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#221 healey36

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Posted 10 November 2022 - 04:53 PM

A quick update; tentative dates (January 19-22, 2023) are set for a play of North Sea operations loosely based on the period December 10-14, 1917. Quite a bit of research has gone into it so far with a bit more required. This, together with the ever-expanding contents of the fleet cabinets, should yield an interesting OOB. There's still quite a bit of operational rules haggling going on amongst the back-benchers, but I think we'll have something 90% workable in time. I'm sure there will be gaps, but we'll deal with those as they emerge/erupt. Its ultimate form will largely depend on how many suckers, err players, we can get rounded up for the effort.

 

I've already warned the wife she should probably plan to stay at her sister's that weekend.


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#222 healey36

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Posted 24 December 2022 - 01:01 PM

52584066928_a7d634597e.jpg


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#223 Peter M. Skaar

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Posted 29 December 2022 - 05:22 PM

Hi Healey

I hope you and everyone else here had a Merry Christmas.  Here's to a Happy 2023 to you all!


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#224 healey36

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Posted 21 January 2023 - 07:53 AM

The gathering for the Dec, 1917 campaign game has been temporarily delayed; one of the group has pulled up with Covid and another had his knee-replacement surgery moved up to last week. This geriatric life-style is killing me, metaphorically, lol. Gimpy will have to sit it out; we’re rescheduling for the end of the month. Gives me time to rework a few models and the OOB.



#225 simanton

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Posted 21 January 2023 - 03:41 PM

I hope things smooth out soon!



#226 healey36

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Posted 23 January 2023 - 10:05 AM

No worries as the additional prep-time will be well spent. Top of the list is working with the controller on time management, i. e. keeping the operational map goings-ons synchronized with tactical dust-ups. I think we agreed to use hourly increments for the operational phase, so up to ten tactical phases of six minutes each can occur during one operational “turn”.

We also need to come up with a way to reflect tactical movement. A running battle at high speed, say twenty knots, could easily equate to movement to an adjacent hex on the operational map.
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#227 healey36

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Posted 27 January 2023 - 07:18 PM

Zeppelin L 42 heads out on patrol after a brief layover at Nordholz:

 

LZ 42
 
She and L 48 (Tondern) are assigned in our OOB to patrol the upper reaches of the North Sea in support of Scheer's planned operations during December 1917.
 
L 42 actually survived the war with an exemplary record, only to be scuttled by her crew in June 1919.

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#228 simanton

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Posted 27 January 2023 - 11:21 PM

Nice!  Where did you get the model?



#229 healey36

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Posted 28 January 2023 - 08:30 AM

Thanks. It’s a 3D print I found on Shapeways, Masters of Military being the designer. I posted a description of how I painted and based it over on the “On the Workbench” thread. I went ahead and finished it thinking I might need one for the table. The markings are a bit garish (and inaccurate, I think); a bit of a dry-brush might tone them down a bit.

We’ve had the twin-motored MetLife blimp layover at our local airport on occasion when it’s in the area for a big sporting event (Preakness Stakes, Army-Navy, etc.). It’s flown over the house a few times at 750-1000 feet, and it’s pretty loud. I can only imagine how loud one of the five-motored Zeppelins must have been at low altitude.
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#230 simanton

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Posted 28 January 2023 - 10:13 PM

Thanks for the info!



#231 Peter M. Skaar

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Posted 30 January 2023 - 03:20 PM

Very nice Zeppelin, Healy! 


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#232 healey36

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Posted 01 February 2023 - 12:43 PM

Thanks, Peter. 1/2400 Zeppelin models are tough to find!   :D


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#233 healey36

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Posted 22 February 2023 - 11:47 AM

I think we finally have a quorum lined up to get the December 1917 play underway. This weekend (Feb. 25), we will try to get at least the first day in the books (a day when there is unlikely to be much in the way of surface clashes). Depending on how that goes, we'll likely reconvene on Mar. 2 and try to complete it in four days. Should be do-able (although the wife's birthday falls on that weekend, so I could see it coming to an abrupt end  :lol: ).

 

For each of these events, I usually try to put together some sort of introduction for the participants, and I include the text here (with apologies for its rather long-winded delivery):

 

 

North Sea

10-15 December 1917

 

“The victor has the privilege of writing the story of the war; for one mistrusts the vanquished, because he will try to palliate and excuse his defeats.”

 

So wrote Reinhard Scheer in the preface of his 1919 semi-autobiographical accounting, Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World War. It’s a fair statement, perhaps more true when the author is the last survivor of his peers. Without detractors, one can paint him or herself in a far better light. Scheer was neither, living only another eight years, outlived by Jellicoe, Beatty, and Hipper (amongst many others).

 

Jellicoe’s The Crisis of the Naval War was published in 1920. Compiled from his notes during the last year of the war and the months following, it is a detailed accounting of the Royal Navy’s struggle with the U-boats and commerce raiders, and is dedicated to the men of the war-time trade routes, both naval and civilian. As far as I know, he never personally wrote a book describing the planning and execution of the Grand Fleet’s major surface battles. This seems a great omission given the criticism he absorbed during and after the war, leaving a huge gap in any defense of his record.

 

To my knowledge, neither Beatty nor Hipper, successors of Jellicoe and Scheer as “admiral-of-the-fleet”, ever wrote books detailing their experiences or the conduct of the war. Had they been written, they certainly would have been interesting. As best I can tell, Scheer and Hipper maintained a good, or at least respectful relationship throughout the war; Jellicoe and Beatty perhaps less so, and for good reason. 

 

There’s no denying that Scheer left out a lot. He paints his role in the war as a noble fight, an effort to fulfil the Kaiser’s dream of throwing off the yolk of the Royal Navy and winning Germany a greater role in geopolitics. Perhaps, but it soon devolved into total war, an effort to inflict a stranglehold on a foe while simultaneously trying to break one, all set in an ugly tit-for-tat chronology. His omissions are staggering (unrestricted submarine warfare, mistreatment of survivors, the shelling of civilian targets, the bombing of cities by the Navy’s Zeppelin arm, etc., and finally the conditions, discontent, and mutinous behavior of his own sailors during the last months of the war and his brutality in attempting to repress it), yet he laments the destruction of the fleet following the war. That said, Scheer’s operational commentary often provides answers to the question “What the devil were you thinking?”, and he does so largely without making many excuses. As expected, it’s a bit of a mixed bag.

 

I tend to trust first-hand accounts far more than the seemingly endless regurgitation of history we see today based on “new” information. Historians defend the constant rewrites by telling you that there is so much more data available today, that the archives are falling open, and that much of it is online for your perusal/review. Make your own judgement they say, as they clearly do. I instead would defer to what the grand admiral has to say, or what the guy on the bridge or in the map room was thinking/doing, not necessarily the stuff written/reinterpreted/reconstituted by folks intent on stirring controversy and selling books.

 

So, right or wrong, we looked back to Scheer and Jellicoe for details of just what was going on in the North Sea over the final months of the war. With their ever-opportunistic subordinates, the door for success or disaster remained open. Their accounts and their assessments became the basis for a series of looks at what was and what might have been.

 

 

Autumn 1917

 

By November 1917, the third battle of Ypres had come to a miserable end. None of Haig’s planned objectives had been achieved and another 250,000 dead and wounded lay on the field or had crawled back to their lines. The field itself was a horror, a sodden morass where a man could drown in liquefied soil if he stepped off the narrow planks that served as footpaths. The impetus to keep going must have seemed unfathomable, but the guns, for now, had largely fallen silent.

 

In the east, the war with Russia was drawing to a close, and within months the German General Staff would begin planning and carrying out the great rotation of troops from east to west, hopeful to land a knockout blow before the weight of newly arriving Americans might arguably tip the balance. Despite the heretofore lack of progress on the field, new techniques and methods were being developed. The shock effect of the tank, the rolling-barrage, and troops specifically trained to exploit them via incremental breakthroughs gave the generals hope. The desperate 1918 spring offensive known as Kaiserschlacht would begin in March with great expectations.

