 8) and illuminated the first 8 ships (all the bats, cruisers and DesDiv 12) in the Japanese column.

RAdm Palliser’s cruisers at 29 knots and his destroyers at 35 knots and having started further North than the old crocks were now due East of Kondo and Palliser was aware of the Japanese location because of radar contacts from Exeter and his destroyers, turned 45 degrees to port to a heading of 315 degrees to close the range and get out of the squall.

0027 hours Scout and her division disappeared into the fog due east of Kondo but their star shell continued to illuminate him as he accelerated to 25 knots while the bats could only do 24. Kondo ordered Hashimoto to flank speed to close with these irritating old cans with his cruiser and destroyers. Kondo would support him if he could ever see anything.

0030 hours, Hashimoto in Sendai and followed by DesDivs 12 and 20 accelerated to 33 knots and turned to starboard on a heading of 45 degrees and went straight at the guns flashes he could see buried in the fog ahead.

0033 hours Palliser emerged from the squall and acquired Kondo’s cruisers and the bats and reported the sighting to Phillips who at 29 knots decided to follow Palliser in.

0036 hours Palliser’s cruisers and destroyers fired off every TT that was in arc at Kondo’s cruisers and the bats for a total of 1 quintuple, 3 quads and 7 triples. With quin and quads at the cruisers and the triples targeting the bats. They were just inside 8,000 yards when fired. Scout and her division fired their TT (8 twins) at Sendai but they were bow shots.

0042 hours Takao was able to attempt evasion against one of the two spreads targeting her and that might have saved her if she had not taken 3 out of 5 from Jupiter. Takao took 7 hull, lost her aft turret, was set afire and had her rudder jammed to starboard. Takao turned out of line at 5 knots. Atago failed to evade at all and took a hit each from the two spreads targeting her for 6 hull, a fire and a hit to her engines. Atago was reduced to 10 knots. Fuso attempted to evade one of the four spreads targeting her and the others missed on their own. Yamashiro was not so fortunate and took two hits that damaged her hull thrice and knocked out her forward turrets. Yamashiro was reduced to 16 knots. Sendai evaded the only real threat.

0045 hours Palliser knowing that Phillips would be up soon held fire and reversed course to bring his starboard tubes to bear. Scout and her division turned back into the squall and disappeared yet again. Hashimoto not having seen Palliser’s group turned East after Scout and her gaggle.

0048 hours Hashimoto continued his pursuit East after Scout. Palliser’s cruisers now fired their remaining 7 triple TT at Fuso and Yamashiro. Only Exeter targeted Yamashiro, who at 16 knots could not evade and took another hit for another hull and a fire. 6 spreads targeted Fuso who took two hits for 3 hull and the loss of fore and aft turrets. Fuso was reduced to 16 knots while Yamashiro was down to 11.

0051 hours Phillips emerged from the squall and PoW targeted Fuso with her MB while her secondary took on Atago. Repulse engaged Yamashiro.

PoW hit Fuso 4 times, knocking out her fore starboard secondary, damaging her hull (down to 11 knots), knocking out her remaining fore turret and her FC. PoW secondary firing rapidly hit Atago twice, knocking out her fore starboard TT and bouncing off her belt. Repulse hit Yamashiro once in the hull reducing her to 7 knots.

Palliser’s cruisers also got into the act with Exeter and Danae targeting Takao and Dragon and Durben targeting Atago. Exeter hit Takao twice, knocking out a turret and damaging her hull (that was enough to sink her). Danae also hit Takao once, knocking out another TT and setting a fire the sea quickly put out. Dragon and Durben hit Atago 4 times, knocking out her FP, setting her afire, knocking out a starboard secondary and hitting her hull twice sinking her.

0054 hours Phillips sent Palliser after the anchorage while he finished off the Fusos. PoW hit Fuso 5 times, knocking out her FP, setting her afire, knocking out another starboard secondary as well as a tertiary and both her amidships turrets. Repulse hit Yamashiro twice, knocking out a secondary and hitting her engines.

0100 hours Phillips recalled Scout’s division. PoW and Repulse sank Fuso and Yamashiro and pressed in on the anchorage. Scout having turned towards the anchorage ran into Sendai and DesDivs 12 & 20 who sank Scout and her division almost without any damage in return due to the 4” being only half damage to DDs and the S&Ts inability to roll odd even when they got a hit.

0103 hours Palliser’s cruisers and destroyers took on DesDivs 11 & 19. This would have gone better if the cruisers had been better suited to shooting at DDs. But Exeter’s 8 inch were shooting with a negative and the D class’s 6 inch do not rapid fire. But they still had shell weight. It was the rapid firing 4.7” of the 4 destroyers that really told. Jupiter hit Hatsuyuki 7 times right off, knocking out a TT, a gun mount, damaging her hull twice and her engines, her FC and jamming her rudder amidships. Express and Encounter whiffed but Electra hit Uranami 4 times, knocking out all her guns and damaging her hull. Exeter and Danae whiffed but Dragon hit Isonami 4 times, knocking out a TT, damaging her hull twice and a bulkhead, Durben hit Shikinami 5 times, knocking out 2 TT, damaging her hull twice and her bridge.

Uranami failed morale and tried to withdraw. DesDiv 11 made their morale and decided to fight it out.

0106 hours But Palliser had gotten too close and the Japanese acquired his force (fog can only do so much). The Japanese fired off every TT that could bear. DesDiv 11 got 8 triple Type 90 TT off at Palliser’s cruisers and destroyers, 1 each just to be fair. Of the destroyers targeted, only Encounter managed to evade. Of the 4 cruisers, it was Danae that managed to try and evade.

Jupiter took a hit that damaged a bulkhead and set her afire. Express was missed outright as was Encounter. Electra took a hit that sank her. Now for the cruisers. Exeter was missed. Danae almost evaded but this was not horseshoes and close does not count, Danae took a hit that gave her 3 hull and knocked out her two aft gun mounts. Dragon was missed. But Durben took a hit that gave her 3 hull and knocked out her aft 2 gun mounts.

0109 hours Jupiter repaired her bulkhead. Japanese failed to repair (their dice went south again). DesDiv 19 was running under smoke as fast they could for the exit. The rest were in a swirl of ships in various states of damage fighting to the death.

Jupiter’s guns were still working and firing rapidly she hit Fubuki twice, knocking out a now empty TT and damaging her engines. Encounter hit Shirayuki twice, damaging her hull and her engines. The cruisers whiffed. DesDiv 11 return fire did nothing.

0112 hours into this mess steamed PoW and Repulse. PoW’s rapidly firing secondary sorted Fubuki with 7 hits, that having knock her FC then took out all her guns and two of her TT mounts as well as damaging her hull. PoW’s MB hit Hatsuyuki 4 times. Finishing off her guns and damaging her hull twice. Repulse hit Shikinani 12 times, damaging her DC, setting her afire, knocking out all her TT as well as her last gun mounts, damaging her hull thrice, a bulkhead and her engines.

DesDiv 11 now failed morale and also tried to flee the field.

0115 hours Now it was the anchored transports and the AV’s turn. They were trying to get up steam but needed 15 more minutes just to get under way. They were not going to get it. PoW and Repulse went past them at point blank range creating 14” and 15” port holes with rounds that didn’t find something hard enough to detonate them and total devastation if they detonated. The slaughter went on for some 15 minutes. The Japanese would later claim that it was a merciless atrocity but their outrage, given their behavior throughout the war would find very little sympathy anywhere for several decades.

Phillips’ s Z Force or what was left RTB’d to Singapore. The landing as Kondo ruefully admitted when fished out of the water by Hashimoto was aborted.

WMC

Having lost these accounts in the data corruption of a couple years ago, I wanted to get them back on here as I think they were fun (others may find them tedious or inconsequential, lol). They are missing subsequent edits and all of the photos, stuff lost to the ether. I cobbled this composite version together from my notes, those of our game-session scribe, and the recollections of a few players gleaned from a number of phone calls. If I find any other bits or photos, I’ll add them over time.

The Riddle of the Sands

22 April 1915

In 1903, Smith, Elder & Company published a novel written by Erskine Childers, a guy who was born in England but raised by his mother’s family in Ireland following the death of his parents. The book, “The Riddle of the Sands”, is considered a ground-breaking piece of fiction, arguably the first of the espionage genre that would become so popular five decades later following the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War.

My father, a voracious reader throughout his life, had a copy of RotS in his library, the place where I first encountered it. I’m not one for reading bits of historical fiction more than once, but I recall reading Childers’ book two or three times when I was a kid. Much like the later works of Fleming, Clancy, and others, the story is heavily laden with political, geographical, and technical facts which bear heavily on the story. This, together with the writing style of the late Victorian era, required a few reads to digest everything and make sense of it.

Childers wrote his book at a time when Britain’s Foreign and War Offices were trying to determine who and what was the country’s primary threat as the calendar turned over into the new century. To his credit, Childers identified Germany as Britain’s likeliest adversary and developed his somewhat fantastical story within that premise.

The Frisian Islands are a long band of barrier islands that run along the western Danish and northern German and Dutch coasts. Much like the barrier islands along the Atlantic coast of the United States, the Frisians are ever-shifting bits of sand formed by the tides and currents of the North Sea. Only in populated areas where man has attempted to intervene in the endless ebb of water and sand has there been any stability; otherwise, these islands are relentlessly on the move. For centuries, they have played both havoc and sanctuary for the coastal shipping lanes of northwestern Europe, and their strategic importance lies at the center of Childers’ book.

From the First World War’s start, both the British and German navies found reason to extensively mine this southeastern corner of the North Sea, first as a means of interdicting the flow of goods and materials in and out of Germany’s northwestern ports, and second as protection for the great German naval base on the Jade. Throughout the war, there was an extensive effort by both sides to penetrate, disrupt, and/or defend the integrity of the vast minefields sown here. Minelayers, minesweepers, trawlers, drifters, submarines, and various light units fought a seemingly endless series of actions in these treacherous waters, a cycle that appeared to be nearly as predictable as the tides.

Some historians credit Childers’ book with having influenced Britain’s strategic deployment of its naval assets in the years leading up to the First World War. That seems rather far-fetched to me, but Churchill, for one, was known to have commented on it.

With this as a backdrop, together with the grander strategic notions laid out in Childers’ book, there forms the basis for a series of games to be played over the remaining weeks of this summer of 2021. More than a century after it all went down, there remains only a cursory view of these vicious actions fought in coastal waters, so they will be largely surmised. No matter, the heaviest units of the Grand Fleet and High Seas Fleet shall be restricted to the fleet cabinets, for this shall be the realm of the destroyer and the torpedo boat.

In mid-April, 1915, Admiral von Pohl dispatched 2nd Scouting Group on a mining operation supported by the HSF, and a week later a sweep in the direction of Dogger Bank was ordered with hopes of engaging British units. Concurrent with this operation was a secondary effort to clear British minesweepers and drifters operating around the eastern end of the Frisian Islands.

Action off Ameland

22 April 1915 (part 1)

Von Pohl took command of the High Seas Fleet (HSF) in the first week of February, 1915, relieving von Ingenohl following the debacle at Dogger Bank. There was a price to be paid for the black eye suffered less than two weeks before, and von Ingenohl, a man whose operational view was not too different from his replacement, paid it.

Within months of the start of the war, there developed two prevailing strategic notions within the Imperial Navy high command regarding the employment of the HSF. One advocated for an aggressive campaign directed at the Royal Navy, anytime and anywhere, while the second was far more conservative, prioritizing coastal defense and preservation of naval assets. Von Ingenohl’s thrust-and-parry strategy had ended in failure, primarily due to poor operational execution. Von Pohl largely withdrew from the North Sea, focusing instead on the U-boats and their assault on the shipping lanes surrounding Britain.  

For the next twelve months, the HSF would see little action. Operations were conducted primarily in coastal waters, the only exceptions being a token number of sorties less than 150 miles out with the misplaced hope of encountering British sweeps. The Royal Navy, however, had scarce reason to venture south other than to support its interdiction efforts and to observe its rival’s activities. A “phony war” of sorts developed, only ended by von Pohls’ death from liver cancer in January, 1916, and Scheer’s elevation to command.

The Day Before - 21 April 1915

Korvettenkapitän Gerhard von Gaudecker was on the bridge carefully surveying the charts with his executive officer when the change of orders were received early in the afternoon of April 20. SMS Hamburg, a Bremen-class light cruiser, had been sent two days earlier to patrol northwest of Mellum. It was treacherous work, plying the narrow band of open water that intersected the vast mine belt that protected the mouth of the Weser. His patrol area would occasionally take Hamburg within 800-900 yards of the field, leaving a razor-thin margin for navigational error. Only five months earlier, the armored cruiser SMS Yorck had been gutted by a pair of mines when she inadvertently wandered outside a designated channel through the field. Many lives along with a number of naval careers were terminated that day, and Gaudecker desperately wanted to avoid a repeat. Unlike Yorck, he had no pilot aboard, and the weather was poor, with low-lying clouds, occasional fog, and a steady light rain. When new orders came sending him west, Gaudecker was not displeased.

Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey Layton stood peering over Petty Officer Davies’ shoulder, the latter’s hands and arms covered in grease and diesel oil, using an adjustable spanner to gently tap on the broken driveshaft coupling at the back of one of E13’s two Vickers 8-cylinder diesels. With the dim light overhead flickering ominously, there was no longer any fooling themselves. They both knew it was a mechanical failure they had no capability of repairing while rolling about in the middle of the North Sea. They would have to return to Harwich for repairs, if they could.

Despite the sentiments of a number of her crew, Layton refused to believe E13 was a jinxed boat. Following his command of the coastal submarine C23, he’d been assigned to the new E13 at her commissioning in December, 1914, the fifteenth of the E-class submarines that had started rolling down the slipways in late-1912.  Admittedly, she had encountered a number of “incidents” during her shakedown and early maneuvers, but now she was on her first war patrol, destined for the western Danish coast. Departing Harwich on April 18, she had made good progress when, approximately 45 nautical miles north of Ameland, diesel No. 2 let go. After 36 hours trying to make repairs, they’d given up and would now turn for home. Barely able to make five knots while pushing against the North Sea swells, half the crew sick, and difficulty recharging the batteries, she was largely a sitting duck for anything that might come along. Layton, his sense of optimism fading, began to rethink his relationship with E13.

Reporting his situation in a coded message to Harwich, Layton was advised that HMS Bonaventure, an old Astraea-class cruiser which had been tasked as a submarine tender, was being dispatched to assist with repairs or, failing that, to take E13 under tow for return to the yard at Dovercourt. Bonaventure’s captain, Commander Stanley Willis, estimated he could be on E13’s position in less than a day’s sailing. Until then, Layton and his submarine were directed to continue inching their way westward.

To escort Bonaventure in her efforts to reach E13, a small scratch force from 4th Destroyer Flotilla was assembled, consisting of leader HMS Swift and destroyers Acasta, Christopher, and Owl. Captain Charles J. Wintour, overall commander of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, would personally lead the destroyers. Wintour’s 4th DF, which typically operated in conjunction with Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force and the Dover Patrol, found itself temporarily short-handed, as most of the DDs were having to maintain patrols of the Thames Estuary and coastal waters as far south as eastern end of the Channel. Wintour, with his four destroyers, expected an out-and-back of no more than 72 hours.