 

The war at sea had taken a decided turn in April 1917 with the adoption of convoy tactics. Soon the days of U-boats randomly running down individual merchant ships would subside, replaced by a system comprised of large groups of ships protected by a surrounding force of naval escorts, each capable of a lethal challenge to a submarine’s attack. The result was a gradual decline in the number of merchants lost while the number of submarines destroyed grew exponentially. While the dire supply situation in Britain was not immediately relieved, certainly more ships and supplies were reaching their destination.

 

On the other side, the chokehold applied on German ports by the Royal Navy went on unabated, and the effect was becoming acute for the army and general public. A lot of goods and materials were becoming scarce, not to mention some foodstuffs. Imports of supplies from Africa and South America had largely stopped, as had all materials imported from the newly belligerent U. S. While Scheer and Hipper still held out hopes for another grand surface fleet confrontation, the likelihood of breaking the blockade was increasingly a longshot, certainly many weeks, if not months out. The situation heaped even more pressure on the army and its roll-of-the-dice Kaiserschlacht offensive.

 

The Norwegians were suffering similarly; much like the Germans and to some extent the British, their supply situation had grown to epic proportions. The British, out of fear that the Norwegian government might fall, developed plans for a convoy route supplying English and Welsh coal to Norway’s fuel markets. Small convoys would assemble at Lerwick for the two or three day run to Bergen and other ports, then return. These convoys would primarily consist of Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish merchants, all protected by Royal Navy escorts.

 

In response, Scheer now firmly adopted the position that if neutral merchant ships sailed in convoys under the protection of British warships, they would be regarded as enemy combatants. The conduct of commerce interdiction and the convoys would generally be altered. Operations in the North Sea, both on the Scandinavian routes and those along Britain’s east coast, would similarly be subject to such interdiction.

 

With an eye toward turning up the pressure, Scheer advised Hipper to make light surface units available for attacking the convoy routes in the North Sea. “Interruption of this traffic was intended to heighten the effect of the U-boat campaign,” he wrote, “by placing him (Beatty) under the necessity of affording better protection to the neutral shipping placed at his service.” Providing escorts for the convoys was largely a zero-sum game at this point; in order to boost the number of escorts on one route would entail stripping them from another. From a resource perspective, Beatty’s hands were largely tied.

 

The first effort in this direction was the dispatch of the light cruisers Brummer and Bremse in mid-October 1917 for the purpose of attacking the Lerwick-Bergen route (previously played in the Action off Lerwick scenario). Historically all but two of the merchants were sunk, along with both escorting destroyers (Mary Rose and Strongbow). A great success, Scheer began laying plans for the next.

 

Concurrent with this effort was the never ceasing work of the minelayers and minesweepers. Both navies continuously worked parts of the North Sea, the eastern end of the English Channel and Dover Straits, the Skagerrak, and the Baltic approaches. These efforts were frequently subjected to intervention/disruption by surface units, and in November 1917, the Second Battle of Heligoland developed out of such an operation. It proved another example of a confrontation offering a chance for a clash of heavy units, yet little developed from it.

 

Scheer now made plans for his next convoy attack, this time using lighter, faster units in the form of Torpedo Boat Flotilla II, comprised of the 3rd and 4th Half-Flotillas. These large destroyers, together with the light cruiser Emden, set off from their base on 11 December, reaching Dogger Bank late that afternoon. There the force separated, 3rd Half-Flotilla heading north to attack the Lerwick-Bergen route, while 4th Half-Flotilla would turn north-northwest to attack coastal shipping along the eastern English coast’s “war channel”. Emden would remain on station off Dogger Bank, awaiting the return of the destroyers.

 

 

The Operational Scenario (A Big Picture Approach)

 

Playing Scheer’s second raid as the historical scenario of four destroyers falling upon a small, weakly defended convoy (the second half-flotilla not having had much success in its search and attack) was not likely to offer up much in the way of fun or learning anything, and I’ll be honest, we play FAI largely to teach or learn something. As we’ve all agreed in the past, the “game” aspect is typically a secondary consideration.

 

In light of this, the scope has been expanded to cover the entire North Sea theatre. Players were sent copies of the proposed rules along with screen-shots of the map; please give them a brief review prior to convening. Separate mails with the opening OOBs and initial intelligence reports will be sent to the fleet admirals; share those as appropriate.

 

There has been some additional work on map-play. Thumbing through some twenty sets of rules yielded much. Sartore’s Seekrieg, Dunnigan’s Jutland, Bond’s Harpoon, and Carter’s Naval Wargames offered some good ideas on developing an operational map and regulating/controlling movement. Carter also provided some ideas on how to set and manage supply stores at various ports/bases (though not needed for this 5-6 day scenario). Featherstone's Naval War Games, while always a good read, offered little. ODGW’s North Sea Campaign and Defending the Malay Barrier provided two different approaches to developing and playing a campaign incrementally. Using all of these and a few others as inspiration, we believe we have constructing the first leg of a relatively simple scenario of incremental operations that includes considerable variability, centered on the North Sea situation during the fall and winter of 1917/1918 (a sort of last gasp of the High Sea Fleet). The goal was to develop broad, largely unscripted increments that play out over no more than a scale week, the first centered on Scheer’s destroyer operation.

 

At the top-end, this is a double-blind system with a controller (tracks all fleet movement, submarines, weather, and special events, while providing intel and reports as appropriate) working with an umpire (oversees map-to-table and table-to-map interface, tactical rules questions, dispute resolution, and other ad hoc remedies). All table play is governed by FAI, as overseen by the umpire.

 

This is intended to be an eight-player game excluding the controller and an umpire, but we will almost certainly have fewer participants. We’ll address that when we convene. Also, someone raised the fear of never finishing as the game will consist of 1440 tactical “turns”; however, remember that broad swaths of the game will be map-only, so “turns” will be lopped off hourly in increments of ten. We anticipate that map-only “turns” will move quickly.

 

The game’s outcome will likely hinge on executing successful searches, but weather and luck will play havoc in finding that success. Nothing should be taken for granted.

 

Good luck!



#234 healey36

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Posted 04 March 2023 - 05:22 PM

North Sea - December 1917 AAR

 

General Situation

 

HSF

 

Scheer’s initial planning for December operations had his destroyer actions set for mid-month; however, weather projections had the top-half of the North Sea enjoying moderate conditions during the first two weeks (seasonally unusual), so the calendar was advanced one week. Briefings were prepared by the staff on 7 December, reviewed on the morning of 8 December, with ship departures set for early morning 10 December.

 

Lerwick-Bergen convoy departures and arrivals were nearly a daily occurrence, but there was specific intel regarding upcoming activity for 10-11 December. Agents reported convoys scheduled to depart Lerwick bound for Immingham (eight ships, escort unknown) and Newcastle (five ships, escort unknown) on 10 December, 0400 and 1400 respectively, and a Lerwick-Bergen run (seven ships, escort unknown) set to sail at 0200 on 11 December. Such reports were found to be generally accurate, with occasional minor variances as to composition and time of departure.

 

There were two Zeppelins at sea on the morning of 10 December. L42 was operating in its patrol area, approximately 100 nautical miles southwest of Egersund, Norway, reporting no activity other than the normal trawler/drifter operations working shoals of herring. L52, which had been set for a patrol position some 70 miles east of the Humber Estuary, was returning to its base at Ahlhorn after experiencing mechanical failure on engine nos. 1 and 4. Its current position was reported as 80 nautical miles due north of Borkum, which would put it back over land within a few hours.