*****

Bert “Duffy” Landon’s trawler, motoring northeast at ten knots, was pretty far south of the traditional fishing grounds off Dogger Bank. Overnight they had passed a scant 10 miles from the Dutch coast, at one point close enough to have seen the light at Zandvoort. With the hold empty of fish, the booms drawn, and the nets stowed, they showed little pretense to be where they were.

Primrose had been Landon’s boat for more than a decade, acquired from an old Cromer fisherman who’d retired not long after the millennial calendar turned over. Prior to that, Landon had briefly worked in the pits, something he’d despised despite his family’s long history with mining. No, he’d left the mines, instead working as a fishing hand for seven or eight years, saved his money, and when the trawler came up he’d made arrangements with the owner to buy it on time. Crab and lobster in the summer, herring in the fall, then cod through winter, it was a never-ending rotation of long hours and hard, dangerous work. Still, he never once considered returning to the pits.

Trawler Primrose.

If it wasn’t already difficult enough, the war had raised the bar even further. A couple of the boats operating from Cromer had inexplicably gone missing; one day they went out and simply never returned. No trace was ever found – no wreckage, no debris, no bodies, nothing, they just vanished. Now the drifters had taken to operating in pairs or small groups, and within a few weeks the new dangers of the trade became apparent.

In November, a pair of Cromer’s trawlers were surprised by a surfaced German submarine. Ordered to stop and abandon their boats, one captain did so, the other dropped his lines and managed to slip away. Upon returning some thirty-six hours later, the captain of the escaped boat reported the incident to local authorities and subsequently to Royal Navy personnel. No trace of the other drifter or her crew was ever found.

Two weeks later, a trawler dragging for herring unknowingly snagged a naval mine in her nets and was destroyed while winching her catch alongside. One badly-injured survivor was picked up by a nearby fishing boat, the man able to detail the circumstances of the incident. A second drifting mine was observed a few days later by another boat, this successfully detonated from a safe distance by rifle fire. The danger was escalating rapidly.

By January, 1915, 45 boats had been lost or disappeared and the fishing fleet was in an uproar. There were reports of submarines and torpedo boats sweeping the fishing grounds and, true or not, of crews being machine-gunned in the water following the sinking of their boats. Calls for protection by the Navy were dismissed as impractical, but offers were made to arm trawlers for their own defense. Landon, for one, jumped at the opportunity. In early February, he and his six-man crew took possession of a 20 year-old short-barreled Hotchkiss 3-pounder which they mounted near Primrose’s bow (positioning and deck modifications as directed by the RN team that delivered it).  A few days later they received 90 minutes of training on the gun’s use, along with two crates containing 40 shells. Landon supplemented his armament with a pair of Lee-Metford .303 rifles that he stored in the wheel-house.

Primrose made a pair of short fishing runs in late February and early March, both of which were uneventful. On their third outing, a 96-hour run south and east of the Norfolk coast, they encountered nothing unusual other than an overturned, partially submerged steel buoy which they initially thought might have been a drifting mine. Three shots from the Hotchkiss (two misses and one hit) dispatched the buoy, an object that posed a considerable threat to any small vessel that might come upon it.

After a relatively quiet March, the number of boats lost started to rise again. With the risk of mines, submarines, and torpedo boats increasing, a number of trawlers were being requisitioned for minesweeping and patrol duties, a fate Landon hoped to dodge. The cod, however, were running in small numbers, and doing some paid work for the navy began to look lucrative. An early-April meeting produced a request for Primrose to temporarily move south where an increasing number of drifters and fishing boats were working. Landon’s assignment was a reconnaissance of sorts, a slow meandering cruise up the Dutch coast to observe and document the extent to which the German Navy was expanding its reach into the southern end of the North Sea. Couched as a one-off, and in light of everything going on, Landon and his seven-man crew agreed to undertake the request.

Primrose departed Cromer early in the morning of April 19, 1915, slipping past the breakwater at 0340. Preparations were minimal, laying in a couple weeks’ worth of provisions while offloading or stowing most of the fishing gear. A ring of sandbags now encircled the shield-less Hotchkiss, a stiff canvas tarp tied over it.

The voyage south was uneventful. Landon set a three man watch, rotating every six hours. They made the 100-mile trip south to Harwich in twelve hours. There they received charts and maps of the Dutch and German coast, including the position of known facilities and minefields. A new three-kilowatt radio was installed, along with the protocols for its use, and they were given a Danish flag to be flown if challenged. The radio and all charts, maps, and papers were to be destroyed if confronted. At 1930, having topped off the bunker with diesel oil, they slipped their mooring and headed down-channel at a leisurely eight knots. Twelve miles out, the coast disappearing behind them, they doused the lights and set their course due east, raising their speed to ten knots. A days sail and they’d be on the Dutch coast.

*****

The torpedo boats, S141, S142, S143, and S144, were all of the S138-class, commissioned in 1907. They were an older type and relatively lightly armed, recently refitted with a pair of 88mm SK (quick-firing) L/35 cannon, a single 50mm SK L/40 cannon, and three 18-inch torpedo tubes arranged in single-mounts. They were quick, but not as fast as one might expect, topping out at around 31 knots.

If the torpedo boats were old, Hamburg may have seemed geriatric. Launched in 1902 and commissioned in 1904, she was armed with ten quick-firing 4.1-inch, supplemented with ten 1.5-inch Maxim for close-in defense. She also had a pair of 18-inch torpedo tubes in reloadable submerged broadside mounts. Flank speed was 22 knots. Hamburg, assigned to 4th Scouting Group, had participated in December’s raid on Scarborough where she’d had a brief encounter with British destroyers. Otherwise, her war had been relatively quiet.

The run west was largely uneventful, encountering only a few Dutch scows and the German coastal steamer Tümmler churning past, her holds piled high with a load of coal. At 1530, having pushed nearly 20 miles west of Terschelling, Gaudecker ordered the turn north, continuing at a leisurely 14 knots. Twenty minutes later they encountered what appeared to be a large trawler sailing across their bows heading southwest. Gaudecker sent S141 to investigate, soon reporting it as the French armed trawler Faucon. Apparently surprised by the German torpedo boat’s rapid approach, a shot across the bow and the Frenchman stopped. After a brief boarding and inspection, the crew was ordered into a pair of dinghies and Faucon was dispatched with three or four rounds from the torpedo boat’s 88mm.

In just over ninety minutes, S141 was back in its position on the point.  At 1806, S143 reported a fisherman some seven or eight miles ahead on a northwest heading. Gaudecker again ordered S141 off for a look, and the TB was soon charging off at 30 knots to run down its quarry.

*****

The weather overnight had been good, almost too good for Landon’s liking. The sky was crystal clear, and a high half-moon reflected off the sea ahead. Good visibility, yet around midnight Primrose was nearly run down by an unknown steamer heading south along the coast at what Landon estimated to be 25 knots. Running without lights in the dark was a huge risk, no doubt, and he and the crew were left badly shaken by the near-miss. How his first mate MacGregor, on watch at the time, had missed the onrushing behemoth was a mystery. Sunrise, with its own associated risks, couldn’t come soon enough.

By 1030, they were past Texel and headed out into the open sea. Landon watched the Frisian Islands and the Dutch coast melt away astern, glad to be clear of the constrictions he felt when operating close to shore. Consulting the charts, he set a course that continued north-northeast, figuring he’d pass the last checkpoint and turn for home by 1800. A long 200-mile run west would have them back in Cromer by evening the next day.

Primrose continued on her northeastward heading throughout the day, uninterrupted by not so much as a glimpse of another craft. The calm sea was eerily empty, horizon-to-horizon, and Landon began to suspect the entire excursion to have been a great waste of time. Midafternoon, he turned the trawler a few degrees further north, continuing at a steady ten knots.

At 1818, one of the men yelled that a craft was approaching from the port quarter. Through glasses, Landon couldn’t quite discern who or what it might be, but the tall bow wave indicated it was coming fast. Large, dark, and low to the water, he figured it was likely some sort of German patrol craft.

With the Danish ensign fluttering from the fantail, gear stowed, and the Hotchkiss hidden under the heavy tarp, he wondered how long the charade might last. Suspecting not long, he figured he would have three choices - continue pretending to be a neutral and act dumb, immediately stop and surrender, or fight it out. All three seemed likely to get them killed, some sooner than later. Leaving the wheelhouse unattended, he ran forward to tell MacGregor to get the men ready to use the 3-pounder. While the Scotsman began untying the tarp, Landon returned to the wheelhouse. He pulled out the two rifles, handing one to a deckhand along with a cartridge box. The other he kept for himself.

The German torpedo boat gradually reduced its speed as it approached, closing to within a few hundred yards to casually look over the trawler. While the fisherman appeared rather nondescript, Second-Lieutenant Wilhelm Keil had his suspicions this wasn’t just a Danish fishing boat. Why would one of their boats be so far south and west of the Danish coast? It wasn’t impossible, but it wasn’t likely either. Keil told his XO to have the trawler stopped for boarding and inspection.

Flashes from a lamp meant nothing to Landon, nor would he have heeded them had he known what was being signaled. He could see a sudden milling about mid-ship, along with a few crewmen manning a rather ominous-looking gun forward of the main-mast and the conning tower. Feeling a mixture of anger and adrenalin welling up inside him, he maintained his course, raised speed slightly, all the while keeping an eye on the dark-gray silhouette gliding along off to his starboard.

Minutes later he heard a loud crump, a shot fired by the torpedo boat, throwing up a great geyser of seawater a 100 yards or so ahead of Primrose’s port bow. There could be no misunderstanding this message, Landon thought to himself. Never one to shrink from a fight, no matter the odds, he eased his speed ahead another knot, then waved his arm at MacGregor who, with a great heave, pulled the tarp off the Hotchkiss and, together with another crewman, scrambled over the sandbags.

Praying to God he’d hit something, the Hotchkiss recoiled as MacGregor sent his first shot toward the German torpedo boat. The lack of training did not serve them well as, even at such short range, the round sailed over the TB’s aft funnel by some 30 feet. This served to get the attention of the German gunners who, within less than a minute, began returning fire.

Landon looked at his watch, surprised it was 1842, only 20-odd minutes since they’d first seen the German’s approach. MacGregor fired again, this round also sailing far wide of the target. The TB’s forward gun barked, missing short by some 75 yards, sending seawater raining down on the trawler. Landon spun the wheel to starboard, hoping to turn into his antagonist’s line of fire while presenting his narrowest profile as a target.

MacGregor continued firing but was unable to put a round on the TB. The Germans, however, seemed to be gradually getting the range. An 88mm round slammed into the water just a few yards off the port side, steel splinters tearing into Primrose’s wooden hull. Keil ordered S141 to increase her speed, trying to get around on the trawler, but Landon kept turning inside him, so he decided to straighten up and move away, then make a run back in.

On his first pass, Keil’s TB put a round into Primrose’s forward hold, blowing a large hole in her hull just above the waterline. As S141 passed, the aft 88mm landed another round, this burrowing into the sandbag ring around the Hotchkiss, crushing the mount and disabling the gun. The blast threw MacGregor nearly twenty feet, pinning him against the port-side gunwale under a steel hatch cover. The crewman who’d acted as the Hotchkiss’ loader was dead. Another crewman scrambled over to get MacGregor out from under the heavy cover while Landon, his knee braced on the wheel and the rifle laid across the ledge of the wheelhouse window, pumped .303 rounds into the torpedo boat as it hurtled past.

On the TB’s next pass, Primrose took another hit, this at the waterline on the starboard side where she began slowly flooding. Twelve minutes later, another hit on the opposite side, showering the trawler in seawater and splinters. The shell had penetrated to the engine compartment where the marine diesel, immersed in rising seawater, spluttered to a stop. Slipping down a ladder, Landon was greeted by a sight of total carnage; in places he could see sunlight through parts of the hull. Smith, his engineer, was nowhere to be found. With water nearly to his chest, he climbed back up the ladder to the clatter of machinegun fire.

As the deck began to pitch sharply to starboard, the mast and derrick came crashing down, nearly crushing the wheelhouse. His youngest deckhand, a 15 year-old boy from Metton, remained crouched on the stern, blazing away with the other rifle. Landon yelled to him to go over the side, telling the same to another crewman who helped MacGregor get clear of the sinking trawler. Landon smashed the radio with the butt of his rifle, then threw the maps and logbook into a steel box on the deck. He calmly shot a hole in the box, tucked it under his arm, then tossed the rifle and himself over the port side. Once in the water, he held the steel box under him, feeling it fill with water and sink out of his grasp. He looked up to see the 15 year-old swimming toward him, then together they swam off through the debris and diesel oil, to find MacGregor and the other man. Primrose, his beloved trawler, rolled over and sank behind them.

It was dark when S141 rejoined Hamburg and the other torpedo boats. The action with the trawler and subsequent recovery of the survivors had consumed nearly three hours and expended more than 40 of their 200 88mm shells. Landon, who’d felt certain they’d be shot before or after they were fished from the sea, found himself drinking coffee in the torpedo boat’s wardroom. MacGregor, his left leg badly lacerated and his left arm broken in two places, was being tended to by a couple of German crewmen. The other two men had been taken below for dry clothes. The loss of the others weighed on him, especially when S141’s young second lieutenant commander gave them the news that they would likely spend the rest of the war in a prisoner camp once S141 returned to Germany.

His boat gone, a third of his crew dead or missing, and facing an uncertain time ahead, it could have been easy to feel sorry for himself. Then again, four of the seven of them were still alive; it seemed likely that things could have turned out worse, much worse.

Tomorrow would prove him right.

Action off Ameland

22 April 1915 (part 2)

Day of Battle

With E13 in tow, Wintour directed Willis and Bonaventure to set course on a west-southwest heading, aiming to take the shortest route back to Harwich. An alternative would have been to head due west, approaching the sanctuary of the English coast and its patrol regimen overnight. There, in relative safety, they could turn south to reach the Thames Estuary. This, however, would add upwards of ten hours to the return voyage and risk entanglement with German fleet units engaged in an operation to their northwest (Wintour had received wireless reports in the early hours of the 22nd of enemy operations northeast of Dogger Bank).

Wintour split his escort, with HMS Christopher and HMS Owl taking up a position approximately 3000 yards off Bonaventure’s starboard bow, while HMS Swift, his flag, and HMS Acasta stood some 4000 yards off the old cruiser’s port quarter. The crews suffered some discomfort as the destroyers rolled in the gentle swells while trying to maintain their positions at this dreadfully slow speed. No matter, they’d be home soon enough. Wintour ordered the watch doubled and went below to check on repairs to a ventilation problem that had been reported by the galley earlier that morning.

At 0948, a report of a smudge of smoke on the horizon dead ahead came to Bonaventure’s bridge. It was faint, but there, and after a few minutes they were able to confirm that, whatever “it” was, it was headed directly for them. Commander Stanley Willis ordered his men to their action stations while advising E13 that, depending upon a determination of any threat approaching, the tow would be dropped and that the submarine would be on her own. A quick wireless message was sent to Wintour, advising of the sighting.