 

The only confirmed sighting of enemy activity was that of a picket, the armed trawler Fritz Reuter, of Group S, North Sea Outpost Flotilla, reporting minelaying activity 35 nautical miles southeast of Spangereid, Norway.

 

There were numerous U-boats operating in or passing through the North Sea at 10 December. Three (U-52, U-63, and UB-21) were specifically designated in support of these operations, and all were in their designated patrol areas on the morning of 10 December.

 

Torpedo Boat Flotilla II slipped the Jade at 0100 on 10 December. TB II was comprised of eight destroyers in two Half Flotillas (3rd and 4th), headed by the light cruiser Emden. Overall command (albeit nominal) was assigned to Korvettenkapitän Oskar Heinecke. Half Flotilla 3 is commanded by KKpt Hans Kolbe, with Half Flotilla 4 under the command of KKpt Paul Heinrich.

 

Detachments from Scouting Groups I and II are designated for support of these operations.

 

RN

 

CinC Grand Fleet Beatty was finding the task at hand rather miserable. Largely gone were his grand notions of coming to grips with the heavy elements of Hipper’s fleet; all of that was now supplanted by the mundane, ongoing task of keeping Britain’s world-wide trade routes open and protected. The seas were vast, the routes long, and every day saw a steady drumbeat of losses.

 

With the implementation of the convoy system, he could, however, demonstrate some considerable success. Since April 1917, the number of ships sunk each month had fallen by more than half, with only 174 having been sunk or damaged in November (down from 435 in June). Yet it was still too many, and the losses seen by the merchant fleet and the escorts themselves continued to exceed new construction.

 

The Scandinavian convoys were a new burden in his very front garden, and finding and maintaining a viable force of escorts for their protection was proving difficult. Confronting the U-boat threat was one thing, but the problem was now compounded by German successes using surface raiders as recently as October. The convoys, together with supporting the ongoing minelaying and minesweeping efforts, were stretching the destroyer and light cruiser forces to the breaking point. Beatty and the staff were forced to rely increasingly on lighter forces such as naval trawlers and the oldest classes of destroyers (B through E classes). It was ugly, but there were few alternatives.

 

An additional problem was the sudden dearth of reliable information flowing from Room 40. German signal jamming was becoming increasingly effective, resulting in a sharp decrease in intelligible traffic and the amount of detailed information available to the staff. Without that, the guesswork increased exponentially.

 

As the first week of December drew to a close, the pressure mounted. On 8 December 1917, the British steamer Maindy Bridge was torpedoed and sunk just four miles northeast of Sunderland, well within view of the English coast. Debris (and at least one body) washed ashore for days, and the British public and press wondered “Where is our navy?” The Admiralty was displeased.

 

Two days later, the next round of convoys prepared to depart Lerwick for ports on England’s east coast, followed on the 11th by the next coal run to Bergen. All told, eighteen merchant ships (four in ballast) with ten lightly-armed escorts. Covering forces were cobbled together from parts of 2nd Cruiser and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons

 

At 0154 on 10 December, Captain Edwin Edwards, commander of the newly-converted light cruiser HMS Boudicea, received word that the last of the sixty mines they’d carried on this first mission was in the water. Another ninety minutes went by before the gear was stowed. With a sense of relief, Edwards ordered Boudicea around for home. It had been quiet; he hoped it would stay that way.

 

NS AAR 5
The controller's map at Midnight, 10 December.

 

 

10 December 1917 (Day 1)

 

SMS Emden and her Torpedo Boat Flotilla II charges (FLOT 100) pushed out into the channel at 0112, passing the western end of Wangerooge, then safely through the mine-belt and into open sea forty minutes later. Proceeding at 20kts, Half-Flotilla 3 formed the van, line-ahead, while Half-Flotilla 4 followed Emden line-astern. Barring any issues, they should reach the northern end of Dogger Bank by 0600. The only communications they receive are revised meteorological reports advising isolated storms north of Lerwick.

 

Five hundred miles north of Emden, Convoy 1 departs Lerwick at 0400, bound for the coal docks at Immingham. Ten miles southeast of the harbor, the six colliers and bulk-carriers are joined by escorts HMS Ouse and HMS Garry. Turning due south, the two old River-class destroyers take up positions off the port and starboard bows of the lead merchantmen, now arranged in two columns of three ships each. They are due in Immingham by 0800 the next day.

 

As planned, Emden reaches the northern edge of Dogger Bank at 0606. There the half-flotillas detach, with 3 heading due north at 25kts for the Lerwick-Bergen route, and 4 turning northwest at 26kts toward Sunderland and the RN’s “war channel”. Emden remains behind to patrol the area for British minesweepers.

 

The German destroyers continue north and northwest towards their planned patrol positions. At 1112, some two hours after sunrise, KKpt Paul Heinrich, commander of Half-Flotilla 4, receives a report from U-63 that a southbound convoy has been spotted 65nm southeast of the Shetlands making 11kts. There are no details as to the number of ships or, more importantly, the size and composition of the escort. Heinrich directs KptLt Victor Hahndorf, commander of B 109, to change his course to a new north-northwest heading, maintaining his speed at 26kts.

 

For the next two hours, U-63 tracks the convoy from a distance, relaying course and speed data. Heinrich tweaks his course and plans for interception a number of times. He receives one more report from U-63 at 1342, then contact is lost by the U-boat in a snow-squall. Heinrich tells Hahndorf they will maintain their current heading until they reach a position 25 miles off the coast, then turn north to search for the convoy’s position.

 

Earlier, around Noon, Half-Flotilla 3 was spotted by a Scottish drifter which, despite German efforts to jam the signals, successfully radioed the sighting. KKpt Hans Kolbe, commander of Half-Flotilla 3, pressed on with no change to speed or heading. Still 170nm south of their patrol position on the Lerwick-Bergen route, Kolbe would hope for the best.

 

At 1524, Heinrich receives a new report on the convoy’s position, now believed to be just 15-20 miles off his starboard bow. He orders Hahndorf to bring the column of destroyers around onto a due-north heading, raising speed slightly to 28kts. Twenty minutes later, a smudge of smoke appears on the horizon off his port bow. Raising his glasses, he orders Hahndorf to further adjust his heading by one degree.

 

Lieutenant-Commander Thomas Barton is in Ouse’s radio-room when the report of smoke ahead comes down. Reaching the bridge, he quickly orders the crew to action stations. He signals LC Edward Law, commander of Garry, of his intention to change the convoy’s course slightly, moving closer to the coastline in an effort to turn inside the approaching ship’s or ships’ course. It is a fateful decision, one which effectively seals the fate of his charges.

 

NS AAR 1
German destroyers under fire.

 

At 1612, the oncoming ships are identified as 3-4 destroyers approaching at high speed. Barton, not waiting for positive identification, presumes they are unfriendly and orders the convoy to disperse. Unfortunately, their position just miles off Rattray Head leaves little room for maneuver. A turn to port delivers them to the Germans, a turn to starboard will put them on the rocks. Every ship raises its speed to flank and barrels ahead. Ouse and Garry turn southeast to challenge the onrushing Heinrich.

 

Flank speed for Barton’s River-class DD is just 25kts, nearly ten knots slower than his adversary, four B 97-class. The disadvantage is compounded by their woeful poor armament, just a single 3-inch, a handful of six-pounders, and a pair of 18-inch torpedoes. Heinrich’s B 97 packed four 4.1-inch and six torpedo tubes. Barton ordered Ouse to commence firing on the lead destroyer, hopeful for a miracle.

 

Heinrich ordered an oblique turn to starboard, hoping to get his destroyers into a better firing position. B 109 opened on Ouse, quickly scoring two hull hits at the waterline as the Englishman’s 3-inch rounds sailed overhead. The damage report to Barton was bad, heavy flooding below deck, including the forward engine room. The next salvo was worse, disabling the 3-inch, a bulkhead hit aft, and one of two torpedo mounts destroyed. Ouse was done before she got started; water pouring into her badly-holed hull, Barton ordered his remaining crew on deck and over-the-side.