Korvettenkapitän Gerhard von Gaudecker watched the torpedo boats gradually form into a column astern of Hamburg, a maneuver largely completed by 1000. On their current east-northeast heading, the cruiser, churning along at 15 knots, was headed straight into the morning sun, hampering his ability to see dead ahead. It did not, however, present a problem for the men in the forward director position, reporting smoke ahead and off both their starboard and port bows. Within minutes, Gaudecker radioed Keil in S141 to raise speed to 20 knots and to maintain the line astern.

It wasn’t long before Gaudecker had reports from his XO that the force ahead comprised a light cruiser escorted by two pairs of destroyers, one pair on each side. By 1048, the range between Hamburg and Bonaventure was down to 11000 yards, with Wintour’s destroyers less than 10000 yards out and closing fast. He had to make a decision quickly, the two forces running in on each other at a combined speed of some 50 knots. To turn south in a running battle risked getting himself quickly pinned against one or more of the mine belts. No, he would turn north-northeast to gain position and bring his torpedo boats to bear. At 1054, the Germans began making their turn north.

At 1100, the umpire declared the first random event of the day, a ship striking a drifting mine. A series of die rolls reveals S141 as the unlucky ship. With the turn northeast underway, Gaudecker hears a tremendous blast astern. He turns to see S141 shrouded by a curtain of smoke, steam, and seawater, pitched to starboard some 30 degrees. Her back broken, the torpedo boat’s stern drifts in a slow spin to port, her forward section sinking rapidly. S142, immediately astern of the stricken torpedo boat, veers sharply out of line, narrowly avoiding collision with the aft section of S141. Second-Lieutenant Keil, his crew, the survivors of Primrose, along with his ship are lost.

Hamburg barrels ahead, but the TBs, having had to turn out of line to avoid the wreckage of S141, are now some 700 yards astern on the cruiser’s port quarter. Gaudecker orders Hamburg to open on HMS Christopher, now a scant 2800 yards off the cruiser’s starboard bow. At 1106, a German 4.1-inch round penetrates Christopher’s forward boiler room. The resulting carnage sharply reduces her steam, dropping her speed nearly in half with the partial loss of power.

As the ships close to near point-blank range, the combination of headings, tube positions, and blocked line-of-sight temporarily prevents anyone from acquiring a firing solution for a torpedo attack. HMS Owl slashes past Hamburg, scarcely 500 yards astern of the cruiser. Owl’s 4-inch scores a single hit, disabling one of Hamburg’s stern 4.1-inch mounts. Hamburg batters the destroyer in turn, scoring two engineering hits that knocks out all power. Gunfire from the torpedo boats is ineffective.

With both DDs from his northern flank temporarily out of action, Wintour begins a charge from the south. Bonaventure, creeping along in the center of the table at a leisurely 12 knots, now opens on Hamburg at a range of 7300 yards, missing with her forward 6-inch. Gaudecker and Hamburg, who’d not been paying much attention to the old cruiser, returned fire, his salvo landing well short of the target. Wintour orders Swift to open on the torpedo boats, the range being just 4100 yards. A single 4-inch hit in her engineering section drops S144’s maximum speed to 19 knots, just a knot less than her current speed.

HMS Swift

The battle has now taken on this great clockwise rotation, with the Germans being at the Noon position, Bonaventure at the four o’clock position, and Wintour with Swift and Acasta at the seven o’clock position. Wintour maintains his speed at 29 knots while trying to turn inside Gaudecker’s arc toward Bonaventure and Willis, who is now turning toward Hamburg as well. Lieutenant-Commander Robert Hamond, HMS Owl’s skipper, manages to get her forward boiler room back online by 1130, and she, together with the wounded HMS Christopher, turn east to resume their pursuit of the German torpedo boats.

HMS Swift is rapidly reeling in the German force. At 1136, she lands a hit on S142, stoving in bulkhead A7 just ahead of her forward engine room. The torpedo boat begins flooding, but is able to maintain her speed and position as damage-control crews try to repair the damage. The torpedo boats return fire with their 88mms, but score no hits. Six minutes later, S142 fires a spread of torpedoes at the oncoming Bonaventure, but all fish pass safely ahead of the cruiser without any evasive action. S144 takes a hit at the waterline from Swift, resulting in one hull-box of damage.

A steady exchange of fire continues with few hits. Swift manages a 4-inch hit on Hamburg that takes down her foremast along with her searchlights and disables the wireless room. S142 gets her flooding under control and S144 restores full power. At this point, Gaudecker decides to break off the action, knowing he can outrun Bonaventure and deems it unlikely that Swift and Acasta will continue their pursuit. He orders all ahead flank.

Of course, the wildcard in all of this is E13. After being cast off by Bonaventure, Lieutenant-Commander Layton crept along on the surface at five knots, the action of the morning being some distance to the west. By 1130, however, the battle was observed to be moving back toward them, and he ordered E13 to submerge. With fully charged batteries, he expected he had some ninety minutes to two hours of runtime under water before he’d have to consider resurfacing. As the Noon hour approached, he sees that the Germans were moving in his direction and that he was likely to get at least one chance before they passed.

Layton, however, had misjudged the speed of the onrushing German ships. He ordered E13 hard over and lined up his shot. The oncoming torpedo boats would pass scarcely 500 yards in front of him, and Hamburg not more than 1000 yards beyond the TBs. At 1206, Layton fired both of his bow tubes, then went deep to avoid the possibility of the TBs veering over top of him. The die rolls, however, just weren’t there; the torpedoes passed in front of S142 and the column of TBs, then slipped safely aft of the light cruiser.

Wintour now made the decision not to pursue Gaudecker, although confident he could have run him down given another thirty minutes. The odds had run in his favor this day, and he didn’t want to press it. If his overall objective was to get E13 back to base, then they should resume that effort once assured the German force would not return. HMS Christopher, still short of steam from her engineering damage, reaches the site of S141’s sinking to search for any survivors. None were found.

Over the years, we’ve fought some pretty large actions that involved upwards of 40-50 ships, and those have often been rather bloody affairs. These smaller battles, as seen in RotS II, tend to be more a game of maneuver, often relatively bloodless. After you’ve spent five or six hours on one of these, the lack of a clear result is often a bit frustrating. I’ve spent quite a bit of time trying to understand why this is, and I have a few ideas.

I think the first is the simple fact that each side has so few “assets” available. Players come to understand that the loss of just one or two ships can put one side or the other in a serious bind. As platforms decline in number, the gunfire starts to concentrate on fewer targets and it’s possible/likely for damage to accumulate even faster. For this reason, people grow skittish and tend to play not to win, but instead to not lose.

The other thing that seems to happen can be laid at the feet of the relatively small-caliber weapons that are employed. In RotS II, the largest gun on the table is the pair of 6-inch single mounts on Bonaventure; everything else is 4.1-inch or smaller. This is a situation where a player is not racking up lots of equivalent hits when sorting through the gunnery results, so damage tends to accumulate quite slowly. Degrading the enemy seems a long process.

Torpedoes were greatly feared by the WWI navies; whole flotillas were seen to turn away at the very threat of a torpedo attack. For the life of me, I don’t understand why. My experience with FAI and torpedoes is one of great promise yielding little in result. I’ve come to the conclusion that one would have to darken the sea with vast shoals of tin fish to raise the likelihood of achieving anything, and even then, I have my doubts. The mounts are small, the numbers are low, ranges relatively short; only a brilliant die roller is going to lay open a few hulls.