 

NS AAR 3
The Danish SS Nike heads for oblivion.

 

Garry rocketed past the Germans untouched, her QF 3-inch barking as she steamed by. She managed one hit on B 112, the last DD in Heinrich’s column, knocking out one of her torpedo mounts. At a combined speed of nearly 60kts, Garry was pretty far down-range before Law could get her around and headed back toward the colliers. He realized the situation was dismal, but hoped to wreak some damage before the day was over.

 

Heinrich, focused on the merchant ships ahead, momentarily looked back to see Ouse roll over on her side. His attention was reoriented when a shell splash erupted just a few yards off B 109’s bow. A Royal Navy crewed 3-inch on the stern of the small steamer Polwell had a bead on them. Undeterred, Hahndorf’s DD began reeling them in. With the range down to less than 3000 yards, B 109 managed a pair of hits, both bulkheads. Within twelve minutes, Polwell tipped up in the air and disappeared stern first.

 

NS AAR 2
Heinrich's flag, B 109, under fire.

 

Law’s Garry was heading back toward the line of German destroyers. At a range of some 6000 yards, Law launched both of his torpedoes in quick succession. The angle was bad, not to mention at least one merchantman was in the line of fire. Shortly thereafter, Garry took a bulkhead hit, her speed quickly falling to just seven knots before they could get the flooding under control.

 

With the sun rapidly sinking in the western sky, Heinrich ordered his DDs to separate and run down the remaining merchant ships. Next to go was the 1825 ton Swedish collier Peter Willemoes, dispatched by a single torpedo from B 110. The Norwegian Elfi and British Hunsgrove soon followed. Pounded by numerous shell hits, it took a torpedo from B 111 to finish the 3063 ton Hunsgrove. Nike, a Danish collier, was collectively shot to pieces by three of the destroyers, while the British Lornlon escaped southwestward along the coast.

 

NS AAR 4
British collier Hunsgrove passes the final resting place of Swedish steamer Peter Willemoes.

 

Scarcely two hours and the fight was over. The question for Heinrich was what to do next. Sticking around seemed a bad idea, as did going home. Relatively undamaged, he pulled the destroyers back into column and sailed off southeast into the darkness.

 

Newcastle-bound Convoy 2 had sailed from Lerwick at 1400 and was now approaching U-63’s patrol area. Comprised of six freighters and another pair of River-class DDs, they unknowingly slipped past the submarine without detection. By midnight, they’d left the U-boat behind and were now just eighty miles north of the scene of Convoy 1’s demise. Radios crackled with traffic from the ships sent out to search for survivors. Still, they pressed on in the darkness.

 

With darkness settling over the sea, Kolbe’s Half-Flotilla 3 continued its course north. By midnight, they were just 25 miles south of the Lerwick-Bergen route, approximately 100nm west of Bergen. Sea conditions remain moderate, with good visibility. The question would be whether to follow the route east or west. The intel reports at-hand had a convoy scheduled to leave Lerwick the next day, the 11th, so heading west seemed the most promising. He advised KptLt Rudolf Schulte, commander of his flag G 101, of his intentions. Turning northwest, he ordered a speed reduction to just 12kts, hopeful to conserve fuel.

 

For the destroyer captains, tomorrow is another day.

 

(Days 2-5, Dec. 11-15, to follow)


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#235 simanton

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Posted 04 March 2023 - 10:54 PM

Nice!



#236 healey36

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Posted 07 March 2023 - 05:05 PM

Nice!

Thanks. This thing is going to grind out over multiple weekends. I hope I can keep the group together and focused. Hopefully, having played one full day, things are familiar and will move quicker. I didn't think there'd be any actual engagements on Day 1, but what do I know? 


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#237 healey36

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Posted 18 March 2023 - 10:15 AM

North Sea - December 1917 AAR

 

11 December 1917 (Day 2)

 

The naval dispatches were fairly flying throughout the night of 10-11 December following the near wholesale slaughter of Convoy 1 off the northeast Scottish coast that afternoon. Beatty, feeling the collective heat from First Lord Geddes, in turn vented his frustration to Admiral Frederic Brock, Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands. So soon after the incident, neither Beatty or anyone on his staff acknowledged that at the time of the attack, the convoy had passed beyond Brock’s immediate operating area.

 

Day 2 Aa
The controller's map at Midnight, 11 December 1917.

 

It’s interesting to note the level of turmoil and personal angst at the upper reaches of the Royal Navy in the autumn of 1917. There was, of course, a huge vacuum of leadership between Beatty, Commander of the Fleet, and First Lord of the Admiralty Geddes, primarily in the form of First Sea Lord Jellicoe, a man who had adopted a largely defeatist mentality when it came to the war against the U-boats. He had remained skeptical of the effectiveness of the convoy system and, for nearly a year, responded to the many calls for action by saying there was little that, in his opinion, could be done to mitigate the submarine threat. The effect of this was a near total loss of confidence in him by Geddes, PM Lloyd George, and even CIGS Robertson, ultimately resulting in his sacking on Christmas Eve, 1917.

 

Brock had called for the Scandinavian convoys to be reorganized into larger, less-frequent sailings with larger escort assignments, something that flew in the face of Beatty’s inability to provide more destroyers. This, combined with his gruff, antagonistic demeanor, won him few friends or allies in his efforts to garner additional resources, and he was largely left to make do with what little he was provided.

 

Beatty, however, was no idiot. Jellicoe might have a firm grip on the lightning rod, but Beatty knew he was standing close by. He had no destroyers to spare, but was keenly aware more needed to be done to curb the carnage in the North Sea. In the early hours of the 11th, he advised Brock that he was making the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, and the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron available to provide limited cover/support for Brock’s convoy operations.

 

To that end, Captain Louis Woolcombe (Acting Commander of 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron) was to execute a sweep across the North Sea on a line some 100 miles south of the convoy route. Three light cruisers (Chatham, Yarmouth, and Birkenhead) and three destroyers (Pelican, Paladin, and Nereus) would comprise Woolcombe’s Force F. Barring any encounters with the HSF, it was a 60-hour out-and-back; a message was sent to Brock reporting that Force F could depart Scapa in a matter of a few hours.

 

Rear-Admiral Reginald Tupper had only just arrived three days earlier to take command of 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Lerwick. Tupper, having come over from 10th Cruiser Squadron, had dreamt of landing the plum assignment of 4th Battle Squadron. Instead, he’d been passed over for Browning and was transferred to Lerwick. He arrived to find his command consisted of two Minotaur-class armored cruisers and three armed merchant cruisers, one of which, HMS Alsatian, had inexplicably been designated by his predecessor as the squadron’s flag. Tupper wasted no time transferring his flag to HMS Shannon, and when word came down to prepare, he advised Brock that Shannon and Minotaur could put to sea within hours. The two cruisers, together with destroyers Sable, Sorceress, Sturgeon, and Satyr were designated Force E and ordered to sweep the sea lane ahead of Convoy 3. A minor problem with a pair of Minotaur’s Yarrow boilers delayed their departure, however, and Force E would in fact sail three hours after the convoy.

 

Rear-Admiral Arthur Leveson received word that his 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron was to raise steam and stand by to support Brock’s operations as required. The directive Leveson received seemed to leave much of the operation’s execution to his discretion, and in view of his concurrent charge as Rear-Admiral Commanding the Australian Fleet, Leveson elected to only partially activate the squadron, sending Inflexible and Indomitable while leaving Australia and New Zealand at Scapa. Force W would be comprised of the Grand Fleet’s two oldest battlecruisers, with destroyers Mansfield, Menace, and Mischief to serve as the van.

 

Convoy 3 was set for its Lerwick-to-Bergen run at first light on the 11th. Four colliers and a pair of bulk-carriers (Bollsta, Kong Magnus, Bothnia, Torleif, Maracaibo, and Cordova) were scheduled to pass out of the harbor at 0830. Due to the propensity for U-boat mining operations outside the harbor, they were led by a pair of minesweepers for the first fifteen miles; there they met their escort and were reconfigured into two columns of three ships. Destroyers Partridge and Pellew took up positions on the starboard and port bows respectively, while RN trawlers Livingstone, Commander Fullerton, Lord Alverstone, and Tokio took up positions beside and behind. Plodding along at 11kts, the convoy was scheduled to reach Bergen by midmorning the next day.

 

52755653858_003fbbc781_o.jpg

Convoy 3 as it departs Lerwick.

 

With radio-silence maintained by Heinrich and his destroyers, the Germans’ success the day before was unknown to Scheer and Hipper. By 0100 on the 11th, Heinrich’s half-flotilla was nearly 160 miles out, due east of the Firth of Forth, planning their next move. If undetected and unchallenged, Heinrich decided he would venture back into the shipping lanes somewhere along the Northumberland coast north of Newcastle.

 

Kolbe had the intelligence report in-hand indicating that a convoy was scheduled to depart Lerwick that morning. Speed could be estimated, but the exact time of sailing was unknown. His position at Midnight was approximately 150 miles out from Lerwick, at roughly the mid-point of the shipping route between the Shetlands and Norway. Thinking that executing his attack from the north might give him a tactical advantage, Kolbe ordered the destroyers to proceed nearly 30 miles north of their current position, then a turn west to roughly parallel the expected course of the convoy.

 

Cruiser HMS Antrim, having suffered some severe storm damage while on convoy escort in the North Atlantic, had been in the repair yard at Grangemouth for two months having things put right. Her captain, Victor Gurner, was generally pleased with the speedy repairs made and was looking forward to getting back to sea. Only partially coaled and her magazines largely empty, Antrim was scheduled to leave the yard midmorning on the 11th, destined for Chatham where, unknown to Gurner, she would either begin a period of refit or be paid off.

 

Day 2 f

HMS Antrim.

__________

 

The overnight and early-morning hours were filled with sighting reports flowing into the Royal Navy’s stations from various sources, provided predominantly by drifters working the fishing grounds across the northern and western North Sea. Reports were intermittent and inconsistent until 0500 when a patrolling naval trawler operating fifty miles north of the Lerwick-Bergen route and 120 miles northeast of Lerwick, reported a small group of warships moving northwest at 15kts. The trawler was able to keep these ships in sight for 90 minutes, radioing approximate speed and position. Contact was lost shortly before 0700 as weather conditions deteriorated.

 

A massive low-pressure front had begun pushing over the North Sea at 0500, and by 0900 near-gale conditions were in play over the Shetlands, continuing south along the eastern English coast as far as Scarborough. The front proved fast-moving at nearly sixty miles-per-hour and was largely far out to sea by 1100.

 

At 0500, Convoy 2, sailing south to Newcastle, reached the approximate position of Convoy 1’s destruction the previous day. Nothing was observed that hinted at the earlier catastrophe, yet the watch remained vigilant with eyes focused toward the horizon and the radiomen glued to their headsets. Maintaining position within the convoy became difficult as the storm-front moved over them, but it also shielded the ships from the prying eyes of the U-boats. By 1000, the worst of the weather had passed well beyond the Firth and was racing out to sea.

 

Around this time, Kolbe’s destroyers, unaware of their detection, had turned southeast from their track north of the projected Bergen convoy route. Unbeknownst to Kolbe, Convoy 3 had just picked up its escort and began churning east-northeast toward Bergen. Kolbe made the presumption that he’d somehow missed the scheduled convoy and that it was now east of his position, when in fact it was still more than 60 miles west.

 

At 1100, HMS Antrim casts off from the yard at Grangemouth and sails out toward the Firth and open sea. An hour later, she slips past the ruins of Tantallon Castle under sullen, overcast skies, turning south for Chatham. Captain Gurner, ever-mindful of the submarine threat, doubles the watch.

 

A few minutes before Noon, Brock orders Tupper’s Force E to sea after receiving another report of unidentified ships, now just 30 miles southwest of Convoy 3. Shannon, Minotaur, and the four destroyers slip out of Lerwick and quickly raise their speed to 20kts. From the bridge of Shannon, Tupper orders Sable and Sorceress into line-ahead as the van, while Minotaur, Sturgeon, and Satyr fall into line aft.

 

Day 2 e
HMS Shannon and HMS Minotaur.

 

By 1300, nearly all of the rough weather is safely east of operations. Kolbe’s force is soon spotted by a naval trawler operating along the convoy route. Its report is radioed to Lerwick, then relayed to Force E and Convoy 3’s escort. Unbeknownst to Tupper, Force E has also been spotted and a report relayed to Kolbe, yet the exact position of the convoy remains unknown to him. He turns northwest, which not only brings him closer to the merchant ships, it also allows Force E to rapidly close on him. At 1400, wisps of smoke appear on the horizon off his starboard bow, and he directs the destroyers in that direction. At 1436, less than two hours before sunset, the merchant ships are spotted and Kolbe orders the destroyers around to attack.

 

Nearly simultaneously, LC Reginald Ransome, captain of Partridge and commander of the escorts, is alerted to the approaching enemy destroyer force. He signals LC James Cavendish in Pellew of his intention to turn into the onrushing DDs, an attempt to break up the attack, while signaling the convoy and trawlers to disperse. As the lumbering colliers slowly begin to turn away from the threat, Cavendish takes Pellew north across the bows of the lead ships, raising his speed to flank. In the distance he can see Partridge heading directly toward the German destroyers.

 

Naval battles, at least the ones on our table, tend to degenerate into great swirling masses of ships as maneuver often takes precedence over gunnery and actually coming to grips with the enemy. This thing proved no different, a sharp destroyer clash followed by a sweeping pursuit of the convoy. There were a number of head-scratching moments, but in the end, poor tactics and the dice prove decisive.

 

Moving from the operational map, we saw the convoy plodding across the table eastward as Kolbe’s destroyers entered from the northwest. The range was approximately 15000 yards as Partridge turned to make her run north. The convoy and trawlers semi-dispersed and turned south at flank speed (12kts).

 

As Partridge rapidly closed on the column of German DDs, Kolbe made the strange decision to turn south, than southwest directly toward the merchant ships. At less than 8000 yards, Partridge opens on G 101 with her forward 4-inch, missing badly. Kolbe held his fire, hoping the outnumbered Partridge would veer off, but she didn’t, and when the range had closed to just 3000 yards, Ransome cut loose his twin-mounts of 21-inch torpedoes.

 

Day 2 a
Partridge looses her fish.

 

G 101 blazed away at Partridge as she passed, scoring no hits. Kolbe saw the torpedoes go in and ordered evasive action. The first fish passed safely behind G 101, fifty yards or so ahead of G 103, but the second torpedo didn’t miss, slamming into G 103 square amidships, blowing her in half. The third destroyer in line, G 104, watched a torpedo approach, thought she’d make it past, but instead there was a massive explosion as it clipped her tail, tearing away propellers, shafts, steering gear, and fifteen feet of her stern. She spun out of line, V 100 narrowly avoiding a collision as it turned to pass the stricken destroyer from behind. Partridge's fourth torpedo had slipped past or beneath V 100 unseen, but the mortally wounded G 104, dead in the water and rapidly flooding, was quickly abandoned.