If this game (scenario) was one primarily of maneuver, the Germans had executed miserably. On numerous occasions Hamburg had found her line-of-fire blocked by an intervening column of torpedo boats, and more than once suffered flank shots by the pursuing Swift and Acasta. The disruption caused by the loss of S141 stayed with the German commander for the rest of the day, largely preventing him from getting his units back into a better tactical formation.

Still, the game proved to be great fun; another stride back toward something that feels normal. A good friend of mine used to say, “You’re not lost as long as there’s gas in the tank.” With that in mind, we’ve decided we’re not done with the Frisian Islands.

PostScript

Erskine Childers, a native Englishman, soldier, naval officer, later an Irish nationalist and gun-runner, got himself shot at the age of 52, but his life, whether you agree with his politics or not, is an amazing but complicated tale unto itself. If you get a chance to read The Riddle of the Sands, do it; I think you’ll find it a great beach-read, or better, a good book for this winter while sitting in front of the fire on a cold evening. Lay in a box of wood, two fingers of Jameson, then settle in. Let me know what you think.

When it was working (and that was a huge if) and your target was at least 800 yards away and no one was jamming the radio signal; it worked like a charm. Just as easy to hit with as a TOW in my experience. And mechanically, the Sheridan was better than a M113 IMHO. But that all changed with the first conventional round you fired. Firstly, the shock almost aways unseated some of circuit cards in a box behind the TC's seat knocking out the ability to fire the missile. I always immediately after firing a main gun round unlatched the box cover and patted the 10 to 20 (I'm old and don't remember exactly how many) circuit cards back into place and at least one if not many more would need it. After we had fired a couple of main gun rounds, I would be out on the rear deck with engineer compartment hatches open and a 9mm box wrench tightening the bolts that held the engine and transmission together. And that does not take into consideration all the other things that could come lose from the kind of shaking the recoil subjected the entire tank too. The testimony to the vehicle's mechanical reliability IMHO was that it was the primary vehicle that OFOR used for its mockups of Soviet vehicles in the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in the Mohave Desert. It was fast and it ran better than any other vehicle I ever crewed including jeeps. I loved it in peace and was deathly afraid to take it to war. 

I remember at Ft. Riley (I was in 1/4 Cav) the Army (OK, DOD) had bought up a bunch of farmlands including their buildings. 1st Engineers was out there blowing stuff up for fun and officially for practice. I thought if they can do it why not me? Of course, I didn't have anything on hand that went boom. but I did have my Shank (the shortened nickname for the Sheridan that we called a "son of a Tank"). So, I drove it through a silo and of course the silo collapsed on my shank. But my shank didn't care, and I drove out the other side. So, I'm sitting on a pile of brick that covers the front slope of my shank using the tube for an arm rest when the Lt. walked by. He asked me where my shank (actually A-28) was, and I replied that I was sitting on it. His response was "great camouflage job" and that was the end of the matter.  I really liked that Lt. We affectionally called him "Peaches" because that was the only part of C-rations that he would eat.

WMC

Force du Raid

France’s what if contribution to the Norway Campaign

The First and Second Battles of Narvik had come and gone. Britain could claim that she had gutted Germany’s pre-war destroyer force (although at great cost), but she had not fulfilled her objective of closing the port of Narvik to iron ore shipments bound for Germany. German Gebirgs infantry held the town and the port. Of course, that is not the whole story. The Germans were short of ammunition and had not landed the bulk of their heavy weapons before the ships carrying them had been sunk. They therefore determined to remedy that situation with a new convoy bringing ammo, support weapons and an entire regiment of Gebirgs infantry. The Allies had divined their intent and it was France’s turn to stop their new effort.

The French engaged in no half measures. They committed all of Vice Admiral Gensoul’s Force du Raid except for the Second Ligne Division (the Bretagne class being considered too slow for the mission). The Germans responded with just about their entire surviving fleet. This set the scene for the largest surface action the North Sea had seen since Jutland.

VAdm Gensoul was on the bridge of his flagship, Strasbourg, trailed by Dunkerque.  The six La Galissoniere class cruisers of Cruiser Divisions 3 and 4 under RAdms Marquis and Bourrague followed astern. The Second Legere Squadron and the Second Destroyer Squadron under RAdms Lacroix and Dorval made up the light forces. The French Navy had a great many ships under repair or refit and four Contre-Torpilleur and three destroyer divisions making up the two groups were almost all short a ship or even two. Nevertheless, the nine Contre-Torpilleurs and six destroyers present were bound to exceed what Germany could muster. The seaplane tender, Commandant Teste held the French to 20 knots, but also provided aerial reconnaissance as long the North Sea’s legendary bad weather allowed. Gensoul’s mission was to keep the Kriegsmarine from getting anything resembling aid or comfort to the Germans at Narvik.

Vice Admiral Lutjens commanded the Narvik relief force from the bridge of his flagship Scharnhorst and her sister Gneisenau followed astern. A cruiser force (Admiral Hipper, Koln, Konigsberg & Karlsruhe) under RAdm Schmundt trailed the battle cruisers. The eight remaining destroyers (in 2-four ship divisions) provided the screen. The transport Duisberg and the cargo ships Saar and Adolf Luderitz carried the troops, ammo, food and heavy weapons intended for the garrison of Narvik. As Lutjens made clear to his subordinates; the Fuhrer had ordered him to deliver the convoy and its cargo to Narvik and Lutjens had never failed to carry out an order in his entire life.

The Germans were steaming due north just off Utsire Island at 12 knots (the best speed of the Duisberg). The French were closing from the west on a northeast converging course. Float planes from both sides had reported each other’s course and approximate speed.

The Weather God had rolled the customary D12 and D6 with a 5 and a 4 as a result. Thus, we had a Force 4 wind from the north (another DR) with 2 layers of clouds. Spotter a/c were going to have to get a bit closer than they would like to spot shots. The visibility was 18,000 yards at noon when the fleets sighted one another. Smoke could only be expected to last few minutes in the prevailing wind.  Two squalls were visible on the northern horizon about 36,000 yards apart. There was no sea haze. Both sides launched their remaining FP and got ready to shoot each other up.

Or at least the Germans did. Gensoul had other ideas. He had turned the 1^st Ligne Division together as soon as he saw the Germans and now heading due north in a quarter line. He had Strasbourg make smoke and that covered Dunkerque. Gensoul also ordered his cruiser divisions to take station on his port (unenaged) side where they too were covered by Strasbourg’s smoke as well as being beyond max visibility. Gensoul ordered an increase in speed for the Strasbourgs and the cruisers to 29 knots. He ordered the contre-torpilleurs to flank speed and to stay beyond 18,000 yards for now. The destroyers would escort the AV until Gensoul had a clearer idea of what the German reaction would be.

 At 1206 hours Strasbourg opened on Scharnhorst while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau fired back. Strasbourg hit Scharnhorst once. Scharnhorst missed, but the unengaged Gneisenau also hit Strasbourg once. Strasbourg suffered the loss of a search light while Scharnhorst was hit on the fore turret and the shot bounced off.

At 1212 hours Lutjens realized from the various spotter a/c that several French destroyers (the contre-torpilleurs) were forging ahead just out of his sight at something like 30 plus knots to his 12. He ordered Schmundt to flank speed with his cruisers to keep them from heading his line. Meanwhile the duel between Strasbourg and the Scharnhorsts continued. Strasbourg hitting Scharnhorst again and Scharnhorst returning the favor. Strasbourg bounced another round off the Scharnhorst’s fore turret (Oh the ringing in their ears) While Scharnhorst devastated Strasbourg’s search lights.

By 1218 hours the French FP had reported the increase in the German cruisers speed and Gensoul ordered his cruisers forward at flank speed to assist the Contre-Torpilleurs. For the next 12 minutes Strasbourg and the Scharnhorsts exchanged fire without effect except for some slight damage to Strasbourg that did not affect her speed.