 

Within minutes two of Kolbe’s four DDs were gone and the odds were suddenly much worse (or better if you’re Royal Navy). G101 continued firing on Partridge, and at 1500 a 4.1-inch round cleaves her stern below the waterline, jamming her rudder. Partridge lurches into a tight, uncontrolled turn to port, heeling over sharply. Cavendish’s Pellew returns fire, landing a hit on G 101’s foredeck, taking out her forward 4.1-inch. V 100 pays her back in kind, sending a round into Pellew’s forward engine room, yielding temporary engineering damage that cuts her top-speed to 20kts.

 

And so begins Kolbe’s great “run to the south”. At 30kts, he can quickly outrun Partridge and Pellew in their current state, so he brings V 100 in behind and sets off for the convoy. Pellew, however, manages to quickly sort her engineering damage and is off in pursuit, aiming to keep herself between the German DDs and the merchant ships. Kolbe momentarily mistakes the trawler Lord Alverstone for another destroyer and swings further west to get around. Quickly realizing his mistake, he opens on the slow-moving trawler but misses.

 

Within a quarter-hour, Partridge has her jammed rudder sorted and sets off due south. Miles to the west, Pellew and G 101 commence a running gun-battle, the Brit keen to keep the German well clear of the colliers that have now begun a slow rotation of their own to the southeast. The Germans manage to slowly close the range, and soon G 101 shrugs off her pursuer and turns her attention to the closest trader, SS Cordova. At 1524, Kolbe puts a pair of hits on the collier, one setting a fire in a hold that begins to burn out of control.

 

Day 2 b
G 101 brackets Cordova with 4.1-inch.

 

As the sun begins to fade, V 100 takes up the fight with Pellew. Lively exchanges are traded without any apparent damage. G 101, satisfied that Cordova is doomed, turns on Maracaibo, a big Danish freighter recently converted to a bulk carrier. A 3-inch deck gun on the ship’s stern sends a few rounds in G 101’s direction, but no hits are landed. At 1536, Kolbe is alerted to smoke on the horizon some 13 miles aft.

 

The smoke proves to be Force E; in the fading light Tupper can see the melee ahead and orders Captain Vincent Molteno to take Shannon and Minotaur ahead flank. Word from the director has the distressed convoy ahead proceeding east at 11kts or 12kts. At their combined speeds, it will take Force E an hour to close the range sufficiently for his intervention. He orders the destroyers detached and sent ahead at 30kts.

 

52755652463_eaee80b0bb_o.jpg

Tactical map of the engagement created by the anal-retentive umpire.

 

At 1542, never-say-quit HMS Partridge emerges from the south side of the convoy, guns blazing. She lands a 4-inch round on G 101, wrecking her aft torpedo mount. V 100 returns fire, hitting Partridge twice, wrecking her aft torpedo mount and penetrating her hull below her aft gun mount. A hasty flooding of the magazine saves her from a catastrophic explosion, but Ransome’s DD, battered, littered with dead and wounded, runs south-southeast, ceding the fight to Pellew. Kolbe, however, has little stomach to continue; at 1554, the sun sinking over the horizon, he orders V 100 to close in behind and withdraws to the southeast.

 

__________

 

 

Some 350 miles to the south, Convoy 2 plodded on toward Newcastle. Its escort, the two old River-class destroyers Rother and Moy, are both positioned on the convoy’s port side some 800 yards off the two columns of merchant ships. From the wheel house of SS Highcliffe, Commodore Robert Woods monitors the convoy’s progress. He is blissfully unaware that his charges have been spotted by UB-21, their position radioed to Heinrich’s destroyer group approaching from southwest.

 

Day 2 g
Operational map.

 

The game controller, who weighed in earlier regarding Heinrich’s operations, now advises the German that his high-speed out-and-back and out-again maneuvering has seriously depleted the partial fuel-oil supply he left Wilhelmshaven with. If he hopes to make it back to base, he will have minimal time, perhaps less than two hours, in which to locate the convoy and execute his attack.

 

UB-21’s brief sighting report provided Heinrich little information other than a position and directional speed estimate. Presuming the convoy’s speed being somewhere between ten and fourteen knots, and with its reported position just 20 miles off the coast, the required guesswork in executing a search seemed somewhat limited. At 1406, things took an unexpected turn when the German destroyers were spotted by an RNAS Curtiss H-12 returning to East Fortune.

 

Curtiss H 12

Curtiss H-12 (courtesy of the Naval History and Heritage Command)

 

His position presumably revealed, Heinrich turned due east, believing this gave him the best, quickest chance for intercepting the convoy. At 1518, smoke was spotted both on his starboard and port bows. One was presumably the convoy, the other unknown. He chose poorly, turning northwest, raising his speed to 30kts. Within twelve minutes the source of the smoke was revealed, a lone British cruiser (HMS Antrim) travelling south at 15kts. He had little interest in tangling with the cruiser, and a reversal southward would leave little fuel or sunlight for a run at the convoy, now at least an hour south of him. A night action was certainly out of the question. Antrim provided an incentive to move away when she sent a salvo of her scarce 7.5-inch in the Germans’ direction. Heinrich, choosing discretion over valor, turned south in a wide arc, hoping for a glimpse of the convoy, but none came.

 

The remainder of the day was uneventful. Force F had left Scapa Flow mid-morning, executing a sweep of the North Sea that would take it to a point 60 miles west of Vigrestad on the Norwegian coast. Following a more southerly arc on its return, it was due back in Scapa by Noon on 13 December.

 

Heinrich and Kolbe would sail through the night to rendezvous with Emden early the next morning. Heinrich could report good success, having nearly wiped out an entire convoy. Kolbe, not so much, sinking just a single freighter (SS Cordova) while losing two of his four destroyers.

 

Overnight, Room 40 received a largely incomplete report of German ships passing down the Jade toward open sea. Until better information was available, no action is taken.  


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#238 healey36

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Posted 22 March 2023 - 01:48 PM

Zeppelin L 42, as seen on an overcast 12 December 1917 from Castle-class naval trawler William Beeton:

 

52764829069_b5454dde18_o.jpg

 

iPhone shot from the rolling deck of a trawler  ;)


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#239 Kenny Noe

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Posted 22 March 2023 - 05:20 PM

very cool....



#240 simanton

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Posted 25 March 2023 - 10:27 PM

 

North Sea - December 1917 AAR

 

11 December 1917 (Day 2)

 

The naval dispatches were fairly flying throughout the night of 10-11 December following the near wholesale slaughter of Convoy 1 off the northeast Scottish coast that afternoon. Beatty, feeling the collective heat from First Lord Geddes, in turn vented his frustration to Admiral Frederic Brock, Admiral Commanding, Orkneys and Shetlands. So soon after the incident, neither Beatty or anyone on his staff acknowledged that at the time of the attack, the convoy had passed beyond Brock’s immediate operating area.

 

 
The controller's map at Midnight, 11 December 1917.

 

It’s interesting to note the level of turmoil and personal angst at the upper reaches of the Royal Navy in the autumn of 1917. There was, of course, a huge vacuum of leadership between Beatty, Commander of the Fleet, and First Lord of the Admiralty Geddes, primarily in the form of First Sea Lord Jellicoe, a man who had adopted a largely defeatist mentality when it came to the war against the U-boats. He had remained skeptical of the effectiveness of the convoy system and, for nearly a year, responded to the many calls for action by saying there was little that, in his opinion, could be done to mitigate the submarine threat. The effect of this was a near total loss of confidence in him by Geddes, PM Lloyd George, and even CIGS Robertson, ultimately resulting in his sacking on Christmas Eve, 1917.

 

Brock had called for the Scandinavian convoys to be reorganized into larger, less-frequent sailings with larger escort assignments, something that flew in the face of Beatty’s inability to provide more destroyers. This, combined with his gruff, antagonistic demeanor, won him few friends or allies in his efforts to garner additional resources, and he was largely left to make do with what little he was provided.