The Contre-Torpilleurs were restrained to 31 knots by Lynx and Tigre. These Chacal class ships were a bit long in the tooth and had lost some of the speed they had been built with. But at 32 knots it was going to take the Kriegsmarine cruisers some time to catch up given the head start by the Contre-Torpilleurs. The French cruisers at 31 knots were not going to catch up either unless the Contre-Torpilleurs slowed down. Something RAdm Lacroix had no intention of doing.

At 1230 hours Strasbourg was finally finding the range and hit Scharnhorst twice, knocking out 2 of her starboard secondaries. German return fire was ineffective. Gensoul had reduced speed to match the Germans rather than pull ahead of them too much. Gensoul radioed the Contre-Torpilleurs and his cruisers and ordered them to close with the German cruisers once they had left the German BCs far enough behind to prevent their interference. He realized this would take some time and he resolved to keep the German BCs busy with Strasbourg while his light forces got into position.

Gensoul had not forgotten his destroyers, but he did not see them having the numbers, speed and fire power needed to take the German destroyers on by themselves. He wanted to keep them intact until his CTs and cruisers had had a chance to take the German cruisers out.

By 1330 hours Strasbourg had hit Scharnhorst once more while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had hit Strasbourg 9 times in return. Strasbourg’s hit had caused some damage. But at 12 knots who could tell what it had done. Strasbourg’s searchlight platform continued to be hit and she lost her forward starboard side secondary and her starboard quad secondary; as well as two hits that bounced off her fore turret. Her bridge suffered 2 hits that failed to penetrate, but her gun director was not so lucky and that probably explains her abysmal shooting.

At 1336 hours RAdm Lacroix figured that he was far enough ahead of the BCs and turned 45 degrees to starboard with the Chacals leading and making smoke. RAdms Marquis and Bourraque followed suit, including the smoke.

At first only the fore turrets of Admiral Hipper could be brought to bear and shooting at 18,000 yards at a DD (a large DD, but still a DD) resulted in no joy for the first salvo. Schmundt changed course 45 degrees to starboard also. The French turned 45 more degrees to starboard in response and were now heading 90 degrees.

Schmundt continued on a course of 45 degrees to preserve his gunnery and opened up on Lynx with everything that could bear. The range was coming down and Lynx was engaging both Admiral Hipper and Koln to keep them under fire. Admiral Hipper and Koln between them hit Lynx thrice at 15,000 yards. Karlsruhe and Konigsberg were farther away and not hitting yet. Lynx suffered damage to her hull, including a bulkhead and her fire control. Lynx slowed to 25 knots and the Mogadores and La Fantasque class DDs surged around her rapidly accelerating to 38 knots. Lynx repaired her damaged bulkhead.

The range was down to 12,000 yards and Schmundt’s ships had changed to firing at Mogadore. German gunnery at this point went straight to bad and all 4 cruisers missed (that was a lot of 4-9 results with 16 D12 with a few 11 & 12 by the ships still beyond 12,000 yards). Mogadore fired at Koln and hit her twice knocking out her fore and second 5.9” turrets. Lynx was now firing at Admiral Hipper and Konigsberg to keep them busy. Schmundt upon learning of Koln’s problems was heard to say; “That really is a super destroyer”.

The range was now down to 9,000 yards or less when the French cruisers who had been making smoke also stopped and steamed out into clear. Schmundt hurriedly ordered a change of targets for his cruisers to the new threat.

Marseillaise and her division (Jean de Vienne & La Galissoniere) all targeted Hipper while the 4^th CruSqdn engaged opposite numbers against the German light cruisers. At the same time the CTs turned another 30 degrees to starboard and were threatening to cross Schmundt’s Tee while closing the range quickly.

Marseillaise hit Hipper twice while her sister ships missed. Hipper lost all her post side TT. Georges Leygues hit Koln once damaging her hull. Gloire hit Konigsberg once, knocking out her port secondary. Montcalm hit Karlsruhe once damaging her hull. Mogadore hit Koln thrice, knocking out her catapult and her aft turret. Lynx hit Koinigsberg once, further damaging her hull.

Hipper hit Marseillaise 5 times, Knocking out her catapult, her fore turret and hull. Marseillaise also took 2 hits in her engines and went DIW. Koln missed Jean de Vienne. Konigsberg hit La Galissoniere thrice, knocking out her fore turret, damaging her hull and a bulkhead. Karlsruhe missed George Leygues.

Marseillaise failed to repair her engines and her petrol stores now caught fie causing further damage. La Galissoniere failed to repair her bulkhead and took further damage. Koln also failed to repair and her petrol stores for her FP caught fire causing further damage. But Koln was still in the fight (she rolled a 1 for morale).

Schmundt belated realized he was too close to the Contre-Torpilleurs and tried to reverse course together. The French cruisers and Contre-Toprilleurs had now stopped making smoke and they all opened up on the Germans. Mogadore and Volta got end on fire against Hipper inside 6,000 yards. Between them they hit Hipper 4 times, knocking out her aft turrets, a hit to a magazine damaged a third turret and she took a hit in her engines slowing her to 21 knots. The 5 Fantasques all fired at Hipper and hit her 5 times, knocking out her aft starboard side TT, her remaining turret, damaging a bulkhead and her engines again making her DIW.

Lynx and Tigre hit Koln once to no effect. Jean de Vienne and La Galissoniere hit Hipper 8 times, damaging both her catapults, knocking out a starboard secondary, stirring the rubble of a turret, damaging her hull twice and hitting her twice more in her engines. Gerorges Leygues hit Koln once, taking out another secondary. Glorie hit Konigsberg once, knocking out her fore turret. Montcalm hit Karlsruhe once, knocking out anther turret.

Hipper shifted targets to Jean de Vienne and missed all together. Koln’s secondaries were ineffective. But Konigsberg rapidly firing hit La Galissoniere 5 more times, Damaging her second catapult twice, her starboard fore secondary, her hull and another bulkhead. Karlsruhe firing rapidly hit Georges Leygues once in the bridge. Schmundt kept his head (he rolled a 6 for morale) and by now was desperately trying to disengage.

Marseillaise fixed one engine and got under way, but her fires caused more damage. La Galissoniere failed to repair a bulkhead as well as her fires and took quite a bit more damage to her hull. Koln put out her fire. Hipper failed to repair and took quite a bit more damage.

The German cruisers that were not DIW all made smoke and tried to retire at their best individual speed. But none of them could exceed 32 knots when in good shape and the Contre-Torpilleurs were rapidly over taking them at 38 knots. The good news for the Germans was that the French 4th CruSqdn was compelled to steam straight because of the bridge hit to the Georges Leygues. But Jean de Vienne turned to pursue the Germans as did Tigre.

Over the next 18 minutes the Mogadores and 5 La Fantasques overtook and sank all the German light cruisers (The Germans were rapid firing and could not roll a 1,2,3,10,11 or 12 to save their lives) . The Contre-Torpilleurs seemed to have a knack for knocking out 5.9” turrets. The Germans eventually started failing morale, but they were over 10 knots slower by then and that did not save them. Lynx took her revenge on Hipper by steaming up to her and putting a torpedo in her at point blank range which with her bulkhead and other hull damage was more than enough to sink her.

By this point the German BCs were starting to poke over the horizon and the Contre-Torpilleurs turned away under smoke. La Galissoniere failed to repair the second bulkhead and she sank. Marseillaise eventually made her repairs but was too damaged to reengage and limped back to Brest. The French cruisers were now reduced to 4 and some of them had some damage.