 

Beatty, however, was no idiot. Jellicoe might have a firm grip on the lightning rod, but Beatty knew he was standing close by. He had no destroyers to spare, but was keenly aware more needed to be done to curb the carnage in the North Sea. In the early hours of the 11th, he advised Brock that he was making the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, and the 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron available to provide limited cover/support for Brock’s convoy operations.

 

To that end, Captain Louis Woolcombe (Acting Commander of 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron) was to execute a sweep across the North Sea on a line some 100 miles south of the convoy route. Three light cruisers (Chatham, Yarmouth, and Birkenhead) and three destroyers (Pelican, Paladin, and Nereus) would comprise Woolcombe’s Force F. Barring any encounters with the HSF, it was a 60-hour out-and-back; a message was sent to Brock reporting that Force F could depart Scapa in a matter of a few hours.

 

Rear-Admiral Reginald Tupper had only just arrived three days earlier to take command of 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Lerwick. Tupper, having come over from 10th Cruiser Squadron, had dreamt of landing the plum assignment of 4th Battle Squadron. Instead, he’d been passed over for Browning and was transferred to Lerwick. He arrived to find his command consisted of two Minotaur-class armored cruisers and three armed merchant cruisers, one of which, HMS Alsatian, had inexplicably been designated by his predecessor as the squadron’s flag. Tupper wasted no time transferring his flag to HMS Shannon, and when word came down to prepare, he advised Brock that Shannon and Minotaur could put to sea within hours. The two cruisers, together with destroyers Sable, Sorceress, Sturgeon, and Satyr were designated Force E and ordered to sweep the sea lane ahead of Convoy 3. A minor problem with a pair of Minotaur’s Yarrow boilers delayed their departure, however, and Force E would in fact sail three hours after the convoy.

 

Rear-Admiral Arthur Leveson received word that his 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron was to raise steam and stand by to support Brock’s operations as required. The directive Leveson received seemed to leave much of the operation’s execution to his discretion, and in view of his concurrent charge as Rear-Admiral Commanding the Australian Fleet, Leveson elected to only partially activate the squadron, sending Inflexible and Indomitable while leaving Australia and New Zealand at Scapa. Force W would be comprised of the Grand Fleet’s two oldest battlecruisers, with destroyers Mansfield, Menace, and Mischief to serve as the van.

 

Convoy 3 was set for its Lerwick-to-Bergen run at first light on the 11th. Four colliers and a pair of bulk-carriers (Bollsta, Kong Magnus, Bothnia, Torleif, Maracaibo, and Cordova) were scheduled to pass out of the harbor at 0830. Due to the propensity for U-boat mining operations outside the harbor, they were led by a pair of minesweepers for the first fifteen miles; there they met their escort and were reconfigured into two columns of three ships. Destroyers Partridge and Pellew took up positions on the starboard and port bows respectively, while RN trawlers Livingstone, Commander Fullerton, Lord Alverstone, and Tokio took up positions beside and behind. Plodding along at 11kts, the convoy was scheduled to reach Bergen by midmorning the next day.

 

52755653858_003fbbc781_o.jpg

Convoy 3 as it departs Lerwick.

 

With radio-silence maintained by Heinrich and his destroyers, the Germans’ success the day before was unknown to Scheer and Hipper. By 0100 on the 11th, Heinrich’s half-flotilla was nearly 160 miles out, due east of the Firth of Forth, planning their next move. If undetected and unchallenged, Heinrich decided he would venture back into the shipping lanes somewhere along the Northumberland coast north of Newcastle.

 

Kolbe had the intelligence report in-hand indicating that a convoy was scheduled to depart Lerwick that morning. Speed could be estimated, but the exact time of sailing was unknown. His position at Midnight was approximately 150 miles out from Lerwick, at roughly the mid-point of the shipping route between the Shetlands and Norway. Thinking that executing his attack from the north might give him a tactical advantage, Kolbe ordered the destroyers to proceed nearly 30 miles north of their current position, then a turn west to roughly parallel the expected course of the convoy.

 

Cruiser HMS Antrim, having suffered some severe storm damage while on convoy escort in the North Atlantic, had been in the repair yard at Grangemouth for two months having things put right. Her captain, Victor Gurner, was generally pleased with the speedy repairs made and was looking forward to getting back to sea. Only partially coaled and her magazines largely empty, Antrim was scheduled to leave the yard midmorning on the 11th, destined for Chatham where, unknown to Gurner, she would either begin a period of refit or be paid off.

 

 

HMS Antrim.

__________

 

The overnight and early-morning hours were filled with sighting reports flowing into the Royal Navy’s stations from various sources, provided predominantly by drifters working the fishing grounds across the northern and western North Sea. Reports were intermittent and inconsistent until 0500 when a patrolling naval trawler operating fifty miles north of the Lerwick-Bergen route and 120 miles northeast of Lerwick, reported a small group of warships moving northwest at 15kts. The trawler was able to keep these ships in sight for 90 minutes, radioing approximate speed and position. Contact was lost shortly before 0700 as weather conditions deteriorated.

 

A massive low-pressure front had begun pushing over the North Sea at 0500, and by 0900 near-gale conditions were in play over the Shetlands, continuing south along the eastern English coast as far as Scarborough. The front proved fast-moving at nearly sixty miles-per-hour and was largely far out to sea by 1100.

 

At 0500, Convoy 2, sailing south to Newcastle, reached the approximate position of Convoy 1’s destruction the previous day. Nothing was observed that hinted at the earlier catastrophe, yet the watch remained vigilant with eyes focused toward the horizon and the radiomen glued to their headsets. Maintaining position within the convoy became difficult as the storm-front moved over them, but it also shielded the ships from the prying eyes of the U-boats. By 1000, the worst of the weather had passed well beyond the Firth and was racing out to sea.

 

Around this time, Kolbe’s destroyers, unaware of their detection, had turned southeast from their track north of the projected Bergen convoy route. Unbeknownst to Kolbe, Convoy 3 had just picked up its escort and began churning east-northeast toward Bergen. Kolbe made the presumption that he’d somehow missed the scheduled convoy and that it was now east of his position, when in fact it was still more than 60 miles west.

 

At 1100, HMS Antrim casts off from the yard at Grangemouth and sails out toward the Firth and open sea. An hour later, she slips past the ruins of Tantallon Castle under sullen, overcast skies, turning south for Chatham. Captain Gurner, ever-mindful of the submarine threat, doubles the watch.

 

A few minutes before Noon, Brock orders Tupper’s Force E to sea after receiving another report of unidentified ships, now just 30 miles southwest of Convoy 3. Shannon, Minotaur, and the four destroyers slip out of Lerwick and quickly raise their speed to 20kts. From the bridge of Shannon, Tupper orders Sable and Sorceress into line-ahead as the van, while Minotaur, Sturgeon, and Satyr fall into line aft.

 

 
HMS Shannon and HMS Minotaur.

 

By 1300, nearly all of the rough weather is safely east of operations. Kolbe’s force is soon spotted by a naval trawler operating along the convoy route. Its report is radioed to Lerwick, then relayed to Force E and Convoy 3’s escort. Unbeknownst to Tupper, Force E has also been spotted and a report relayed to Kolbe, yet the exact position of the convoy remains unknown to him. He turns northwest, which not only brings him closer to the merchant ships, it also allows Force E to rapidly close on him. At 1400, wisps of smoke appear on the horizon off his starboard bow, and he directs the destroyers in that direction. At 1436, less than two hours before sunset, the merchant ships are spotted and Kolbe orders the destroyers around to attack.

 

Nearly simultaneously, LC Reginald Ransome, captain of Partridge and commander of the escorts, is alerted to the approaching enemy destroyer force. He signals LC James Cavendish in Pellew of his intention to turn into the onrushing DDs, an attempt to break up the attack, while signaling the convoy and trawlers to disperse. As the lumbering colliers slowly begin to turn away from the threat, Cavendish takes Pellew north across the bows of the lead ships, raising his speed to flank. In the distance he can see Partridge heading directly toward the German destroyers.

 

Naval battles, at least the ones on our table, tend to degenerate into great swirling masses of ships as maneuver often takes precedence over gunnery and actually coming to grips with the enemy. This thing proved no different, a sharp destroyer clash followed by a sweeping pursuit of the convoy. There were a number of head-scratching moments, but in the end, poor tactics and the dice prove decisive.

 

Moving from the operational map, we saw the convoy plodding across the table eastward as Kolbe’s destroyers entered from the northwest. The range was approximately 15000 yards as Partridge turned to make her run north. The convoy and trawlers semi-dispersed and turned south at flank speed (12kts).

 

As Partridge rapidly closed on the column of German DDs, Kolbe made the strange decision to turn south, than southwest directly toward the merchant ships. At less than 8000 yards, Partridge opens on G 101 with her forward 4-inch, missing badly. Kolbe held his fire, hoping the outnumbered Partridge would veer off, but she didn’t, and when the range had closed to just 3000 yards, Ransome cut loose his twin-mounts of 21-inch torpedoes.

 

 
Partridge looses her fish.

 

G 101 blazed away at Partridge as she passed, scoring no hits. Kolbe saw the torpedoes go in and ordered evasive action. The first fish passed safely behind G 101, fifty yards or so ahead of G 103, but the second torpedo didn’t miss, slamming into G 103 square amidships, blowing her in half. The third destroyer in line, G 104, watched a torpedo approach, thought she’d make it past, but instead there was a massive explosion as it clipped her tail, tearing away propellers, shafts, steering gear, and fifteen feet of her stern. She spun out of line, V 100 narrowly avoiding a collision as it turned to pass the stricken destroyer from behind. Partridge's fourth torpedo had slipped past or beneath V 100 unseen, but the mortally wounded G 104, dead in the water and rapidly flooding, was quickly abandoned.

 

Within minutes two of Kolbe’s four DDs were gone and the odds were suddenly much worse (or better if you’re Royal Navy). G101 continued firing on Partridge, and at 1500 a 4.1-inch round cleaves her stern below the waterline, jamming her rudder. Partridge lurches into a tight, uncontrolled turn to port, heeling over sharply. Cavendish’s Pellew returns fire, landing a hit on G 101’s foredeck, taking out her forward 4.1-inch. V 100 pays her back in kind, sending a round into Pellew’s forward engine room, yielding temporary engineering damage that cuts her top-speed to 20kts.

 

And so begins Kolbe’s great “run to the south”. At 30kts, he can quickly outrun Partridge and Pellew in their current state, so he brings V 100 in behind and sets off for the convoy. Pellew, however, manages to quickly sort her engineering damage and is off in pursuit, aiming to keep herself between the German DDs and the merchant ships. Kolbe momentarily mistakes the trawler Lord Alverstone for another destroyer and swings further west to get around. Quickly realizing his mistake, he opens on the slow-moving trawler but misses.

 

Within a quarter-hour, Partridge has her jammed rudder sorted and sets off due south. Miles to the west, Pellew and G 101 commence a running gun-battle, the Brit keen to keep the German well clear of the colliers that have now begun a slow rotation of their own to the southeast. The Germans manage to slowly close the range, and soon G 101 shrugs off her pursuer and turns her attention to the closest trader, SS Cordova. At 1524, Kolbe puts a pair of hits on the collier, one setting a fire in a hold that begins to burn out of control.

 

 
G 101 brackets Cordova with 4.1-inch.

 

As the sun begins to fade, V 100 takes up the fight with Pellew. Lively exchanges are traded without any apparent damage. G 101, satisfied that Cordova is doomed, turns on Maracaibo, a big Danish freighter recently converted to a bulk carrier. A 3-inch deck gun on the ship’s stern sends a few rounds in G 101’s direction, but no hits are landed. At 1536, Kolbe is alerted to smoke on the horizon some 13 miles aft.

 

The smoke proves to be Force E; in the fading light Tupper can see the melee ahead and orders Captain Vincent Molteno to take Shannon and Minotaur ahead flank. Word from the director has the distressed convoy ahead proceeding east at 11kts or 12kts. At their combined speeds, it will take Force E an hour to close the range sufficiently for his intervention. He orders the destroyers detached and sent ahead at 30kts.

 

52755652463_eaee80b0bb_o.jpg

Tactical map of the engagement created by the anal-retentive umpire.

 

At 1542, never-say-quit HMS Partridge emerges from the south side of the convoy, guns blazing. She lands a 4-inch round on G 101, wrecking her aft torpedo mount. V 100 returns fire, hitting Partridge twice, wrecking her aft torpedo mount and penetrating her hull below her aft gun mount. A hasty flooding of the magazine saves her from a catastrophic explosion, but Ransome’s DD, battered, littered with dead and wounded, runs south-southeast, ceding the fight to Pellew. Kolbe, however, has little stomach to continue; at 1554, the sun sinking over the horizon, he orders V 100 to close in behind and withdraws to the southeast.

 

__________

 

 

Some 350 miles to the south, Convoy 2 plodded on toward Newcastle. Its escort, the two old River-class destroyers Rother and Moy, are both positioned on the convoy’s port side some 800 yards off the two columns of merchant ships. From the wheel house of SS Highcliffe, Commodore Robert Woods monitors the convoy’s progress. He is blissfully unaware that his charges have been spotted by UB-21, their position radioed to Heinrich’s destroyer group approaching from southwest.

 

 
Operational map.

 

The game controller, who weighed in earlier regarding Heinrich’s operations, now advises the German that his high-speed out-and-back and out-again maneuvering has seriously depleted the partial fuel-oil supply he left Wilhelmshaven with. If he hopes to make it back to base, he will have minimal time, perhaps less than two hours, in which to locate the convoy and execute his attack.

 

UB-21’s brief sighting report provided Heinrich little information other than a position and directional speed estimate. Presuming the convoy’s speed being somewhere between ten and fourteen knots, and with its reported position just 20 miles off the coast, the required guesswork in executing a search seemed somewhat limited. At 1406, things took an unexpected turn when the German destroyers were spotted by an RNAS Curtiss H-12 returning to East Fortune.

 

 

Curtiss H-12 (courtesy of the Naval History and Heritage Command)

 

His position presumably revealed, Heinrich turned due east, believing this gave him the best, quickest chance for intercepting the convoy. At 1518, smoke was spotted both on his starboard and port bows. One was presumably the convoy, the other unknown. He chose poorly, turning northwest, raising his speed to 30kts. Within twelve minutes the source of the smoke was revealed, a lone British cruiser (HMS Antrim) travelling south at 15kts. He had little interest in tangling with the cruiser, and a reversal southward would leave little fuel or sunlight for a run at the convoy, now at least an hour south of him. A night action was certainly out of the question. Antrim provided an incentive to move away when she sent a salvo of her scarce 7.5-inch in the Germans’ direction. Heinrich, choosing discretion over valor, turned south in a wide arc, hoping for a glimpse of the convoy, but none came.

 

The remainder of the day was uneventful. Force F had left Scapa Flow mid-morning, executing a sweep of the North Sea that would take it to a point 60 miles west of Vigrestad on the Norwegian coast. Following a more southerly arc on its return, it was due back in Scapa by Noon on 13 December.

 

Heinrich and Kolbe would sail through the night to rendezvous with Emden early the next morning. Heinrich could report good success, having nearly wiped out an entire convoy. Kolbe, not so much, sinking just a single freighter (SS Cordova) while losing two of his four destroyers.

 

Overnight, Room 40 received a largely incomplete report of German ships passing down the Jade toward open sea. Until better information was available, no action is taken.  

 

Nicely realistic!







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