 Lutjens by this point realized that his cruisers were gone and that there was a substantial French force of cruisers and destroyers between him and Narvik. He was also concerned about the French destroyers trailing this whole mess.

But what of his duel with Strasbourg? Strasbourg had hit Scharnhorst 4 more times during last hour. And Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had collectively hit Strasbourg 17 times in return. Scharnhorst had lost 2 more secondaries and some hull damage. Strasbourg had also suffered some hull damage, but the bulk of the hits were on her turrets, and they failed to penetrate. So, stalemate so far. Gensoul was thinking about making torpedo attacks from the front and the rear as close together as he could make it happen. The trouble was that he was running out of daylight.

Lutjens was also praying for dark. Lutjens was in a quandary. He was not sure how strong the French force in front of him was, but he figured it was stronger than his 8 destroyers. He had counted on his cruisers to clear the way and that was not going to happen now. He was well aware that there were 6 more French destroyers behind him and he was at a loss on how to deal with both threats at the same time. And he was still faced off with the Strasbourg and her consort.

Lutjens belatedly rolled morale for the loss of his cruiser division and rolled a 12 solving his dilemma; he would retire breaking his here to perfect record of always obeying his orders.

One reason the M10 had worse gun stats, is that the Sherman had a power traverse turret, the M10 was hand cranked, very tiring for the crew...

Regards, Phil

It is a gloomy morning in January 1915 and once again a German force consisting of the battlecruisers Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger, and Blucher have succeeded in bombarding a port city on the British East coast.  With several groups of British ships looking to intercept their escape run back across the North Sea, heavy weather has resulted in reduced visibility of only 12,000 yards. It looks like the Germans are going to escape but then their luck runs out when they are suddenly confronted by a formation of British ships emerging from the gloom, and already at close renege!   They have managed to bump into a squadron of eight obsolete British pre-dreadnought battleships of the King Edward VII class. These ships are affectionately known in the Royal Navy as the "Wobbly Eight."  

The Wobbly Eight don't have much of a chance but their 12 inch guns are enough to inflict serious damage on the German battlecruisers. The Germans are in a battle column while the British are in a long line abreast to facilitate their search for the Germans.  The German ships turn North in an effort to maneuver around the British ships.  This almost succeeds, but it does take them a bit closer to a strong force of British battlecruisers who are nearby and closing rapidly from the North.   Both sides open fire at around 10,000 yards.  The Germans guns score hits on the Wobbly Eight, who also manage to get a couple of good hits on the Germans.  

The German turn to the North takes them very close to the British Division consisting of King Edward VII, Hibernia Hindustan, and Zealandia.  Three of these British ships eventually succumbed to the German fire, but the British ships, who had been concentrating their fire on the Blucher, managed to cause enough damage to slow her to only 11 knots.  

The German attempt to get around the Wobbly Eight by side stepping to the North is blocked by the squadron of four British armored cruisers consisting of the Hampshire, Argyll, Devonshire, and Roxburgh.  This event, plus the sudden arrival of the British battlecruiser force from the Northwest, forces the Germans to turn Southeast, putting them in close range of the second squadron of British pre-dreadnoughts consisting of the Africa, Britannia, Commonwealth, and Dominion.   In this exchange, the Dominion was lost but Seydlitz took enough damage to slow her to only 18 knots.   

The game was wrapped up at this point.  The Germans would of course claim victory when they returned to port, pointing out that they had sunk four British "battleships" even though the loss of those ships would have no real impact on the further conduct of the war.  On the other hand the German battlecruisers Seydlitz and Blucher, had been roughly handled and they slowed to the point where it was unlikely that they would make it home.  This would of course discourage any further German attempts to send the battlecruiser squadron to bombard the English coast.  So, in the end, the Wobbly Eight succeeded in accomplishing what they needed to do.  

Thanks for the kind words, Kenny.

I probably should have described my basing approach in the post above, to give readers an extra clue as to how to decode what they are looking at.  Better late than never, so if you are still scratching your noggin' about the captions to some of the pics (particularly the dismounts), here is now I base my forces.

I base on US Pennies (1 cent coins).  These are about 19mm in diameter. They are cheap and plentiful (I can get 100 for $1, and I can always fish between the cushions of the couch for a few extras if I run out while trying to finish a unit).

It is important to understand that each stand is not necessarily modeled to show the exact number and composition of the troops on that stand. Rather, they are just representative. 

Here is how they are organized and what they represent:

- I put 4 figures on a stand to represent a "standard" rifle squad.  If all the squads in the unit are the same, then the actual models don't really matter except for the look of it.

- I put 3 figures on a stand to represent a "special purpose" squad.  Here the figures might matter in identifying what kind of squad it is.  If you look at the HQ platoon pic, you'll see three different 3-man stands. One is the HQ squad, as can be observed by the RTO and the figure with binoculars.  The other 2 are squad-sized groups, each with a rifleman figure and two figures carrying ammo boxes, representing the maintenance and supply sections (who would be armed with M1 carbines).  You will also see that the 81mm mortar stands and AT guns have 3 crew figures, as these were 8 - 10 man crews (full squad sized), but were not standard rifle squads.

- I put 2 figures on a stand to represent a support team / half-squad. For the platoon's MG squad you will see 3 MG stands (2 x .30cals, 1 x .50cal) that have 2 figures.  These represent smaller 3-5 man MG gun crews.  In the HQ platoon you will also see a few 2-figure stands. These are the XO with an RTO, and 2 vehicle crews (jeeps, trucks, whatever).  Several vehicles which might not have a squad of men might need to have their crews represented.  The medic is based singly, just to make him a bit more obvious to my eye at game time.

My platoon leaders are with the rifle squads of the 1st Halftrack of each platoon.  So there are no separate platoon CO stands.  I identify HQ elements by placing dots on the back rim of the penny used as a stand. 

- 3 dots = platoon CO

- 2 dots = company CO (or 2IC)

- 1 dot = battalion / battlegroup CO.

The dots are generally done with a darker shade of similar tone to the dominant colors on the stand -- so with grass flocked stands this is usually a darker green.  It is very low visibility on the table to anyone but me, but from my position behind my force (it's on the back of the stand, facing me), and with me knowing that it means, it is quit easy for me to scan my force and see my command units.

Often I model or paint my command vehicles a little differently as well. In this particular formation I have used the HMG pulpit of the M3A1 halftrack to denote the commanders' vehicles, with the rest of the vehicles just getting the pedestal mounted MG of the M3 halftrack. Again, quite easy for me to find, but perhaps not entirely obvious to an opponent.

That might help y'all understand the pics a bit better. Or maybe it's just me yammering on for no gain. But if you are interested in at least one guy's approach, there you have it.

Good luck and good gaming.

-Mark

(aka: Mk 1)

Finally!  I am getting ready to run a solo game of Mein Panzer.  This will be an ongoing tutorial of sorts whereby I point out the rules as I use them and provide plenty of pictures showing the game in progress. I have set-up the terrain and have selected the forces I will use for this game.

This scenario, which is not strictly historical, takes place on the Russian Front in August 1943 when the Soviets are going on the general offensive after Kursk.  A breakthrough has occurred and the Russians are racing to seize 2 bridges over a minor river.  The Germans have put together a company of tanks to stop them.  This will be a meeting engagement and feature use of the advanced rules for tanks and command but no infantry, artillery, or anti-tank guns will be used for this scenario.

Here are a few pictures of my layout using GHQ Terrain Maker.  The game is being played in 1/285th scale aka 6mm.

The pictures show the table covered with flannel to keep the terrain tiles from sliding around during play, a view from the German side, a view from the Russian side, and the two bridges.  The total layout is 4' x 2'8".